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Introduction
The Recent Upheaval in 
EU Energy Policy
John S. Duffield and Vicki L. Birchfield
Although two of the three original treaties on which the European 
Union (EU) is based explicitly concerned sources of energy, the EU 
and its predecessor institutions have exercised relatively little com-
petence in the area of energy policy over the years. During the past 
decade, however, the EU has arguably made unprecedented strides 
toward the creation of a common energy policy, as exemplified by 
the European Council’s adoption of an ambitious and relatively com-
prehensive energy action plan based on the European Commission’s 
(hereafter: the Commission) communication “An Energy Policy for 
Europe” in 2007 and the subsequent approval by the Council and the 
European Parliament of a number of concrete measures to implement 
the plan. In late 2009, energy policy per se became a formal compe-
tence of the EU with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
This book takes stock of these important recent developments. In 
particular, it addresses the following questions:
How much progress has actually been made toward the estab-• 
lishment of a common EU energy policy?
What conditions and events explain this recent progress?• 
What remains to be done before the EU can be said to have a • 
truly common energy policy?
What obstacles stand in the way of and what are the prospects • 
for creating such a policy?
This introductory chapter sets the stage for our analysis by first 
describing the evolution and limitations of EU energy policy from its 
origins in the first European communities. It then provides a more 
detailed overview of the recent developments in EU energy policy 
that serve as the impetus for this volume. A third, brief part summa-
rizes the limited existing literature on the subject and the approach 
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employed here. A final part lays out the organization of the volume 
and of the individual chapters.
Historical Background: The 
Long- Standing Absence of a Common 
EU Energy Policy
In the beginning, energy policy was at the heart of the institutions out 
of which the EU eventually evolved. Indeed, it could be said that the 
EU began with a common energy policy. With the passage of time, 
however, these initial institutional arrangements became less and less 
relevant to the energy needs and concerns of the member states, and 
for many years they were never replaced or supplemented by more rel-
evant arrangements. This marginalization of energy policy stands in 
stark contrast to—and is especially puzzling in light of—the consid-
erable progress that was made toward European integration in other 
policy areas, especially the closely related common market. Until and 
through much of the 1990s, energy policy remained largely an orphan 
of the integration process.
The European Union traces its origins to the establishment in 1952 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). At the time 
the Schuman Plan was proposed in 1950, coal accounted for more 
than 80 percent of the energy consumed in what became the original 
six member states, with oil a distant second at 10 percent, and most 
observers expected that coal would remain the most important fuel 
well into the future. With its entry into force, the treaty establishing 
the ECSC created a common market in coal (as well as steel) almost 
overnight. With just a few exceptions, it required the immediate 
elimination of all restrictions on trade, including import and export 
duties, quantitative restrictions (quotas), discriminatory prices and 
transportation rates, and state subsidies. To facilitate the achievement 
of the common market, the treaty also endowed the High Authority 
of the community with unprecedented supranational powers. The 
High Authority could break up cartels, impose fines, guarantee loans, 
influence investments, and, in certain circumstances, fix prices, limit 
output, and allocate supplies (Diebold 1959).
In 1958, the ECSC was complemented in the energy field by the 
creation of European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). At the 
time, the atom was expected to become a major additional source of 
energy, especially after the Suez crisis cast doubt on the reliability of 
01_Birchfield_Intro.indd   2 4/12/2011   5:22:48 PM
Introduction 3
Middle East oil supplies. Thus Euratom was intended to promote the 
growth of the nascent nuclear industry. Nevertheless, within its area 
of application, the powers of Euratom were much more modest than 
those of the ECSC, being largely limited to the financing of some 
common research programs and a common supply policy carried out 
by a Nuclear Supply Agency based on the principle of equal access. 
For the most part, the member states were otherwise left free to pro-
mote national nuclear industries as they saw fit (Black 1977; El- Agraa 
and Hu 1984).
At about this time the ECSC began to be less relevant to the energy 
needs and concerns of its members. The institutional limitations of 
the ECSC were starkly on display during the coal crisis of 1958/1959, 
when the recommendations of the High Authority for addressing an 
acute excess of supply were blocked by the member states. More fun-
damentally, the ECSC was increasingly marginalized by the rapidly 
rising use of oil. In 1960, coal’s share of energy consumption among 
the six member states had declined to 60 percent while that of oil had 
risen to more than one- quarter. By the middle of the decade, oil had 
surpassed coal as the most important fuel supply. And by 1970, the 
shares of a decade earlier had been almost exactly reversed, with oil 
accounting for 60 percent of primary energy consumption and coal 
for just 25 percent, with natural gas rapidly catching up.
Yet the institutional powers of the evolving European communities 
were never updated to reflect this tectonic shift in the energy mix. In 
particular, the community institutions were never given any explicit 
jurisdiction over oil and, later, natural gas, not to mention any general 
competence in the area of energy policy.
This lacuna was not the result of a lack of interest in the matter 
or a lack of trying. Every decade from the mid- 1950s and to the mid-
 1990s saw at least one effort to establish a general European energy 
policy, but none of these came to fruition. The issue of bringing about 
integration of the conventional energy sector was raised at the 1955 
Messina conference, which was intended to revive the integration 
process after the failure of the European Defense Community the pre-
vious year, but it was quickly dropped in favor of a narrow focus on 
atomic energy (Diebold 1959, 646). In the early 1960s, the member 
states tasked an Inter- Executive Working Party on Energy with defin-
ing a community energy policy, but the resulting memorandum on the 
subject was not translated into explicit policy (Black 1977, 181). Then 
in 1968, the recently merged Commission, on its own initiative, pre-
sented its “First Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy,” which 
laid out the case for such a policy and offered a number of concrete 
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measures for creating a common market in the energy sector, but the 
Council of Ministers could agree on only a set of general principles 
(Black 1977, 182–83; CEC 1968). Thus, according to one assessment, 
“by the mid- 1970s, efforts to establish a comprehensive energy policy 
[had] resulted only in agreement in principle on what the parameters 
ought to be, without any agreement so far on a set of substantive 
policy instruments “(Black 1977, 165).
This lack of authority greatly limited the ability of the Community 
to deal collectively with common energy problems, especially those 
posed by the oil shocks of the 1970s. Prior to the first oil shock, 
the community had adopted the requirement that members maintain 
at least 65, and later 90, days of oil stocks. The European response 
to the 1973 Arab oil embargo and production cutbacks, however, 
played itself out largely within the framework proposed by the United 
States (US), and all the community members but France would subse-
quently rely primarily on the IEA’s emergency oil sharing mechanism. 
And although, following the first oil shock, the community adopted 
ambitious long- term goals for energy production, consumption, and 
imports, it was never able to agree on concrete measures for achieving 
them.
Similarly, the following two decades saw several proposals for but 
no concrete actions toward the establishment of a common energy 
policy. In the early 1980s, the Commission drew up several commu-
nications that indicated the need for more joint action in the field 
of energy (CEC 1983). During the negotiations over the Treaty on 
European Union in the early 1990s, the inclusion of a new chap-
ter on energy was proposed but not acted upon. Also in 1995, the 
Commission prepared a White Paper on energy policy that contained 
a number of detailed guidelines. Once again, the initiative languished 
in the face of indifference by or opposition from member states.
Instead, as new challenges and opportunities arose in the energy 
field, the Community actors were forced to take a piecemeal approach, 
making use as best they could of the powers they did possess in related 
areas, especially for market liberalization but also increasingly in the 
environmental realm. Employing these imperfect tools, the EU was 
able to make some noteworthy progress, especially with regard to the 
creation of a single internal energy market. Following the adoption 
of the Single European Act (SEA), the Commission presented a first 
set of draft directives and regulations meant to apply the principles 
contained in the SEA to the energy market, although it took a decade 
for the Commission’s efforts to culminate in the adoption of direc-
tives to open up first national electricity and then gas markets. In 
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addition, some progress was made in the environmental arena, with 
a 1990 agreement to stabilize CO2 emission, a program to promote 
energy efficiency, and a 1997 White Paper for promoting renewable 
energy sources. But the principal proposal to reduce the environmen-
tal impact of energy use, a carbon/energy tax, was dropped in the face 
of strong opposition by member states.
Recent Developments: Upheaval in 
the 2000s
The EU’s relative neglect of energy policy underwent a profound 
change in the first decade of the twenty- first century. Those years saw 
a veritable explosion of proposals, directives, and regulations that 
touched upon almost every aspect of energy policy. The decade con-
cluded in 2009 with the adoption of an energy chapter in the Lisbon 
Treaty, which brought energy policy for the first time fully within the 
competence of the Community organs.
The first part of the decade saw continuing efforts to create a single 
energy market. The high point of these efforts was the adoption of a 
second package of directives calling for full opening of the gas and 
electricity markets for all customers in 2007 and legal unbundling of 
supply and transmission functions. On the environmental side, dur-
ing these years, the EU also adopted directives to promote electric-
ity generation from renewable sources, biofuels, and greater energy 
efficiency in buildings, and to establish a path- breaking emissions 
trading system intended to reduce greenhouse gases. With regard to 
the external dimensions of energy policy, the EU initiated an energy 
dialogue with Russia and negotiated a treaty extending the internal 
energy market to southeastern Europe.
In the middle of the decade, these somewhat scattershot efforts 
were replaced by a more integrated approach to energy policy. In 
2006, at the invitation of the national leaders, the Commission pre-
pared a Green Paper that laid out a comprehensive general strategy 
for obtaining “sustainable, competitive, and secure energy” (CEC 
2006). The following year, the Commission presented a more detailed 
energy policy action plan that was adopted by the heads of govern-
ment that March (CEC 2007; Council 2007). This plan established 
three ambitious goals: to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to increase 
the share of renewable energy in EU’s overall energy mix, and to 
reduce overall energy use in the EU all by 20 percent by 2020. Then 
based on the action plan, the Commission developed an “energy and 
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climate package” of specific measures designed to achieve those goals 
which was presented in 2008. These initiatives on the part of the 
Commission were largely matched by the efforts of the Council and 
the Parliament, which adopted numerous implementing directives 
and decisions between 2006 and 2009. Those years saw, among other 
things, a revision of the ETS and a third package of energy market 
liberalization measures, as well as other concrete policies to promote 
renewables, energy efficiency, the construction of energy infrastruc-
ture, reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, and the security of 
energy supplies. While much remained to be done, this flurry of activ-
ity was capped by the ratification and entry into force in late 2009 
of the Lisbon Treaty, which for the first time brought energy policy 
explicitly into the remit of the EU. Although energy policy remained 
a shared competence between the EU and its member states, no longer 
could initiatives by the Commission be questioned as lacking a legal 
basis.
The Scholarly Study of EU Energy 
Policy
Given the renewed significance of energy to the economic well- being 
of industrialized and industrializing countries as well as its increasing 
importance to the environmental fate of the planet, it is vital to take 
stock of these developments and to explore their implications. How 
much progress has in fact been made toward the establishment of a 
common EU energy policy? What factors account for this recent prog-
ress? And what are prospects for further movement toward a truly 
common EU policy in this area?
Despite the importance of the subject, surprisingly little has been 
written on EU energy policy, perhaps reflecting the limited for-
mal competence that EU institutions enjoyed in this area until very 
recently. To be sure, the 1950s and 1960s saw a number of studies of 
the ECSC and Euratom. But the only comprehensive single volume in 
English on the subject since then, Manne Haaland Matlary’s Energy 
Policy in the European Union (1997), appeared more than a decade 
ago and thus does not address the important developments of the 
2000s at all. David Buchan’s recently published Energy and Climate 
Change: Europe at the Cross Roads (2009) represents a welcome cor-
rective to this general neglect of the topic, but it still suffers from some 
limitations. Primarily a journalistic account, it is not grounded in the 
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broader literature on European integration and contains few citations 
to other scholarly works on various aspects of EU energy policy.
In addition, we contend the subject consists of too many often 
highly technical topics for any single individual to cover it with 
authority. Hence the approach employed here: to bring together in a 
single volume a number of scholars with in- depth expertise in each of 
the main policy areas as well as the energy policies of the leading EU 
member states. In this way, we are able to offer a thorough scholarly 
analysis of how much, or how little, progress the EU has made toward 
the construction of a common energy policy in the past decade and 
what obstacles remain to be overcome. In seeking to offer the most 
comprehensive empirical analysis to date of this most complex of 
subjects and to answer as fully as possible our set of guiding ques-
tions, we deliberately avoided imposing a common theoretical frame-
work across the various chapters, nor did we attempt to test different 
explanatory or analytical models of EU integration or policy- making. 
Instead, our approach is empirically grounded, policy analytic in 
nature, and comprehensive in scope as we examine both the internal 
and external dimensions of the EU’s emerging energy policy as well as 
the supranational and intergovernmental processes that are shaping 
its development.
Organization of the Book
The core of the book consists of 11 chapters divided into three parts. 
The first part examines recent developments in six key policy areas: 
market liberalization, external energy policy, EU energy relations 
with Russia, emissions trading, renewable energy, and energy effi-
ciency. Each chapter in this part addresses to varying degrees the fol-
lowing questions:
What actions have been proposed and what actions have been • 
taken by the EU and member states?
How much progress has the EU actually made in this issue area? • 
What are the limitations of what the EU has done? How far is the 
EU from having a common policy in this area?
Why were these particular policies proposed? What obstacles • 
has the EU faced in making progress? What considerations have 
motivated EU bodies and member states in both furthering and 
impeding the creation of a common policy in this area?
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What are the prospects for further progress in this area? What • 
obstacles remain?
The second part contains national perspectives on recent develop-
ments in EU energy policy. It focuses on the three states that have 
traditionally been most important in the promotion or hindrance of 
the development of common EU policies: France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom (UK). Each of these chapters addresses the following 
questions:
What has been the country’s general attitude toward a common • 
EU energy policy?
What energy issues has the country sought to address through • 
the EU, and how has it sought to do so? What energy policy ini-
tiatives has it resisted and why?
What have been the underlying determinants of the country’s • 
policy toward a common EU energy policy?
What are the implications of the country’s domestic politics for • 
the development of a common EU energy policy?
The third part of the book evaluates recent developments in EU 
energy policy in terms of how the inherent crosscutting nature of the 
policy arena itself contributes to or impedes the achievement of the 
traditional functional goals of energy policy: security of supply, envi-
ronmental sustainability, and economic competitiveness. One chapter 
focuses exclusively on the EU’s climate change policy examining both 
the internal and external aspects of EU policy- making in this area 
and the challenge of balancing domestic competitiveness and global 
leadership in environmental sustainability. Another chapter offers an 
analysis of the policy- making process at the EU level with a goal of 
teasing out how each of the core EU institutions has contributed to 
energy policy formation and its relative coherence (or lack thereof), 
given the varying degrees of competence and authority, dimensions 
of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism as well as competing 
institutional interests and policy preferences. These two chapters also 
address the following broad questions:
What particular challenges does the EU face?• 
To what degree do the policies adopted so far address those • 
challenges?
What more needs to be done to advance EU interests?• 
What further policy developments are feasible or realistic?• 
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A concluding chapter, coauthored by the editors, provides an over-
all assessment of the progress that has been made toward and the 
future prospects for the development of a common EU energy policy. 
Drawing on the insights of the individual chapters, it considers both 
the internal and external dimensions of this strategic policy area. Our 
focus is on the tensions and the complementarities between national 
policies and the efforts of the EU to produce a coherent energy policy 
as well as to assert itself as a global leader in addressing the problem 
of climate change. As such, we hope this volume will serve to advance 
both the scholarly literature and inform ongoing policy debates.
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Chapter One
EU Internal Energy Market Policy: 
Achievements and Hurdles
Per Ove Eikeland
It is now more than 20 years since the European Commission (here-
after: the Commission) issued its first Green Paper on the internal 
energy market in Europe in 1988 (CEC 1988). The major idea was 
that free and fair competition between energy companies across the 
European Community would lead to large efficiency gains, lower and 
more similar prices for consumers across the community, increased 
competitiveness for energy- using industries, economic growth, and 
increased welfare. An important part of the proposal was a “common 
carrier” system for gas and electricity, which meant that European 
electricity and gas infrastructure should be operated and further 
developed by agents that were independent from the production- and 
supply- interests (Eikeland 2004; Lyons 1992). Such independence 
would allow consumers to purchase energy from any supplier in the 
internal energy market, regardless of who owned the grid. The vision-
ary concept emerging was nondiscriminatory third- party access to 
the grid.
Internal market policy has since gone through distinct stages end-
ing with revision of legislation aimed at bringing speed to market 
opening. These are now called the first, second, and third internal 
energy policy packages, denoting clusters of directives and regula-
tions targeting different aspects of liberalization of the electricity and 
gas markets. The first package took several years to negotiate and 
ended up with the 1996 Electricity and 1998 Gas Directives as major 
outputs. The second package was enacted in 2003 and contained 
revised Electricity- and Gas Directives as well as specific regulations 
to harmonize trade and operation of infrastructure across national 
borders. The third package was finally enacted in July 2009, contain-
ing further revisions of the Gas and Electricity Directives, the cross-
 border regulations as well as an additional regulation establishing 
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an independent agency for boosting cooperation between national 
energy regulators.
Gas and electricity supply in Europe were historically organized 
as separate businesses. Most European Union (EU) countries evolved 
with self- sufficiency in electricity supply. In natural gas supply, how-
ever, only a few countries, notably the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
Netherlands, had sufficient resources to cover their own demand. Most 
countries became dependent on imports from the main surrounding 
gas producers Russia, Norway, and Algeria. Until the deregulations 
of the 1990s, gas and electricity supply were organized in entities 
enjoying exclusive rights to supply all customers within a specifically 
defined area. Wholesale supply was in most countries operated by 
public utilities. These figured as dominating national electricity pro-
ducers and gas importers, with monopoly control also over national 
transmission lines or the major gas pipelines. Private ownerships were 
allowed in some countries but still kept under governmental control 
in exchange of exclusive monopoly rights. Lower levels of supply 
(electricity and gas distribution) enjoyed similar monopoly rights, but 
here, the evolving ownership structure differed significantly across 
the countries.
The UK had chosen a model of two major public utilities responsible 
for all generation, transmission, and distribution within the electric-
ity and gas sector, respectively. A similar structure evolved in France. 
The German electricity and gas sectors evolved with mixed owner-
ship—several major private generators and wholesale suppliers, and 
a great many distribution companies owned mainly by the regional 
and municipal governments. The Scandinavian countries (Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark) evolved with major state- owned electricity 
generators and wholesale suppliers, but with considerable parts of the 
business owned by lower governments or private shareholders.
Irrespective of ownership, the structures evolving entailed strong 
vertical linkages in the electricity and gas supply chains, in the form 
of vertically integrated companies or vertical chains established 
through long- term supply contracts between foreign producers and 
gas utilities with exclusive rights to import. An important part of 
EU’s efforts at establishing an internal energy market was to restruc-
ture energy supply—abolishing de jure and de facto monopoly rights. 
Since electricity and gas grid operations would still have a natural 
monopoly character, separating these from the commercial businesses 
(electricity and gas sales) became paramount to avoid anticompetitive 
practices of cross- subsidization and grid access discrimination. The 
Commission admits that these efforts have partly failed and that the 
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European electricity and gas markets are still characterized by struc-
tures that hinder free and fair competition. Its January 2007 final 
report from the energy inquiry instigated in 2005 identified serious 
shortcomings in the electricity and gas markets, including inadequate 
levels of unbundling between network and supply interests and too 
much market concentration in most national markets (CEC 2007a).
Instead of a common internal market, the EU has developed into 
regional and local markets characterized by different market struc-
tures and competitive conditions. Some member countries, notably 
the UK, made a full transformation of the electricity and gas indus-
tries—abolishing legal monopoly rights and splitting up and privatiz-
ing the gas and electricity industries to reduce market concentration. 
Full ownership unbundling was mandated for electricity and gas 
transmission companies. Similar ownership unbundling was carried 
out swiftly in Scandinavia. Other countries, notably Germany and 
France, lagged behind and did not implement ownership unbundling, 
a strategy shared by many of the Eastern European countries that got 
access to the EU in 2004 and later. In 2007, the Commission con-
cluded that wholesale electricity market concentration was very high 
in seven member countries (including France), high in nine countries 
(Germany included), and moderate in seven countries (including the 
UK and Spain), (CEC 2007a, 12). The situation in the wholesale gas 
market was no less worrying. Here, ten countries appeared with very 
high concentration (France included) and five with high concentration 
(Spain included), (CEC 2007a,17). In parallel, horizontal and vertical 
mergers and acquisitions have created major energy conglomerates 
doing business in both electricity and gas supply, something that may 
have aggravated the initial market concentration problems in many 
countries (Domanico 2007).
Given this long history and background it would not be unnatural 
to discuss how far the EU has come in establishing an energy policy 
that adheres to the principle of free and fair competition. Free compe-
tition should mean that energy consumers are free to choose service 
from companies across Europe, whereas the suppliers in turn should 
encounter no barriers to transport of electricity and gas across Europe’s 
national borders. While necessary, securing such freedom of choice is 
far from sufficient for competition to be fair. This would depend on 
market conditions free from dominant actors as well as harmonized 
governmental regulations across national contexts; the latter is impor-
tant to ensure that companies in one country do not enjoy far bet-
ter opportunities at home than other companies, with the competitive 
advantage this would also give in the greater internal market.
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The remainder of this chapter is structured in four parts. 
The section “Brief History of EU Internal Energy Market Policy 
Development” provides a brief historical description of EU internal 
energy market policies, highlighting the most important parts and 
how the situation was evaluated before the most recent round of 
policy- making (the third package). The section “The Third Internal 
Energy Market Policy Package” focuses on the third and hitherto 
final package of internal energy market policies, the proposal of the 
Commission, and what was finally adopted by the European Council. 
Specifically, we look at the Commission proposal to mandate trans-
mission system operators (TSOs) to separate by ownership the oper-
ation of transmission grids and that of other commercial production 
and supply businesses (mandatory ownership unbundling—MOU) 
and why this was not adopted in the final directive. We place this 
European Council decision within the long- term context of internal 
energy market policies and apply a historical- institutional frame-
work to answer the question. This framework looks at the develop-
ment over time (shifts) in coalitions supporting and opposing the 
idea of a free- market solution to European energy problems. We 
identify the key stakeholders, their positions, and how these posi-
tions have changed or remained stable over time. Particular focus in 
the explanation is on the evolution of the relative power of member 
state governments and EU institutions, especially the Commission 
and the Parliament.
The section “Evaluation of Progress in Completing the EU Internal 
Energy Market” evaluates the progress made in the course of the years 
and how far the EU still is from realizing the vision to create a com-
mon free energy market characterized by fair competition between the 
suppliers. The evaluation discusses the development over time in sev-
eral indicators, information disclosed by the Commission in annual 
benchmarking reports on national implementation of internal energy 
market policies. The last section “The Road Ahead—Prospects for 
Free and Fair Competition in the European Energy Market” rounds 
up with a discussion of future prospects for the internal energy mar-
ket. Here, we show that EU internal energy market policy is more than 
the directives and regulations provided by the successive packages. 
We explore three different procedures pursued by the Commission 
in pursuit of a free and fair energy market. In addition to directives 
and regulations, these include application of the general EU treaty 
competition legislation and more bottom- up methods of coordination 
initiatives (coregulation).
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Brief History of EU Internal Energy 
Market Policy Development
Toward the First Policy Package
In 1987, the EU Council adopted the Single European Act revitalizing 
the general principles guiding community cooperation—removal of 
barriers to trade and movement of capital across the member states as 
a means to increase growth and welfare in the region. It strengthened 
supranational authority in a number of EU policy areas, allowing for 
greater use of qualified majority voting in decisions on EU- wide mar-
ket rules and thus removing blocking votes of member states skeptical 
of increased harmonization of national policies.
Although energy was not initially part of the reform program, the 
general drive toward common internal market rules created a new 
dynamic where energy market actors became more active in redefin-
ing traditional energy policy issues (Andersen 2000). European enter-
prises also argued for deeper integration of national energy markets, 
as a way to make energy supply more efficient, to align and cut energy 
prices across the region, and thereby to increase global competitiveness 
of European industry. From 1986 onward, the Council of Ministers 
discussed greater integration of the domestic energy markets (Stern 
1990; Andersen 2000), and the Commission set out to identify proce-
dures for the creation of an internal energy market.
The 1988 Commission communication The Internal Energy 
Market envisioned the electricity and gas grid in Europe as a “com-
mon carrier” system across the member states. Any consumer should 
be able to purchase energy from any supplier across the community 
without discrimination in access to grids, regardless of ownership of 
the grid structures (CEC 1988).
The electricity and gas sectors were viewed as particularly chal-
lenging, characterized as they were by nationally dominant, vertically 
integrated utilities (Lyons 1994, 6–7). Dismantling these structures 
was viewed as pivotal for free and fair competition to prevail in the 
internal energy market. The Commission again discussed different 
decision procedures for restructuring these sectors specifically. One 
was the application of EU competition rules (then Articles 85 and 86 
EEC—European Economic Community) against the utilities to dis-
mantle dominant market positions. Another was to initiate infringe-
ments procedures according to Article 169 EEC against the member 
states. It also acknowledged the need for specific directives for the 
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electricity and gas sectors, which could either be formulated unilater-
ally by the Commission based on Article 90 (3) EEC, or on the basis 
of Article 100a EEC- Treaty, a consensus- based procedure allowing 
other EU bodies to participate in deciding the pace and scope of the 
liberalization package (Eising 2002; Lyons 1992, 23).
Acknowledging that energy was widely regarded as a public good 
within European member states, with dominant public utilities a nor-
mal structure in energy supply, the largest part of the Commission 
(including its energy policy service), the member states and the European 
Parliament preferred a consensus procedure (Article 100a) to allow for 
incremental change (Eising 2002). DG Competition (DG- COMP), on 
the other hand, opted for a faster breakup of monopoly structures by 
using competition rules and Article 90 for pressing forward Gas and 
Electricity Directives (Eising 2002). In fact, the Commission allowed 
DG- COMP to start up proceedings against gas and electricity import/
export monopolies and sent letters to member state governments 
asking them to justify their national monopolies, warning that the 
Commission would act aggressively in order to achieve a single mar-
ket in energy (Lyons 1992, 23). DG- COMP was inspired by a March 
1991 judgment by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) upholding that 
the Commission could use such procedures to force greater competi-
tion in the telecommunications sector (Lyons 1992, 13).
Intense lobbying of commissioners by national governments, energy 
industries and the European Parliament, however, sent clear signals 
to DG- COMP to keep its hands off the internal energy market. And, 
in 1994, the ECJ formalized this lesser role of DG- COMP with its 
rulings in the so- called Almelo case of Dutch electricity distributors 
asking for dismantling the exclusive import and export rights granted 
to the electricity generators (Lyons 1998, 34). The ECJ found that 
Articles 85 and 86 of EU competition rules had been breached, but 
that Article 90 offered the companies opportunities for derogation 
if operating under public service obligations (PSOs). It did not make 
any judgment on whether the obligations necessitated the monopolis-
tic behavior in the specific case, however.1 DG- COMP was therefore 
unwillingly constrained in playing any active role in EU energy mar-
ket policies during the decade. To be sure, the Commission contin-
ued to remind European politicians that an option existed under EC 
Treaty rules to apply general competition rules, which was used to 
press member state governments’ adoption of the first liberalization 
package (Lyons 1992, 24).
The main procedure adopted for internal gas and electricity mar-
ket policy development was therefore Article 100a, the development 
please 
provide 
expansion.
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of directives through deliberation and consensus- seeking. The pro-
cess of getting directives adopted became thorny and lengthy, and 
only toward the end of the decade, after long deliberations with 
the Commission, and with active mediation from the European 
Parliament, did the Council adopt the 1996 Electricity Directive and 
the 1998 Gas Directive. These were heavily watered- down versions of 
the Commission’s initial plan of a common carrier system for Europe. 
They entitled only a limited number of high volume gas and electricity 
consumers the right to freely shift suppliers. The Electricity Directive 
set quantitative goals and a deadline for the reforms whereas the Gas 
Directive left open for the member states to decide (Stern 1998).
To ensure a de facto right for these entitled consumers, the 
Commission sought to establish harmonized terms of access for third 
parties to existing networks and gas pipelines. This effort largely 
failed, however. True, member states were instructed to ensure that the 
TSOs kept separate accounts (unbundling of accounts) for activities 
subject to competition (production and supply) and those considered 
a natural monopoly (operation of transmission grids). No agreement 
was reached, however, on uniform rules for how TSOs should facili-
tate access by third parties. In the end, the directive merely listed 
different options: grid owners could openly list access terms, such 
as tariffs for using the grid and capacity of the grid (called a system 
of regulated third- party access), leaving traders with information in 
advance of striking new deals. They could also choose the less trans-
parent system of negotiated access (allowing the TSOs to negotiate 
separate deals with each eligible customer). The Commission also had 
to accept that member states could restrict trade across national bor-
ders with a “single buyer” system adopted, allowing a single national 
firm to retain full control over imports. The failure in providing 
for invariable instructions as to how owners of power lines and gas 
grids should secure access for alternative suppliers meant that verti-
cally integrated companies were still left with great opportunities to 
obstruct access for competing power supply businesses.
Toward the Second Policy Package
EU decision- makers acknowledged that there were additional barri-
ers to the creation of an internal energy market that were outside 
the scope of the new directives. The directives therefore instructed 
the Commission to go on reporting on additional needs for harmo-
nizing national regulations to remove barriers to trade and physical 
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flow across national borders.2 In the first communication report 
on the Electricity Directive, which came in 1998,3 the Commission 
addressed the problem of reconciling the community’s environmen-
tal policy with the goal of creating an internal energy market. More 
specifically, the report discussed the need of ensuring that provisions 
in the 1997 White Paper on renewable energies4 were not at odds 
with free and fair competition in the internal energy market. The 
Commission concluded that the existence of various schemes for the 
promotion of renewables in member states would most likely lead to 
trade distortions. The Commission concluded that further analysis 
of existing national support schemes for electricity from renewable 
energy sources would be needed, and announced plans for a directive 
on the harmonization of national schemes by the end of 1998.5
New follow- up reports in 1999 on the Gas Directive and in 2000 
on the Electricity Directive addressed these issues and concluded 
that great variation in transmission prices, congestion management 
systems, and outright lack of cross- border transmission capacity 
across the member states restricted cross- country trade (CEC 1999; 
2000a).
Acknowledging the limited success of the top- down legisla-
tive approach applied for the Electricity and Gas Directives, the 
Commission this time chose another strategy—to involve a broad 
range of stakeholders in a bottom- up process to identify and seek 
consensus on the harmonization of cross- border transmission sys-
tem rules and technicalities. Organizing these processes, stakeholder 
forums (the Electricity Regulatory Forum of Florence—the Florence 
Forum and the Gas Regulatory Forum of Madrid) involved participa-
tion by national regulatory authorities, member state governments, 
the Commission, TSOs, electricity traders, consumers, network users, 
and power exchanges.
While giving high priority to these bottom- up processes, the 
Commission also continued to push member states on implementa-
tion of the Electricity and Gas Directives, with benchmarking reports 
used as a major new tool. A 2001 benchmarking report concluded 
that large asymmetries in implementation had jeopardized the pro-
cess of creating a level- playing field in the internal market for energy. 
While some member states had over- fulfilled their obligations under 
the directives, ensuring third- party access through a system of full 
ownership separation of infrastructure and production/supply busi-
nesses (ownership unbundling), other countries maintained systems 
that seriously deterred consumers from changing suppliers in the mar-
ket (CEC 2001). The 2001 Gothenburg European Council Summit 
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agreed on this diagnosis and asked the Commission to prepare a sec-
ond energy liberalization package.
When adopted by the Council in June 2003, the new Electricity 
and Gas Directives required full electricity and gas market opening 
for nonhousehold consumers by July 2004 and for all consumers by 
July 2007 (European Parliament and the Council 2003a; 2003b). To 
prevent discrimination by TSOs in transmission system access issues, 
the directives mandated organizational separation of units operating 
transmission activities from those operating generation and supply 
activities (legal unbundling). Full ownership unbundling had been 
proposed by different agents but the Commission failed to include it 
the proposal due to great opposition by many member states.6
In addition, the directives instructed member states to set up 
national regulatory agencies with well- defined functions and greater 
transparency was called for in that the directives mandated publica-
tion of network tariffs by the TSOs (regulated access) instead of case-
 by- case negotiations. A separate Regulation sought to strengthen the 
bottom- up processes by establishing a separate EU- level committee, 
the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), 
constituted by member state regulatory authorities, with the man-
date to develop guidelines for harmonization of technical and market 
factors constraining access to cross- border infrastructure and cross-
 border trade (such as rules for inter- TSO compensation, national 
transmission tariffs and on allocation of cross- border interconnection 
capacity (European Parliament and the Council 2003c).
The Third Internal Energy Market 
Policy Package
The Commission Proposal
Despite this new second package, energy consumers continued to 
voice dissatisfaction, allegedly experiencing higher tariff levels than 
before and discrimination in access to grids from vertically integrated 
companies. In June 2005, the Commission launched gas and elec-
tricity sector inquiries, with a preliminary report adopted in 2006 
concluding that flaws in access to energy infrastructure in many 
member states had caused unnecessarily high energy prices in Europe 
and the loss of welfare opportunities for European energy consumers. 
Vertically integrated energy producers had constrained competition 
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through discrimination of others in the use of infrastructure and held 
back on new infrastructure investments, causing problems for inde-
pendent producers of electricity and heat. This was also viewed as 
a barrier to producers of indigenous renewable energy and hence to 
the alleviation of climate change and security of supply concerns in 
the EU.
These new concerns made the Commission in March 2006 pro-
pose that a new energy strategy for Europe should be developed, 
aimed at creating greater coherence between the member states and 
consistency between policy measures dealing with the three primary 
objectives: competitive energy for European consumers, security of 
supply, and environmental improvement of EU energy systems (CEC 
2006a). This strategy was approved at the European Council Spring 
Summit 2006.
January 2007, the Commission adopted the strategic energy review 
as part of an energy and climate package that also included the full 
energy sector inquiry (CEC 2006b; 2007b). The package proposed 
new quantitative goals, tabling the so- called “20–20–20” goals: a 20 
percent unilateral reduction of climate gas emissions by the EU, a 
20 percent share for renewable sources, and 20 percent reduction in 
energy use compared to “business as usual”—all to be attained by 
2020. The action plan proposed to achieve the larger energy and cli-
mate policy goals had listed further measures to ensure access to and 
investments in new infrastructure as top priorities.
The review concluded that European gas and electricity markets 
remained national in scope and had maintained from the preliber-
alization period a high level of concentration and scope for exercis-
ing market power (CEC 2007a). Lack of access to infrastructure was 
highlighted as a major barrier to free competition, causing, together 
with higher primary fuel costs and environmental obligations, signifi-
cant rises in gas and electricity wholesale prices (CEC 2006b).
The review elaborated in detail on vertical integration between net-
work and supply interests as a mechanism causing negative repercus-
sions for market entry and incentives to invest in networks, despite the 
existing legal unbundling provisions. Vertically integrated operators 
of the networks (in gas, also storage and liquid natural gas terminals) 
were suspected of favoring access to their own affiliates (discrimina-
tion). Operation and investment decisions had been made on the basis 
of own supply interests. Vertical integration of generation/import and 
supply activities had reduced incentives to trade on wholesale markets 
and thus a lack of liquidity in these markets, in turn an entry bar-
rier. The review also added insufficient or unavailable cross- border 
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transmission capacity as a barrier to integration of national markets 
together with lack of transparency, reliability, and timeliness of infor-
mation on network availability (electricity interconnections and gas 
transit pipelines).
Based on this description, the Commission proposed to go forward 
with a third legislative package. The proposal included many differ-
ent measures, with ownership unbundling of network and production 
assets placed at the top. An alternative Independent System Operator 
(ISO) was proposed as a fallback position, the latter retaining joint 
ownership with returns on network operations regulated and opera-
tion, maintenance, and development of networks no longer decided 
by the vertically integrated owner. The long list of proposals included 
the following:
measures to harmonize the levels of powers and independence of • 
national energy regulators from industry and government;
strengthening the EU- level regulatory function with a new body • 
that could beef up governance required for satisfactory progress 
in the work of harmonizing standards facilitating cross- border 
trade across the member states;
instead of the • voluntary cooperation approach pursued by 
ERGEG, the Commission envisioned new EU- level powers to 
develop binding standards;
new harmonized minimum standards for transparency of infor-• 
mation provided by the TSOs and generators to facilitate market-
 access by new entrants and prevent price manipulation;
measures to beef up planning and approval of priority trans-• 
 European gas and electricity networks;
the setup of a new Office of the Energy Observatory to monitor • 
the demand/supply balance in Europe;
the development of an Energy Customers’ Charter to ensure • 
PSOs; and
the setup of a solidarity mechanism assisting member states par-• 
ticularly import dependent and vulnerable in the supply for oil, 
gas, and electricity and other measures to improve the security 
of supply within the EU.
The European Spring Council in 2007 endorsed the integrated 
energy and climate package and the 20–20–20 percent goals set for 
energy efficiency, renewable energy, and climate gas reductions in the 
EU. They also consented to a third internal energy policy package but 
asked the Commission to come up with more specific drafts for the 
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Energy Council meeting in June 2007. This meeting showed that a 
blocking minority rejected full ownership unbundling as a mandatory 
measure, while still acknowledging “the need for action on . . . unbun-
dling of network operations from energy production and supply activ-
ities.”7 The Energy Council also rejected any EU- level arrangements 
that would interfere with member states’ exclusive right to decide 
on their energy mix, such as the idea of an EU Energy Observatory. 
Energy Commissioner Piebalgs, attending the meeting together with 
Neelie Kroes, the Competition Commissioner, admitted that the 
“majority of the countries did not support ‘ownership unbundling’ 
legislation” and that the Commission would have a very difficult time 
ahead in putting together a new energy liberalization law.
Despite the signals given, the Commission had not abandoned 
“ownership unbundling” as the preferred mandated option in its 
September 19, 2007 proposal. To be sure, the “Independent System 
Operator” was retained as a fallback- option. Another last minute 
“reciprocity clause” was included, specifying that would have barred 
companies from nonmember countries from exercising decisive influ-
ence on transmission assets, unless a bilateral agreement on mutual 
market access to transmission assets in the investors’ country of origin 
had been concluded (Grätz 2009, 77). This was aimed at preventing 
the takeover of transmission systems by vertically integrated compa-
nies from outside the EU, with Commission powers to intervene in 
acquisition matters.
The Final Output
Nearly two years of negotiations followed. In July 2009, the European 
Council finally adopted the third internal energy policy package: new 
Electricity and Gas Directives And new regulations for harmoniza-
tion of cross- border trade in electricity and gas as well as a specific 
regulation providing for the establishment of the new regulatory body 
ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators).
The new Electricity and Gas directives did not provide for MOU 
but allowed the TSOs to choose two other unbundling methods: 
the ISO model that had been proposed as fallback position by the 
Commission and the Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) 
model that had been proposed by a group of eight member state gov-
ernments, led by Germany and France, during the negotiations. Under 
the ISO model, big energy companies would retain ownership of the 
transmission lines, but hand managing control over networks to an 
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entirely separate operator not sharing any shareholders with the par-
ent company. The ITO- model also foresees a parent company retain-
ing ownership of transmission networks, but owned by the same set 
of shareholders. To compensate for the continuation of shared owner-
ship, the model envisages supervision by a national regulator. Among 
other things, there will be a mechanism preventing top management 
from moving freely between a company’s production and transmis-
sion wings. An executive involved in the transmission business will 
not be permitted to work three years before and four years after in the 
parent company. In addition, the national regulator will examine the 
transmission operator’s development and investment plans and may 
require changes.
There were few changes to other proposals in the package that 
had been backed by the Energy Council meeting in June 2007. It 
settled the principle of more power to and the harmonization of 
duties for national regulators so that they are able to issue binding 
decisions on companies and impose penalties on those that fail to 
comply with EU regulation. National regulators would have author-
ity over their own budgets and strict rules for management appoint-
ments for true independence of industry interests and government 
intervention.
The creation of a new European Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) was agreed with the tasks to oversee and 
improve cross- border regulatory cooperation for gas and electricity 
transmission between member states. The agency would not have any 
direct regulatory authority at the national or European level, but it 
would have the power to intervene in the event that national regula-
tors fail to cooperate effectively. ACER will inter alia submit to the 
Commission nonbinding framework guidelines on cross- border flows 
of electricity and gas, which will serve as a basis for the network 
codes adopted by the Commission. ACER will also complement at the 
European level the regulatory tasks vested with the national regula-
tors by adopting individual regulatory decisions in a number of spe-
cific cross- border situations as well as decisions on technical issues 
when so provided for in the package.
Cooperation between national TSOs for gas and electricity, for-
merly taking place on a voluntary basis, was formalized through the 
establishment of a European Network for TSOs (ENTSOs). The main 
tasks given the ENTSO- E and ENTSO- G (electricity and gas, respec-
tively) were to harmonize codes for access to and use of pipelines 
and grids, and coordinate and ensure proper network planning and 
investments in order to prevent blackouts.
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The third- country reciprocity did not prevail in its proposed form. 
It only requires companies from non- EU countries to demonstrate 
compliance with the same unbundling requirements as EU companies 
before they are certified to operate in the common market and does 
not demand changes of market rules in the investor’s home market 
country, as initially proposed (Grätz 2009, 78). To be sure, the new 
regulation says that member states must refuse certification if it is 
deemed to “put at risk the security of energy supply of the member 
state and the Community.”
Why Was Ownership Unbundling 
Proposed and Not Accepted?
The Proposal: Looking first at the question why the Commission pro-
posed ownership unbundling, we find this measure to be the logical 
endpoint of the vision the Commission has pursued since the internal 
energy market was proposed in the late 1980s: to create a truly inde-
pendent grid accessible for transport of energy by all parties with-
out discrimination. Separation of ownership of grids and commercial 
activities would simply provide the best guarantee for such indepen-
dence. The Commission had been an active promoter of this idea 
since the start (Lyons 1992). It had long opted for MOU but failed to 
propose this when the first two packages were up for discussion due 
to major opposition by the member state governments.
There is clear evidence that the decision to finally table it as a pro-
posal in 2007 reflected Commission confidence that it had surely 
gained clout vis- à- vis member state governments reluctant to hand 
over powers to the EU in energy market affairs. An important part 
of this new clout was the new and greater role played by DG- COMP 
in applying its powers under general EU treaty rules. This new role 
is well illustrated when seen through the lens of history. Back in the 
late 1980s, when the Commission formulated its first ideas about the 
internal energy market, it acknowledged that the national vertically 
integrated gas and electricity utilities represented a challenge to real 
market opening and, as noted above, mooted various decision pro-
cedures for dealing with this challenge, but DG- COMP thus found 
itself constrained from playing an active role in EU internal energy 
market policies.
The Commission nevertheless continued to threaten member- state 
governments with EC Treaty competition rules unless implementa-
tion was forthcoming, as in 2001, to press acceptance of a second 
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liberalization package (CEC 2002). By then, moreover, several mem-
ber states backed the idea of MOU. Six member countries had by 
then voluntarily implemented ownership unbundling in their national 
electricity sectors and two in their national gas sectors (CEC 2003). 
Fronting the pro- group, the UK had implemented ownership unbun-
dling back in the 1980s. British politicians, championing neoliberal 
thinking in Europe, had a central role when the Commission drafted 
its first internal market directives (Lyons 1992). The Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands were also among the early reformers. 
In addition, most European Parliamentarians now supported radical 
market opening, with strong Parliamentary voices calling for MOU 
(Eikeland 2008). Fronting the antigroup were France and Germany, 
which even argued against “legal unbundling” (Council of the 
European Union 2002).
Energy consumers continued to voice dissatisfaction, complain-
ing of discrimination in access to grids from the vertically inte-
grated energy groups and the resultant higher tariff levels. The new 
Commission appointed in 2005 under the presidency of José Manuel 
Barroso therefore took a new line in internal energy market policies. 
As part of his overall plan to revitalize the Lisbon agenda, Barroso 
promised a more proactive role for DG- COMP in the screening of 
industrial sectors for barriers to competition (CEC 2005). The inter-
nal energy market was chosen as a pilot case, with DG- COMP and 
the Directorate- General for Transport and Energy (DG- TREN) jointly 
launching a major inquiry into competitive conditions in European 
electricity and gas markets.
This joint project ushered in a new era of close cooperation between 
the two directorates in internal energy market policies. When the first 
results of the energy sector inquiry came in, DG- COMP was con-
vinced that a new liberalization package was needed. DG- TREN was 
not fully convinced, but the preliminary report of early 2006 tipped 
the scales, leading the two DGs and commissioners Neelie Kroes and 
Andris Piebalgs to agree on the need for a new, more radical energy 
liberalization package.8
In January 2007, the Commission adopted the strategic energy 
review proposed a year ahead and endorsed by the Council (CEC 
2006a). This put gas and electricity market liberalization on top of 
the list of further action needed to achieve community energy policy 
objectives. The Commission also proposed a third legislative package 
that put MOU at the top of priorities. The European Spring Council 
2007 agreed on the need for new legislation but the Energy Council in 
June warned the Commission not to propose ownership unbundling 
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(EurActiv 2007). The Commission did not give in to these warnings, 
however, and presented its proposal with MOU included. Interviewees 
in Brussels give DG- COMP much credit for this decision.
The proposal was coauthored by DG- COMP and DG- TREN—an 
unusual procedure in the Commission, which was normally bound 
by the high- level agreement that DGs should not interfere in each 
other’s policy domains.9 The alternative ISO model was secured as a 
fallback position, clearly more in line with the incremental consensus-
 seeking procedure preferred by DG- TREN. The new extended role of 
DG- COMP became evident also in the toning down of “regionaliza-
tion” as an option for step- wise full internal market integration—a 
strategy promoted by the electricity supply industry and supported by 
DG- TREN back in 2003. DG- COMP feared such a procedure could 
increase the chances of regional cartelization.10
The extended role of DG- COMP in internal energy market poli-
cies was further demonstrated in its initiation of investigations and 
court- filing against major companies suspected of breaching commu-
nity competition rules such as: allegedly using long- term contracts to 
abuse their dominant position (Distrigaz, EDF, and Suez- Electrabel) 
and manipulating wholesale and balancing markets. DG- COMP pro-
ceeded to prepare cases for the ECJ, the most highly profiled one 
being against the company German Energy On (E.On).
DG- COMP presented these companies with deals that would 
reduce fines for infringement of EU competition rules in return for the 
sell- off of their network businesses, in turn weakening their incentives 
to lobby member- state governments and providing leeway for other 
national forces to convince the governments to alter their stances. 
The Commission knew that energy- intensive industry associations in 
member states supported ownership unbundling. For example, the 
German Steel Industry Association, in a policy statement to Germany’s 
EU presidency in 2007, made it clear that “If, as a result of the current 
regulations on grids, the intended market inputs fail to materialize in 
the medium term, an ownership unbundling of grids must be consid-
ered as a further step, as this is the only way to ensure that the struc-
ture of grid access is really free of discrimination for all potential grid 
users” (Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl 2006). Supporters of MOU also 
included the Federation of German Consumer Organizations, which 
refuted arguments from the government that it would run contrary 
to constitutional guarantees for property (Europe Energy, 2007). 
In addition, BNE, the German association for new energy suppliers, 
opted for strict unbundling to prevent market- dominant companies 
from exploiting their position, and their EU- level federation European 
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Renewable Energy Council (EREC) took a clear pro- MOU position 
(Eikeland 2008).
Interviews show that central officers within DG- TREN and DG- 
COMP expected companies to eventually sell off their grids even 
without regulatory demands in place. This was based on perceptions 
of the future electricity grid coming to resemble the Internet, with 
many small agents dispatching renewable energy to fulfill the new EU 
climate goals, dramatically changing the current business of serving 
a few central producers and making specialized grid operators bet-
ter commercially prepared.11 The tendencies toward stricter national 
rules on ownership conduct and national regulators squeezing grid 
tariffs were other factors reducing the commercial rationale of own-
ing electricity grids. The Commission expected companies to sell off 
their grids voluntarily, and that this in the next round could change 
the political dynamics at the national level, leading member- state gov-
ernments to shift their position on MOU.
Hindsight proved the Commission right in assuming that major 
companies would eventually strike deals that included ownership 
unbundling, to avoid fines for infringing EU competition regulations. 
On February 28, 2008, the German energy giant E.On confirmed 
such a deal (Economist 2008),12 but this did not change the anti-
 MOU position of the German government.
The Commission added the third- country reciprocity clause to the 
proposal as a carrot intended to appease member states reluctant to 
accept MOU for fear that Russian Gazprom might seize the opportu-
nity to buy networks on sale and gain a firmer grip on the European 
gas market. The last- minute “third- country clause” was particularly 
important in getting new eastern member- state governments to accept 
MOU. With many of these states eager to connect to the EU and 
the NATO umbrella after leaving the much hated planned economy 
and Soviet sphere of interest, the Commission obviously hoped for 
their support in its strategy to combine market forces internally with 
a united voice in talks with Russia. They proved split on the issue, 
however. Planning economy structures are still evident in many of 
their energy sectors, and some of these states remain hesitant about 
yielding to a new international structure that might limit their own 
national sovereignty.
To sum up, we see clear evidence during the Barroso presidency of 
a shift in the will and power of the Commission to push market inte-
gration a major step forward. This will was shared also by the other 
major EU supranational institution, the European Parliament. On July 
10, 2007, the Parliament Plenary Session backed the Commission’s 
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January 2007 proposal, including ownership unbundling. The vote 
was based on a report prepared by the Committee on Industry, 
Research, and Energy (ITRE) representative Mr. Alejo Vidal- Quadras, 
Spanish MEP and leader of the EPP- ED group (Group of the European 
People’s Party—Christian Democrats—and European Democrats in 
the European Parliament), lashing out against efforts by certain gov-
ernments, such as France and Germany, to create “national energy 
champions” as a form of protectionism.13 The report went far in its 
critique of national energy industry structures, portraying France’s 
public companies European Development Fund (EDF) and Italy’s 
Ente Nazionale per l’Energia eLettrica (Enel) as noncompatible with 
free competition, suspecting them of subjecting the functioning of the 
internal market to national political considerations. The Commission 
therefore had strong reason to expect continued support from the 
Parliament when tabling its proposal. In fact, the Parliament majority 
was supportive also of the second liberalization package adopted in 
2003, a change from the 1990s when the Parliament was less enthu-
siastic about radical market opening when discussing the first energy 
market package.
The Final Outcome: The new will and power of the supranational 
institutions were not sufficient, however, for the proposal of MOU 
to prevail. Opposition from the member- state governments was too 
strong. Germany and France headed a group of member states that 
tabled the alternative ITO- model, only a slightly revised version of 
the existing unbundling model. The group included the ministers 
from Austria, Greece, and Luxembourg as well as those of the new 
EU members the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, Slovakia, and 
Hungary, all hosting vertically integrated energy groups and lagging 
behind in implementing previously adopted internal market policies 
(Eikeland 2008). In 2007, the countries that had voluntarily imple-
mented MOU had increased to 13 for the electricity sector and 10 for 
the gas sector (CEC 2008), but this was still short of a majority vote 
in the Council.
To gain a deeper understanding of the differences in the dispute, 
we need to look into deeper perceptions concerning a free market’s 
ability to deliver on PSOs such as security of supply and environmen-
tal protection. We see clearly that the skeptics of full MOU argued 
that dismantling their strong national champions would weaken their 
power in negotiations with major foreign upstream companies, thus 
reducing national security of supply (Eikeland 2008, 2011). Those in 
favor, backed by the Commission, argued that MOU would guaran-
tee the independence of TSOs, as well as bolstering crucial trade and 
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investments in new infrastructure, beneficial for security of supply 
(Eikeland 2008).
These differences were not new in Europe. Back in the 1990s, 
the first energy liberalization package was adopted only after the 
Council had insisted on the inclusion of a provision in the directives 
that gave member states the right to derogations if opting to instruct 
their national industries to take on PSOs. Article 3 of the 1996 EU 
Electricity Directive defined public services as related to “security, 
including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies 
and environmental protection” Also, the French Government’s insis-
tence on including the option to allow a central agency to be responsi-
ble for the purchasing of the country’s electricity, the so- called “single 
buyer” model, was justified by the need for governments to retain 
powers to induce PSOs on their national firms.
When climate change rose higher on the agenda in the late 1990s 
with calls for an increased share of CO2- neutral renewable energy 
sources in the EU energy mix, conflicting views surfaced again. Some 
member states, notably the UK, argued strongly for market- based 
policy instruments, which they viewed as compatible with trade and 
competition in the internal energy market. Other countries, notably 
Germany, argued that allowing the market to choose between renew-
ables would not stimulate the broad technological change viewed as 
necessary for long- term combat of climate change. The competitive 
market would be too shortsighted, the German government argued, 
picking only the least cost technologies that were not in need of much 
development support in the first place. Instead, Germany, which had 
already introduced a feed- in tariff system in 1990, giving renewable 
energy investors fixed prices independent of the market tariff, took 
the lead and convinced a majority of member states to clamp down 
efforts by the Commission to make mandatory a system of renewable 
electricity certificates as part of the new directive on the promotion 
of renewables in electricity production, adopted by the Council in 
2001.
From 2000 onward, energy security gained new topicality in EU 
energy policy, due in part to fresh energy growth figures showing 
an increase in import dependencies14 and other figures showing an 
aggravation of the situation after the 2000 Nice Summit opened the 
EU up to new applicant countries from Eastern Europe in 2004. The 
years 2002 and 2003 added to the concerns, as massive blackouts 
caused havoc in California, Italy, Sweden, and Denmark. Voices were 
once again being raised questioning whether liberalized energy sys-
tems would bring about more vulnerability and short- term risks of 
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supply distortions than under the former centrally planned systems. 
A sudden and persisting growth in oil prices also fanned security of 
supply concerns. From 1999 to 2000, crude oil prices (the Brent Blend 
average prices) jumped from $17.88 per barrel to $28.39 per barrel, 
reflecting a series of geopolitical events: unrest in the Middle East 
and the rapid rise in oil demand in China and other South Asian 
countries. By 2007, the average price had reached $72 per barrel.15 
Oil prices continued to escalate in 2008, reaching peaks above $140 
per barrel.
Early 2006, the security of supply concerns were evoked after 
Russia shut down its gas deliveries to Ukraine, which within the EU 
was taken as a sign of Russia’s readiness to use its gas resources as 
a card in seeking geopolitical influence. Since vital gas infrastruc-
ture connecting Russia and the EU passed over Ukrainian territory, 
EU countries also felt a reduction in the volumes supplied in early 
January 2006. Thus a new sense of vulnerability now dispersed 
among European member- state governments, which lifted long- term 
energy supply to the top of priorities for policy development with 
a call for the Commission to develop a strategic energy review for 
Europe.
The security of supply issue consolidated the split already exist-
ing between the member states on the extent and pace that should 
be taken in internal energy market reforms, illustrated well also by 
the split in the European Parliament during the debate on owner-
ship unbundling in July 2007. This debate showed a division along 
national lines rather than political party lines. Germany, France, and 
several new member states formed an alliance against Commission 
demands for dismantling their national vertically integrated compa-
nies, arguing that this would reduce the companies’ clout in nego-
tiations with major foreign upstream companies. On the other side, 
the UK, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries headed the 
alliance that backed the Commission proposal of further liberaliza-
tion as necessary for increasing the security of supply. Full ownership 
unbundling would guarantee the independency of TSOs and bolster 
trade and investments in new infrastructure, pivotal to security of 
supply, according to these member states.
A deeper understanding of the differences comes when looking 
at the strategies pursued by the governments of Germany and like-
 minded allies for securing their supplies from Russia. The German 
government has in combination with a bilateral diplomacy vis- à- vis 
Russia accepted Gazprom acquisitions of shares in national gas infra-
structure in return for German acquisitions in Russia, based on the 
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philosophy that cross–ownership will give joint commercial interests 
in ensuring stability in supply.
The challenge for the Commission has not lessened lately, with 
Gazprom increasing its influence in several member countries. 
Illustrating this point, Gazprom in January 2008 signed a deal with 
Austria’s state- dominated company OMV to turn the Baumgarten 
gas transmission centre near Vienna into a joint venture, robbing 
the Commission–supported Nabucco pipeline project of its planned 
outlet for supply from non- Russian sources (Eurasia Daily Monitor 
2008).
Evaluation of Progress in Completing 
the EU Internal Energy Market
Looking at the 20- year history of internal energy market policies in 
Europe, we see considerable progress in institutional reforms paving 
the way for a free and fair energy market to evolve. However, the 
institutional reforms have still been insufficient, partly because of 
implementation failure and partly because the reforms adopted have 
not yet gone far enough.
As noted, the reforms carried out in 2003 (the second package) 
forced the member states to ensure that all consumers would be eli-
gible for switching suppliers by 2007. This reform also mandated 
grid companies to transparently inform market agents about terms 
of access to grids. Still, this reform did not solve fully the important 
organizational issue of how to ensure that grids were run indepen-
dently of particular supply interests. It mandated an organizational 
split of grid and supply operations (legal unbundling) but not a full-
 fledged split of ownership. This latter solution was at the core when 
the Commission tabled its proposal for a third policy package in 
2007. But after intense deliberations, MOU did not come through in 
the final decision in July 2009.
Looking beyond the institutional design to what the member states 
have actually carried out in terms of policy implementation, the con-
clusion is strengthened that EU internal energy market policy so far 
can be denoted as only partially successful. The Commission has 
documented this well in its annual benchmarking reports submitted 
to the Council and Parliament since 2001. In its 2009 benchmark-
ing report on implementation of the internal energy market rules, 
the Commission gave a mixed picture, stating that member states 
still lagged behind in implementation. Günther Oettinger, European 
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Commissioner responsible for energy, said at the launch of the report: 
“The full and correct implementation of the energy rules has still not 
been achieved. This situation needs to change and the Commission 
will use all means available to make this happen. What is at stake is 
our ability to reach the goals set in the Europe 2020 Strategy through 
a secure, competitive and sustainable supply of energy to our econ-
omy and our society” (CEC 2010c).
As noted already in the first Commission benchmarking report 
from 2001,16 asymmetrical implementation of the directives between 
the member states had created different market conditions across 
member states in Europe, affecting both energy consumers and 
energy companies. The 2003 benchmarking report added attention 
to yet another problem for free and fair competition: the high degree 
of market concentration found in the gas and electricity industries 
in many member states. This problem was increasing because of the 
wave of mergers and acquisitions seen between companies in the gas 
and electricity industries, creating fewer and larger vertically inte-
grated energy groups. Fears were voiced that companies operating in 
countries shielded from competitive pressure used their monopoly rev-
enue to buy up companies in countries correctly abolishing monopoly 
conditions, which were less able to fatten up on monopoly rents.
In June 2009, the Commission initiated infringement procedures 
against 25 member states for incorrectly implementing internal 
electricity market provisions and against 21 member states for defi-
ciencies in transposition of the gas market rules. The key violations 
identified were lack of transparency, insufficient efforts by TSOs to 
make interconnection capacity available, absence of regional coopera-
tion, lack of enforcement by national regulators, and lack of dispute 
settlement procedures (CEC 2010a, 2). The benchmarking report for 
2009 shows that most member states have finally transposed the legal 
provision guaranteeing all consumers the right to shift suppliers in the 
national electricity and gas markets, with a few still lagging behind, 
however. Nevertheless, the report shows that the actual rate of shifts 
is rather small in many countries. Of those actually making these data 
available to the Commission, most members recorded no or close to 
no switching in 2008 in the retail electricity and gas markets (CEC 
2010b, 7–8). This indicates that competition is still not very intensive 
in the retail markets. And to be sure, EU legal unbundling require-
ments are still applicable only for the major TSOs and not the many 
distribution companies operating in Europe. The 2009 Benchmarking 
Report shows that few of the electricity distribution system opera-
tors in Europe were ownership unbundled and that only around 42 
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percent even had legal unbundling (CEC 2010b, 36). This indicates 
a clear lack of independence prevailing in European grid operations. 
Moreover, the benchmarking report shows that the market domi-
nance problem continues in many member states, with 15 member 
states stated to have very highly or highly concentrated electricity 
market conditions, and the situation is no better for the gas market 
(CEC 2010b, 12–16). On top of this, lack of infrastructure capac-
ity across the borders and, hence, lack of cross- border trade accentu-
ates the asymmetrical situation across Europe, with some companies 
operating in home- markets shielded from and others quite exposed to 
competitive pressure.
The Road Ahead—Prospects for Free 
and Fair Competition in the European 
Energy Market
While failing to achieve full ownership unbundling as a guarantee of 
grid independence, and given the many problems with asymmetrical 
implementation still making the internal energy market character-
ized by deficiencies to free and fair competition, the Commission still 
records an increasing number of allies that share the idea that free 
market conditions should be realized in an all- European market. The 
growing number of member states that have actually carried out vol-
untary ownership unbundling in the electricity and gas markets illus-
trates such a will. There is thus much to indicate that the Commission 
will perceive further proposals in the field as highly legitimate, and 
not stop with the results achieved through the adoption of the third 
policy package.
Next, the third policy package provides for new soft- law measures 
to create a level internal energy market. Alongside application of EU 
treaty rules and the specific framework directives targeting deregula-
tion of the electricity and gas industry, soft law constitutes the third 
pillar of EU internal energy market policy, starting out with the estab-
lishment of the Florence and Madrid Forums in the late 1990s. This 
pillar emerged in response to needs for deepening implementation of 
legislation adopted through the traditional community method. In 
particular, the Commission acknowledged different harmonization 
needs (the need to establish common codes of conduct) for TSOs con-
cerning operation of and investments in cross- border transmission 
infrastructure to enable free trade in energy across the community. 
More specifically, the Commission acknowledged that there would 
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be no well- functioning trade in electricity without harmonization of 
such factors as:
transmission tariff structures;• 
modes by which capacity is allocated when networks are con-• 
gested, which is the normal situation since cross- border capacity 
is poorly developed (congestion management);
modes by which TSOs are compensated for use of their networks • 
in transition of power from one country to another (inter- TSO 
transit compensation);
transparency for market agents concerning availability of capac-• 
ity on interconnectors and tariffs for using them; and
planning of investments in new interconnector capacity.• 
The Commission- established Florence Forum created a meeting 
place and a process whereby private industry agents (consumers, pro-
ducers, and TSOs), national regulators, and EU institutions commit-
ted to work for voluntary joint solutions. European TSOs established 
the all- European organization ETSO in response, to coordinate inter-
nal discussions.
In 2003, soft law efforts were to a far greater extent codified with 
regulations adopted under the second internal energy market package. 
These regulations vested more control with the member- state govern-
ments, notably the European group of national regulators, CEER, 
and proposed the new organization European Regulators’ Group for 
Energy and Gas (ERGEG) (as CEER’s extended arm functioning as 
the formal advisory group of CEER to the Commission) in leading 
further work on the development of guidelines for how such common 
codes of conduct should look. The new regulation meant that if agree-
ment was reached through comitology, codes of conduct related to 
cross- border trade would be adopted by the Commission and included 
in the annex to the regulation and function as community hard law. 
Proceeding from pure voluntarism to community regulation (comitol-
ogy) reflected the view that the former voluntarism had not created 
the results hoped for.
In the following years, national regulators (CEER, ERGEG) and the 
industry itself (ETSO) proceeded with efforts at detailing and nego-
tiating guidelines and codes of conduct, now with a regional focus, 
expecting that splitting up negotiations in smaller groups could bring 
the process more effectively forward. By 2007, the Commission still 
voiced great dissatisfaction with the existing leadership of ERGEG. 
As part of the third internal energy market legislation package, 
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institutional change has been initiated with greater formalization of 
TSO cooperation in new EU- level bodies responsible for developing 
codes of conduct (ENTSO- E for electricity and ENTSO- G for natural 
gas) as well as a new EU- level regulatory body, ACER.
To be sure, the Commission has great hope that these bottom- up 
processes will produce results that will eventually increase transpar-
ency and harmonization of grid operation codes across Europe and 
manage to create agreement on investments in new infrastructure seen 
as pivotal not only for cross- border trade to increase competition in 
the internal energy market but also more security of supply and better 
conditions for independent producers of climate- friendly renewable 
energy. As such, the ambitious climate and renewable energy goals 
agreed upon by EU member state leaders in 2007 are currently an 
important driver of continued internal energy market efforts to open 
up existing networks and invest in new energy infrastructure across 
the member states.
Notes
 1. In 1996, the Dutch appeal court, taking the Court of Justice ruling as its 
base, found that the public service obligations presented by the genera-
tors were not sufficient grounds for imposing an import monopoly, and 
thus the generators had acted contrary to the Treaty’s provisions (Lyons 
1998, 34).
 2. Article 25 (1) of the Electricity Directive and Article 27 of the Gas 
Directive (European Parliament and the Council 1996; 1998).
 3. COM (1998) 167 final. March 16, 1998.
 4. COM (97) 599 Energy for the future—renewable sources of energy. 
White Paper.
 5. Ibid., 9.
 6. Interview with a senior Commission official, February 2008.
 7. EurActiv. 2007. EU states reject breaking up energy firms. June 7.
 8. Interview with Lars Kjølbye, Head of Unit Antitrust—Energy & 
Environment, DG- COMP, European Commission, Brussels, February 
2008.
 9. Interview with Matti Supponen, Electricity & Gas Unit, DG- TREN, 
European Commission, Brussels, February 2008.
10. Interview with Lars Kjølbye, Head of Unit Antitrust—Energy & 
Environment, DG- COMP, the European Commission, Brussels, 
February, 2008.
11. Information received in interview with Lars Kjølbye, Head of Unit 
Antitrust—Energy & Environment, DG- COMP, the European 
Commission, Brussels, February 2008.
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12. In late July 2008, Vattenfall Europe AG, the German subsidiary of the 
Swedish Vattenfall, followed suit, announcing that it would sell off its 
high- voltage grid (EurActiv, 2008).
13. EurActiv. 2007. MEPs call for dismantling of energy giants July 11.
14. CEC (2000b). The Green Paper presented risks of short- and long- term 
supply distortions, based on the trends of EU’s ever- widening depen-
dence on energy imports, expected to rise from 50 percent of its energy 
requirements to 70 percent the next 20 to 30 years if no countermea-
sures were taken. Energy imports represented in 2000 6 percent of total 
imports, whereas 45 percent of oil imports came from the Middle East 
and 40 percent of natural gas came from Russia.
15. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007.
16. SEC (2001). 1957. December 3, 2001. 
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Chapter Two
Foreign Policy and Energy Security: 
Markets, Pipelines, and Politics
Richard Youngs
Few policy areas have witnessed such intense activity and rapid evolu-
tion in recent years as that of energy security. With its dependence on 
external oil and gas supplies inexorably rising, the European Union 
(EU) has set out to become a lead player on energy questions. This 
applies especially to the foreign policy dimensions of energy security. 
There has been much policy activity during the last five years that 
would seem to suggest an incremental Europeanization of key dimen-
sions of energy security.
In formal terms, the EU has staked out an approach to energy secu-
rity that is based heavily on liberal internationalist norms. Its stated 
cornerstones are interdependence, market integration within and 
beyond Europe, and a convergence of governance standards. Time 
and time again EU documents and European ministers and policy-
 makers reject realist geopolitics as a basis for energy security. The 
EU also lays claim to a “rules- based governance” approach to energy 
security. Integral to the liberal approach is the conviction that more 
open and accountable governance in producer states is a necessary 
part of Europe’s own energy security interests. In practice, however, 
energy security is an area where geopolitical realism has made one 
of its most spectacular comebacks. In their foreign policy strate-
gies, member- state governments seek the influence that flows from 
Europe- wide market rules while simultaneously pursuing short- term 
gain from highly geopolitical behavior.
The shift back to geopolitical realism militates against the central-
ization of EU external energy policy. This does not negate EU unity 
quite as much as is sometimes assumed. But it is certainly the case that 
today the dynamics of bilateralism and EU coordination exist uneas-
ily together. Sometimes, support for common, supranationalized EU 
rules is seen by member states as the best form of geopolitics. At least 
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as often, however, such rules are discarded as unduly constraining. 
A crucial question is whether member states can continue to benefit 
from the advantages of both EU commonality and national maneuver-
ability over the long term. Are these two perfectly proper elements of 
a balanced external energy policy or mutually incompatible dynamics 
that betray the EU’s inability to cohere its strategic thinking?
New Institutionalized Commitments
At one level, it is remarkable how many formal EU energy security 
initiatives have been established in the last five years. An impressive 
range of new commitments has been enumerated, establishing the 
foundations for significant Europeanization of the external dimen-
sions of energy policy. This is illustrative of the value, in formal 
terms at least, that member states have attached to developing such 
centralized commitments as a means of pursuing their own energy 
interests.
A quick run through some of these initiatives suffices to demon-
strate how dense the network of external EU commitments now is. 
An EU- Russia energy dialogue commenced in 2000. November 2004 
saw the launch of a Black Sea and Caspian Sea cooperation initiative, 
aimed at the progressive integration of this region into the European 
energy market. In October 2005, the Energy Community of South 
East Europe (ECSEE) Treaty was signed, with the aim of incorpo-
rating Balkan states into the European regional market for gas and 
petroleum products; this initiative extends the EU energy acquis to the 
Balkans and coordinates infrastructure linkages, with World Bank 
financial support (Grant 2006). A Memorandum of Understanding 
on energy cooperation was signed with Ukraine in December 2005, 
reflecting Kiev’s aspiration to join the Energy Community of South 
East Europe Treaty. Similar bilateral energy partnerships were signed 
in 2006 with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
Subregional energy dialogues were developed with the Maghreb 
and Mashreq from the late 1990s under the Euro- Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP). The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) also 
contains an energy component. A notably reinforced program of such 
energy cooperation began under the rubric of Algeria’s EMP associa-
tion agreement. Outside the scope of formal EU frameworks, after 
2003, efforts were made to initiate energy dialogue with Libya. In 
December 2004, bilateral political dialogue between the EU and the 
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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was for-
mally established and developed from 2005.
If policy- makers recognized that such initiatives had developed 
in a fragmented fashion, deliberation then (apparently) moved to a 
more overarching strategic level. Discussion was pushed in particular 
by the United Kingdom (UK) presidency in the second half of 2005. 
The October 2005 EU summit at Hampton Court agreed to a formal 
commitment to move toward the definition of a common European 
energy policy. A first set of proposals was set out in the European 
Commission’s (hereafter: the Commission) March 2006 Green Paper. 
This paper started from the premise that “acting together, [the EU] 
has the weight to protect and assert its interests” (Commission of 
the European Communities 2006a). The paper identified a number of 
practical, technical priorities in relation to the internal dimensions of 
energy policy. The most significant new departure was, however, at 
the international and strategic level. The Commission argued that the 
EU needed a “coherent external energy policy,” agreement on which 
would represent “a break from the past”—a past characterized by a 
conspicuous lack of unity and coordination. The paper proposed a 
Strategic EU Energy Review, with regular follow- up of political discus-
sions; a network of “energy correspondents” to facilitate coordination 
between member states; “a better integration of energy objectives into 
broader relations with third countries”; coordinated response mecha-
nisms in relation to crises in energy supplies; and the development of 
interconnecting energy systems between different geographical areas, 
as a means of transcending the so far partial technical cooperation 
pursued separately with individual partner states (Commission of the 
European Communities 2006b).
Responding to the Green Paper, member- state representatives in 
the European Council accepted that “foreign and development policy 
aspects are gaining increasing importance to promote energy policy 
objectives with other countries.” They backed the Commission’s calls 
for better coordination, and more specifically for a comprehensive 
Strategic Energy Review, “addressing in particular the aims and 
actions needed for an external energy policy over the medium- to long-
 term” (Council of the European Union 2006). In a follow- up note to 
the Council, the Commission stated that energy security policy “must 
also be consistent with the EU’s broader foreign policy objectives such 
as conflict prevention and resolution, nonproliferation and promoting 
human rights” (Commission of the European Communities 2006a). 
Such linkages were pushed inter alia by the Benelux states (Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), which urged the Political and 
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Security Committee to drop its reluctance to engage in energy mat-
ters and argued that European leverage would be strengthened by 
“embedding energy in a wider range of subjects” (Benelux Position 
Paper 2007).
The then external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero- Waldner 
revealed that the aim to bolster the foreign policy dimensions of energy 
policy was the key driving force behind the ENP. She admitted that 
the Russia- Ukraine gas dispute at the beginning of 2006 was “a wake 
up call, reminding us that energy security needs to be even higher on 
our political agenda” (Ferrero- Waldner 2006). Indeed, some analysts 
saw energy security concerns as the only factor linking the diverse 
regions included within the ENP and as the main issue according the 
latter some logical rationale (Danreuther 2006). At the first high- level 
ENP conference held on September 3, 2007, Commissioner Ferrero-
 Waldner listed energy as a top priority and floated the idea of a new 
“neighbourhood energy agreement” (Ferrero- Waldner 2007).
Further initiatives commenced to deepen energy cooperation with 
Turkey, in recognition of the latter’s importance as a transit route into 
the EU and Ankara’s influence in the wider Black Sea and Caspian 
regions. By 2007, energy was a prominent issue in nearly all external 
political dialogues, where it had been barely mentioned five years pre-
viously—this, according to one official, requiring member states to 
look at energy from a common European perspective and not merely 
through the lens of their national policies. Twenty- two million euros 
from one of the Commission’s post- 2007 external relations budgets—
the development cooperation instrument (DCI)—was allocated to 
energy projects, representing 7 percent of funding. Eurobarometer 
polls suggested a clear majority of the European population wished 
to see a more common EU energy policy (although in a number of 
Central and Eastern European states and in Finland the balance of 
opinion was against such deeper cooperation) (European Commission 
Eurobarometer Unit 2007).
Rhetorical commitments incrementally intensified. At the end 
of 2006, Commission president José Manuel Barroso declared that 
energy had been “until recently a forgotten subject in the European 
agenda. Now it is back at the heart of European integration, where it 
began with the creation of the Coal and Steel Community. And where 
it belongs.” He was confident that by this stage a “quick revolution” 
had taken place, with member states dropping their nationally cen-
tered approaches and genuinely agreeing on the desirability of a com-
mon European energy strategy (Barroso 2006). He committed the EU 
to making energy a priority topic in all summits with third countries. 
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During his stint as external relations commissioner, which ended in 
2004, Chris Patten had engaged little with energy issues; for his suc-
cessor, Ferrero- Waldner, energy became a staple part of diplomatic 
activity. The deputy director general for energy at the Commission 
railed that “those who try to hide the fact that energy has moved 
into the realm of foreign policy are trying to forget reality . . . Why 
can’t Europe bring energy politics into the core of external policies?” 
(Barabaso 2007).
A number of institutional innovations reflected the new priority 
attached to energy issues. The network of “Energy correspondents” 
was launched in May 2007, linking together the key personnel cov-
ering energy issues in member states and the Brussels institutions. 
This was conceived as the core of “an energy crisis management sys-
tem” (PlattsEU Energy 2006). An energy unit was created within the 
Commission’s external relations department, with instructions from 
commissioners that energy be woven into policies in each geographical 
area: this unit was charged with ensuring that henceforth geographi-
cal departments assessed and justified policies in terms of how these 
contributed toward energy security. A number of member states advo-
cated moving all decisions on energy security to qualified majority 
voting (QMV)—they contrasted the stagnation of unanimity- bound 
foreign policy making with the qualified majority voting that had, 
they argued, ensured more productive debate in the area of climate 
change.
On January 10, 2007, the Commission published its eagerly 
awaited Strategic Energy Review. This reiterated the main principles 
and objectives that had taken shape during 2006: the need for greater 
“capability to react in times of external energy security pressure”; the 
importance of international partnerships based on “shared rules or 
principles derived from EU [internal] energy policy”; the desirabil-
ity of “comprehensive partnerships based on mutual interest, trans-
parency, predictability and reciprocity”; the need for some form of 
energy supply solidarity mechanism, especially for states dependent 
on a single gas supplier; the intention to make available increased 
funding for energy projects through the EU’s new financial instru-
ments; the need to promote “transparent legal frameworks” in pro-
ducer states; and the idea of European coordinators to represent EU 
interests in key international energy projects (Commission of the 
European Communities 2007).
The March 2007 EU summit agreed on an energy action plan for 
2007–2009. This reiterated a series of core principles, based on the 
need for diversification; crisis response mechanisms; transparency 
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both between member states and within producer states’ gover-
nance structures; and an assessment of current patterns of energy 
imports into different member states (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007). The June 2007 summit, at which the new Lisbon 
Treaty was hammered out between European leaders, included a 
number of developments pertinent to energy. A new legal base was 
introduced in the Treaty for EU legislation in the field of energy, along 
with provisions for qualified majority voting in some areas of energy 
policy. Poland insisted on a new energy solidarity clause, this repre-
senting one of its threats to veto a new Treaty mandate—although the 
reference to energy policy needing to be in accordance with “a spirit 
of solidarity between member states” was less committal and specific 
than Poland had wanted. Some of the more general reforms agreed 
also had relevance for energy security. The powers of the high repre-
sentative to speak on behalf of the EU were enhanced, fusing powers 
hitherto falling to a number of different commissioners (although the 
UK insisted that the post would not be called “foreign minister” and 
that there was reference to the fact that these new powers would not 
cut across national foreign policies). Some member- state representa-
tives reported that they supported this revision thinking in particular 
of energy policy. In mid- 2008, preparations began for a new strategic 
review that would consider the need for additional energy security 
policy instruments.
Under the Lisbon Treaty a new energy department has been cre-
ated, combining energy and foreign policy diplomats—a move that 
offers the possibility of a more security- informed energy strategy. 
However, the Treaty also provides for separate energy and climate 
change commissioners, with the new high representative for foreign 
and security policy seemingly marginal to both these issues. At the 
time of writing, it is clear that the Lisbon Treaty reinforces a formal 
European energy security mandate but it remains to be seen exactly 
how this will be developed in terms of institutional innovation.
Part of the explanation for this incipient Europeanization is to be 
found in external factors. Indeed, it is not difficult to intuit the geopo-
litical concerns driving all this new activity. The Commission’s 2005 
paper famously suggested that the EU’s import dependency for oil was 
set to increase from 52 percent in 2003 to 95 percent in 2030, and for 
gas from 36 to 84 percent over the same period, and that in absolute 
terms EU import requirements would double by 2030 (Commission of 
the European Communities 2006c) The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) estimated that $200 billion worth of investment per year—
equivalent to 2 percent of global gross domestic product—would be 
03_Birchfield_Ch02.indd   46 4/12/2011   5:23:34 PM
Foreign Policy and Energy Security 47
needed in increases to production capacity to meet energy require-
ments by 2030. It was also calculated that by 2012 the EU would face 
a 30 percent shortfall in its gas import requirements. While reserves 
are set to decrease, demand for oil and gas is predicted to rise expo-
nentially. It is estimated that in 2035 global energy consumption will 
be double that of 2005, with fast- developing economies such as those 
of China and India hungry for ever- increasing supplies of oil and gas. 
Record high oil prices during the mid- 2000s, Russia’s periodic inter-
ruptions of gas supplies to Ukraine, and terrorists’ threats to target 
energy pipelines have all additionally helped propel energy to the top 
of the foreign policy agenda.
The Liberal Model of Energy Security
Adding to concerns over rising dependency is an internal dynamic 
that accords more to institutionalist, spillover- type explanations. If 
Europeanization has advanced in the energy sphere, this can only 
be understood in the context of the interstice between internal and 
external policies.
A liberalized internal energy market is routinely presented as 
Europe’s best foreign policy tool. The internal market fosters a more 
efficient and flexible distribution of energy supplies within Europe. 
And it also shapes the external dimension of energy security. Internal 
market rules help break up powerful non- European energy multina-
tionals. State- backed oil and gas giants from non- European countries 
are less able to play divide- and- rule politics with member states, as 
supplies flow without restriction across European borders. Moreover, 
the internal market serves as the model for regulatory rules and stan-
dards to be extended to oil- and gas- producing states in other regions. 
The single European energy market also acts as a more powerful 
incentive for producer states to sign up to the principles of energy 
interdependence. It is the EU’s best negotiating tool to win conces-
sions from producers.
The Commission has pushed to deepen internal market liberaliza-
tion by requiring companies to separate out (or “unbundle”) the gen-
eration of power from control over its distribution. The Commission 
has presented this as key not only to internal efficiency but also to 
external security. To the extent that large third- country companies, 
such as Russian giant Gazprom, would also be required to “unbun-
dle” within the European market; this would protect EU consumers 
from these firms gaining a dominant position. Breaking apart national 
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energy champions within Europe would make it harder for large non-
 European firms, like Gazprom, to negotiate their way into dominant 
positions simply through a small number of bilateral deals.
Internal EU competition laws condition foreign policy positions. 
For example, they have required non- EU oil- producing countries to 
drop traditional “destination clauses,” through which they tradition-
ally prevented a buyer passing on surplus supplies to other states. 
Removing such provisions undermines the exclusivity of bilateral con-
tracts. Supplies are better able to flow to where they are needed within 
the European Union, and national EU governments gain leverage over 
producer states. Europeanized internal rules are what provide foreign 
policy leverage and unity.
European policy- makers have readily acknowledged that complet-
ing the internal market in energy is necessary for external influence 
and unity. The rules and regulations of the internal market are defined 
as the key foundation to the EU’s international projection in energy 
matters. New EU energy partnerships around the world offer coop-
eratively to draw producer states into a European market–governance 
area. Integration and partnership are said to reign rather than zero-
 sum geopolitics. Most recently, new energy cooperation clauses have 
been inserted into the EU’s eastern partnership. The EU has also sup-
ported and sought to harness the Energy Charter Treaty as a pivot of 
rules- based multilateralism in energy.
Among member states, British energy policy has been the most 
market oriented. Having already liberalized its own markets, the 
UK has the most to gain from ensuring that market reform is imple-
mented in other EU states and beyond Europe. One diplomat defines 
the aim of external UK energy security as, “To take the politics out 
of energy.” Officials insist that liberalization has increased long-
 term investment to increase production capacity, rebutting fears that 
investors need long- term contracts protected from market instability. 
The UK is forceful in urging the EU to push for more competitive 
international oil and gas markets. It insists that offering Gazprom 
downstream access into the EU market is the best way of pushing 
this supposed bogeyman of international energy into making long-
 term investments to increase production capacity. While the UK is 
the most pro- market of member states, others have adopted similar 
rhetoric. Spain has largely privatized its energy sector and invested 
heavily in liquified natural gases (LNGs) as a way of injecting greater 
fluidity into gas supplies. Even French policy- makers recognize that 
energy security should be predicated on a “logic of market integra-
tion” (Lamy 2007).
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Geopolitics Return
Part of the story of external energy policy is indeed liberal internation-
alist. But another part is decidedly geopolitical. And it is this part that 
is in the ascendant. Significantly, so far this trend has fractured EU 
unity rather than act as a prompt to deeper coordination. Geopolitics 
have been as much about zero- sum competition between different 
member states as between producer states and the EU as a whole.
Producer states’ more assertive emphasis on short- term national 
interests has led EU governments to question market- based 
approaches. The “economization” of international energy has been 
arrested. The fear is prevalent that the internal market is already too 
open to third- country producers to give the EU sufficient leverage to 
negotiate reciprocal liberalization for their investments in producer 
states. Even in relation to oil supplies, which are more market- based 
than gas trading, the reliance on bilateral, highly politicized energy 
deals is on the rise. Many member states have not definitively given 
up on the market but they are “hedging” bilateral energy deals in case 
things become more acutely geopolitical in the future (Linde 2007). 
European policy may not be as geopolitical as United States (US) 
energy security strategy—which most analysts judged to have become 
increasingly militarized during the Bush administration—but it does 
exhibit more of a geostrategic flavor than it hitherto did.
The internal market is still not integrated enough—even at the level 
of basic infrastructural links within Europe itself—either to serve as 
a common regulatory- governance magnet for producer states or to 
absorb external shocks. Member states have rejected proposals, for 
example, for common strategic storage facilities managed by an EU- 
level agency. A September 2008 IEA report expressed concerns over 
the EU’s failure to implement commitments to market liberalization 
(Platts EU Energy Review 2008). Another independent review car-
ried out for the European Parliament highlighted the extent to which 
bilateral agreements are distorting efficiency and leading the EU into 
the uncertainties of prisoners’ dilemma diplomatic brinkmanship 
(Keppler 2007). In summer 2009 the Commission opened infringe-
ment procedures against a total of 25 member states related to energy 
market protectionism (EurActiv 2009a).
Most notably, the principle of “unbundling” has been blocked 
by a coalition of market- skeptical member states, led by France and 
Germany. The European Parliament’s two- year battle to retain full 
unbundling came to an end in March 2009, when it assented to a 
diluted package of reforms. Member states are now able to choose one 
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of three options: the full unbundling of ownership, the independent 
operating of the energy distribution system, or the independent oper-
ating of transmission (with parent companies in charge of supervi-
sion). Several have already unbundled ownership unilaterally, but the 
majority look set to rein back market principles.
This dilution of market principles has important external dimen-
sions. Much revolves around the more technical detail of energy 
questions; but from this detail emerge crucial questions of high poli-
tics. The proposal for an EU- level clause providing for reciprocal 
market access between the EU and producer states has in essence 
been dropped. Each European government will have the freedom 
to decide whether or not big energy contracts are to be based on 
producer states providing reciprocal access to their markets. Now 
all deals involving non- European companies have to be approved 
by national regulators. One regulator alone can block a deal with 
pan- European coverage, rather than there being a one- stop EU- 
level mechanism to approve market opening deals. Member states 
have ensured that they will not be required to abide by an approach 
based on market interdependence rather than geopolitical trade- off. 
A number of member states reject even the notion of transparency 
and information sharing between EU member states on the bilat-
eral energy deals that each concludes. A new EU energy agency has 
been created but is limited to overseeing loose coordination between 
national regulators and is bereft of powers to force liberalization on 
reluctant member states.
Russia had made the fair point that the proposed “reciprocity 
clause”—or what the press dubbed the “Gazprom clause”—would 
impose on Russian suppliers a degree of liberalization and market 
discipline to which the EU was unwilling to subject its own energy 
companies. Russia argued that this clause was legally incompatible 
with the EU- Russia partnership and cooperation agreement provi-
sions on nondiscrimination. While the UK expressed concerns that 
the principle of reciprocity was being used to legitimize protectionism, 
its own reaction to Gazprom’s interest in Centrica (British Gas) was 
defensive. Vladimir Putin threatened to drop the Nord Stream pipe-
line project if the EU did not give Russia a guaranteed level of demand 
for future years. Faced with a choice of either extending to itself the 
market openness it would have Gazprom abide by or retracting from 
liberal principles externally as well as internally, the EU chose the lat-
ter option. The EU has abandoned the liberal argument that the best 
defense against Gazprom and other third- country energy giants is full 
liberalization and unbundling, which would prevent these companies 
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buying up distribution networks and establishing a dominant market 
position.
The increasingly preferential protection accorded to national 
energy champions represents a dramatic return to “economic nation-
alism” within Europe (Vos 2006). When President Nicolas Sarkozy 
pushed through a merger between Suez Gulf Power Company (Suez) 
and Gaz de France (GDF) unashamedly creating a new powerful 
“national champion” in 2007, French Europe minister Jean- Pierre 
Jouyet stated that such preferential strategic measures represented 
the “vision of what could be the energy policy for Europe.”1 Italy 
has pumped increasing amounts of financial sweeteners into Ente 
Nazionale Idrocarburi (Eni) to subsidize international deals whose 
financial viability is dubious.
With governments backing their respective national champions in 
signing bilateral contracts, EU competition law has not been invoked 
against such deals. The Commission’s competition directorate has 
been reluctant to get drawn into the external politics of energy, 
and no member state has pushed this in the European Court of 
Justice. When the Commission took its antimonopoly action against 
Microsoft, energy experts noted the political significance of the fact 
that similar action against Gazprom had not been contemplated. The 
Commission says it has no locus over the political conditions included 
in long- term bilateral contracts, as long as they do not include desti-
nation restrictions—that is, as long as German Energy On (E.On), 
for example, can sell Russian gas to the wider European market and 
other suppliers. In practice even this basic transferability of energy is 
absent, with the European market carved up into fiefdoms served by 
separate contracts with Gazprom and other external suppliers.
External energy supply is now driven by the need for a diversi-
fication of supplies. Producer states complain that the EU preaches 
mutually beneficial, market- based solutions but then urges policies 
that reduce political dependence on these “partners” (Stern 2002).
With oil supplies supposedly fungible and governed by markets that 
should clear and self- correct at any given price, diversification is 
a clearly geopolitical design. The tilt toward geopolitics is further 
driven by the increasing importance of gas supplies—which are 
shaped by political deals over fixed supply routes rather than, as in 
the case of oil, supplied onto an open international market. While 
much European rhetoric insists that energy supply is a matter for pri-
vate companies rather than government command, the EU increas-
ingly seeks to direct producer governments to increase production 
and export capacity.
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European energy companies commonly criticize governments and 
the Commission for being insufficiently pro- market and for increas-
ingly intervening in a political fashion. But their own behavior in 
practice prioritizes alliance building and the protection of existing 
dominant market positions. Energy officials in the Commission note 
that network industries are the most resistant of all sectors to liberal-
ization. European energy companies have fought hard to gain support 
from their respective national governments to secure long- term pref-
erential deals with individual third- country producers on a bilateral 
basis.
The debate now is not so much about reverting from political deals 
to market principles, but whether the EU can substitute the current 
plethora of contracts signed by individual companies for overarch-
ing, umbrella deals to buy certain quantities for Europe as a whole. 
Such deals have notably been concluded with Turkmenistan and Iraq. 
In addition, at the time of this writing, a consortium is being final-
ized to undertake common, bulk purchasing of Central Asian and 
Caspian supplies. However, these common accords remain the excep-
tion rather than the rule, and those that have been signed do little 
to remove doubts about whether commonly contracted supplies will 
actually reach European markets.
Many officials suggest that the tougher international energy pan-
orama requires the EU to drop the pretence that energy policies are 
to be based on liberal interdependence. Officials increasingly lament 
that it is “unrealistic” to expect key producer states to sign up to a 
model based on the extension of the EU’s own internal market. They 
point to a whole range of disquieting trends. Azerbaijan responded to 
the 2008 Georgia conflict by diverting additional supplies to Russia 
and eastward, nervous about relying so much on the Baku- Tbilisi-
 Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to the west. Gazprom has proposed to buy all 
Libya’s oil and gas exports. In most member states foreign ministries 
have fought to gain a say over energy policy, to politicize what they 
tend to see as the overly technocratic approach followed by energy 
and trade departments. One report concludes that decision- making 
on energy security has already moved in significant measure into the 
hands of national security strategists (Austin and Bochkarev 2007).
One senior official acknowledges that the host of supposedly rules-
 based Memorandums of Understanding that the EU has signed with 
third countries have produced nothing more than “empty talks.” 
Diplomats prefer to define the EU model as one of “regulated liber-
alization”; a “third way . . . between markets and geopolitics,” pred-
icated upon “political dialogue and cooperation.” One of the EU’s 
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particularly senior producer- state interlocutors observes that the EU 
is “egotistically geopolitical” but seeks to mask this with rules- based 
discourse.
These trends are evident in all main producer regions. The reach 
of EU internal market norms remains especially limited in the Gulf. 
Here member- state governments have rather sought energy coopera-
tion on the back of traditional geopolitical forms of engagement, such 
as security cooperation and arms sales. In North Africa the EU has 
offered increasing amounts of technical cooperation to boost energy 
links and regulatory harmonization in the energy sector, based on 
the existing market- oriented acquis of the EMP. The EU talks of cre-
ating a Mediterranean Energy Ring. However, with North African 
producers resistant to the market- governance model, in countries 
like Algeria bilateral political agreements and deals have increased in 
number. An interesting aside to the sagas of “pipeline politics” is that 
public funding for LNG facilities has not been readily forthcoming. 
LNGs may be more market- susceptible, but policy- makers fret that 
they are geopolitically more vulnerable to attack.
It is, of course, in relation with Russia that Europe’s geopoliti-
cal stance has emerged most clearly. The well- known differences 
between member states are not over the need for a more geopoliti-
cal approach toward Russia on energy issues. Rather, they are over 
what such a political approach should consist of: confrontation or 
uncritical engagement (Youngs 2009). Most states, and particularly 
Germany, have sought to engage more in pursuit of long- term bilat-
eral contracts. A majority of member states have now signed bilat-
eral deals of some kind with Russian energy companies. Several new 
member states, of course, argue for a tougher stance. Polish politi-
cians admonish member states for their increasingly furtive energy 
deals with Russia. Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus insists that 
the EU must respond in kind to Russia’s securitization of energy and 
drop the “mantra” that the market by itself will provide for Europe’s 
energy security (Eurasia Daily Monitor 2007). A low- level Energy 
Dialogue with Russia has existed since 2000, aimed at extend-
ing market rules, deepening regulatory convergence and improving 
the governance of foreign investment. But progress at this level has 
been stymied by high- politics tensions. Increasing Russian heavy-
 handedness has led to some notable measures, such as the EU’s focus 
now on extending its Energy Community Treaty from the Balkans to 
Ukraine, Turkey, and Moldova. In the wake of the Russia- Ukraine 
gas dispute of January 2009 the EU has increased subsidies available 
to large energy companies to build interconnectors between different 
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European countries—which some have criticized as another step 
away from a free market model (Platts EU Energy Review 2009a). 
Council officials acknowledge that since the Georgia conflict and the 
2009 Russia- Ukraine dispute the “market purists” are in full retreat. 
The prospect of Russian control over key pipelines passing through 
Georgia has further politicized energy calculations.
In September 2008 the Commission and the African Union for-
mally established a new energy partnership. This could attract up 
to 1 billion euros for energy infrastructure projects in sub- Saharan 
Africa, including help for the Trans- Saharan gas pipeline. Energy 
Commissioner Andris Piebalgs noted that these new steps in Africa 
represented an overtly political reaction to a new Gazprom partner-
ship with Nigeria as well as to the Georgian conflict (Financial Times 
2008). In Africa the EU talks the same talk of extending internal mar-
ket rules. Economic Partnership Agreements are formally to involve 
liberalizing energy markets. But this approach in practice has little 
resonance. Most energy experts see the Trans- Saharan pipeline as a 
purely geopolitical venture whose economic fundamentals do not make 
sense. Diplomatic deals are increasingly pursued by France and others 
with Angola. Several European states help the US navy in patrolling 
the Gulf of Guinea. Responding to China’s presence in Africa is seen 
as requiring a more geopolitical approach and presence.
Pipeline Politics
The geopolitical dimension is indeed starkly manifest in the thicken-
ing intricacies of “pipeline diplomacy.” There is now a great deal of 
new activity relating to the development of additional pipeline capac-
ity from the Caspian Basin and Central Asia into Europe. European 
governments’ preferences remain balanced between support for routes 
involving Russia and those designed to exclude Russia, especially the 
Nabucco pipeline set to run through Turkey into southeastern Europe. 
Prompted by many member states, the Commission says it is now 
more willing than before to back big (Russia- bypassing) infrastruc-
ture projects and take a more geopolitical view on these—including 
not only Nabucco but also the more speculative White Stream pipe-
line planned to run directly from the Caucasus across Ukraine. It is 
perceived that without backing, the long- planned Nabucco pipeline 
may not get off the ground. Unlike most pipeline projects that are 
constructed by upstream producers to get their gas to export markets, 
Nabucco is being led by a consortium of consumer- state companies 
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without firm guarantees yet of supplies to fill the pipeline. It is a 
clearly political rather than purely commercial undertaking.
However, it is doubtful that this represents the beginning of any 
deep Europeanization of pipeline geopolitics. Major differences 
remain between member states on this issue. Germany remains unen-
thused over European backing for the Nabucco pipeline, in preference 
to its cooperation with Russia on the Nord Stream line. Hungary, 
Italy, Bulgaria, and Greece have all backed the Russian- sponsored 
South Stream project, support that some experts see as fatally under-
mining Nabucco. The Hungarian opposition has pressed for Hungary 
to pull out of South Stream. In July 2009, the new Bulgarian gov-
ernment announced plans to switch from South Stream to Nabucco. 
Conversely Silvio Berlusconi has led Italy into a position even more 
supportive of the Russian- led project. The summer of 2009 witnessed 
further spats and divisions. The Lithuanian government reprimanded 
Andris Piebalgs for his support of Nord Stream. The French energy 
giant GDF Suez then negotiated its way into the Nord Stream con-
sortium, after being denied a role in Nabucco by the latter’s Turkish 
partner (EurActiv 2009b).
With Nabucco’s costs now estimated at 8 billion euros, indus-
try experts judge that it would need Iranian gas to make it viable. 
Many policy- makers and experts opine that Nabucco still needs the 
involvement of at least one European oil major to be workable. The 
Kazakh government rails that the EU has been offering small- scale 
technical cooperation for a generation, but has built nothing; the 
Chinese arrived recently in Kazakhstan and very quickly set to work 
building a pipeline eastward. While Germany seeks partnership with 
Russia on energy, the Czechs retort that “you need two for a partner-
ship” and that the EU and Russia will increasingly be rivals for finite 
resources.
The Russian invasion of Georgia in the summer of 2008 led some 
European governments to conclude that Nabucco needs stronger 
political backing. Others have reached the opposite conclusion, that 
solutions must be sought through and collaboratively with Russia. 
European policies consequently exhibit an inchoate mix of the two 
stances. The European Council in March 2009 asked for “concrete 
action” to develop access to Caspian supplies. The Commission allo-
cated 200 million euros of funding for Nabucco (Platts EU Energy 
Review 2009b).What Nabucco needs even more than public money 
is governments’ backing to unlock political blockages. Some mem-
ber states are beginning to agitate for such involvement. However, 
Caspian states want a broader strategic partnership, and not be 
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treated merely as gas suppliers. Even after two European companies, 
Austrian mineral oil authority (OMV) and Hungarian Oil and Gas 
Public Limited Company (MOL), signed contracts in Kurdistan in 
May 2009 to feed Iraqi oil into Nabucco, coleader of South Stream 
Eni opined that Nabucco would still not fly (Financial Times 2009). 
Also, when the EU presented its “southern corridor” initiative in May 
2009, offering Central Asian suppliers guaranteed levels of long- term 
demand, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan walked away, 
complaining that Europe had placed insufficient incentives on the 
table. In July 2009 Nabucco’s five transit states finally signed the nec-
essary intergovernmental accords to give the project legal ground-
ing. But producer states declined European pressure to accompany 
the signing ceremony with firm promises of supplies into Nabucco. 
Even after this agreement, the lack of funding rendered the project 
doubtful (Denison no year), and key transit state, Turkey, also gave its 
backing to the South Stream project only a month later.
Institutionalized Rules Versus Political 
Maneuverability
So, what can we conclude from these policy trends in terms of the 
reach of Europeanization? The question pertinent to this volume is 
what all these evolving features of policy mean for the extent of com-
monality in European external energy policies. Analysts of European 
foreign policy routinely point to a range of factors seen to be pushing 
in the direction of deeper EU unity: the ongoing processes of “social-
ization” within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); the 
emergence of a “network” of common security perspectives within 
Europe; the influence of convergent “transborder” linkages between 
functionaries, including in the energy sphere. However, the evolution 
of external dimensions of energy security suggests that such dynam-
ics of convergence remain weaker in this sphere than analysts have 
detected in other areas of the CFSP agenda. Common European 
approaches have certainly created the frameworks for potential 
socialization. But, in practice governments’ pursuit of energy security 
tells a more varied story.
It is commonly claimed that the gradual deepening of the internal 
market will drive convergence in the external dimensions of energy 
security policy. The evidence suggests that this has occurred only to a 
limited extent. Some member states have resisted even the most basic 
principles of transparency and information sharing with their EU 
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partners. Such divergence exists not only at the political level but also 
among diplomats and technical experts—if a transborder epistemic 
community exists in the energy sphere it is no more than incipi-
ent and still often diluted by the disparate winds of fierce national 
competition.
What has determined this outcome? France’s external energy 
dependency is relatively low, undercutting its commitment to foreign 
policy unity. Germany has been even more the “spoiler” through its 
Russia policy and increasingly its bilateral efforts in Central Asia. 
Italy gives increasingly explicit political backing to national, bilateral 
energy deals. Conversely, the traditionally skeptical UK has become 
more supportive of EU cooperation, as its own energy dependency is 
set to increase fast. The Netherlands—the EU’s remaining significant 
gas producer—advocates a balance between unity and retaining scope 
for bilateral policies. Objective energy dependencies and mixes still 
engender very different energy narratives between member states.
At a more fine- toothed level, the balance between convergence 
and divergence itself differs across regions. Russia provides the 
most conspicuous examples of disunity. Member- state governments 
have backed their respective national energy champions in signing 
long- term bilateral contracts with Gazprom—and have indeed been 
minded to argue that such deals represent a success for energy secu-
rity. Even in the case of Russia, however, the pull of EU coopera-
tion is not entirely absent, and unity has tightened to some degree as 
Russia has adopted increasingly heavy- handed tactics in the wielding 
of its new energy- based international power. Differences over Russia 
additionally engender contrasting views among member states on 
how assertive the EU should be in prioritizing Central Asia within its 
energy security strategy. This is witnessed at a very general level–in 
differences over how far the EU should challenge Russian primacy 
in Central Asia—and in relation to more specific policy decisions—
such as whether to offer Kazakhstan a place in the ENP or whether 
sanctions should be lifted against Uzbekistan. At the other end of the 
spectrum to Russia, energy strategy in sub- Saharan Africa has been 
least subject to high political tensions between member states, as the 
EU has sought to take the first steps toward regaining its lost influ-
ence on the continent.
Policy in the Middle East and North Africa has benefited from 
more institutionalized long- term partnerships that the EU has sought 
to use as a base from which to deepen energy cooperation. While 
this undoubtedly renders common EU- level initiatives of great sig-
nificance, even under the rubric of the EMP—the most strongly 
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institutionalized EU framework embracing oil- and gas- producer 
states—competitive dynamics are at least as evident as collusion. 
Member states increasingly undercut each other in an effort to gain 
access to Algerian energy supplies, this compounded by the latter’s 
rejection of the ENP action plan offered to it. Spain and Italy in par-
ticular have justified such bilateralism by expressing frustration at 
the lack of north European backing for deeper EU- level engagement 
in North Africa. Outside the scope of the EMP, Libya has attracted 
even more of an open rivalry between member states keen to gain 
early preference with the internationally rehabilitated Colonel 
Gaddafi—even as they talk of enticing Libya into the EMP and/or 
the Neighborhood Policy.
In the Gulf, the weight of national diplomacy is even more pro-
nounced in relation to the impact of common EU forums and initia-
tives. This is due to a combination of factors: the determination of the 
larger member states to safeguard their national deals and channels of 
access; the relative disinterest in the region of most other member states; 
the tendency of Gulf Cooperation Council states themselves still to pri-
oritize their links with national capitals rather than conceive the EU as 
primary interlocutor; and the limited purchase in the area of traditional 
EU economic, developmental, and regulatory policy instruments. EU 
unity is notable in relation to Iran’s nuclear program, but differences 
predominate over the prospect of energy cooperation with the Islamic 
Republic. Here Italy has been increasingly the most forward- leaning 
state in seeking to deepen energy ties on a bilateral basis with Teheran. 
A limited degree of Europeanization has taken shape in policy toward 
Iraq but—even aside from the original differences over the 2003 inva-
sion—the nature of this country’s security situation and political chal-
lenges continue to engender contrasting views among member states. 
These militate against the possibility of establishing the foundations for 
a common energy strategy toward Baghdad.
In sum, the long- term vision based on a commitment to promoting 
market- governance reform in the management of energy resources is 
giving way to crisis- mode geopolitics. Pipeline brinkmanship and a 
“race to contract” are displacing cosmopolitan holism. As one EU 
policy- maker acknowledged: “There will only be a common energy 
policy when there is a crisis big enough to create it.” At present, mem-
ber states appear content to continue with a nominal commitment to 
market- based energy policy and to the better governance of energy 
sectors, while also adopting bilateral strategies that pull in the oppo-
site direction on both of these questions.
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Note
 1. Quoted in Financial Times, September 4, 2007.
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Chapter Three
Common Rules without Strategy: EU 
Energy Policy and Russia
Jonas Grätz
The European Union’s (EU’s) energy policy toward Russia—or, to 
put it more precisely—the absence of a coherent policy, is a hotly 
debated topic in academic and policy circles. The overall message is 
clear and has been reiterated for many years: As long as the EU does 
not act in a (vertically) coherent way it cannot be externally effective. 
But coherence would require that member states limit their individual 
sovereignty over decisions for the sake of a greater autonomy at the 
community level. This has proven to be especially problematic with 
regard to energy policy, which may be regarded as a domain of “high 
politics” in external relations and is subject to politicized debates 
internally as well. Historically, energy policy has been regarded as 
a national prerogative, strongly linked with national security and 
public service. Also, a common external policy needs an agreement 
on what it is about: Should energy policy toward Russia concentrate 
mainly on maintaining energy security or should it be seen as the core 
of the overall foreign policy toward Russia? As energy is an impor-
tant aspect both for the EU and Russia, a conflation between exter-
nal energy policy and foreign policy in general can easily occur. This 
makes it even harder to arrive at a common position, as there are 
far more possible objectives in general foreign policy than in energy 
policy. In addition, foreign energy policy does not only involve state 
actors, but also big economic actors that control the economic pro-
cesses underlying energy policy.
This chapter evaluates the EU’s external energy policy toward 
Russia according to the general criteria of energy security policy. 
After giving an overview over the challenges Russia poses to EU 
energy security, the chapter will examine the policy measures the EU 
has taken vis- à- vis Russia. When evaluating the success of the actions 
taken, special emphasis will be on the goals of the various actors in 
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the EU. The account of the EU’s energy policy toward Russia focuses 
on the following three levels: External initiatives, aimed at enhanc-
ing energy security via a reduction of risks effected by Russian det-
rimental behavior; external initiatives, aimed at increasing resilience 
by diversifying energy supply routes; and internal initiatives in the gas 
market, which have direct effects on Russia. Specific attention will 
be given to the natural gas sector, as it has been in the focus of the 
EU- Russia energy relationship. This is due to its high capital intensity 
and the rigid grid- bound transportation needs, which bind suppli-
ers and consumers closely together in a long- term relationship. This 
necessitates a much higher degree of coordination than the oil or coal 
markets. In addition, Russia’s reserves of natural gas are much bigger 
than its oil reserves.
The Russian Challenge to 
EU Energy Security
Declining indigenous production of the EU and substantial Russian 
gas reserves result in a mutual interest of the EU in Russian gas sup-
plies and of Russia in the EU gas market. However, notwithstanding 
this mutual interest, the goals of the actors diverge substantially. With 
some simplification, the challenge to the EU is most often described as 
being the result of a Russian worldview and corresponding priorities 
that fundamentally differ from those of the EU (Finon and Locatelli 
2008, 424).Whereas the EU adheres to a “markets and institutions” 
approach envisaging strong and binding rules allowing markets to 
allocate value, Russia pursues a realist “regions and empires” strat-
egy, focused on establishing the state as the prime decision- maker, 
presiding over the economy. This goes along with a fuzzy boundary 
between economic and political goals.1
Thus, current Russian energy policy is based on the conception 
of oil and gas resources as strategic goods, requiring the reliance 
on direct influence of state actors rather than on market forces to 
regulate their extraction and distribution. Increasing state influence 
and regulation of the sector by manipulation of laws is partly a con-
sciously planned policy in order to be able to use oil and gas corpora-
tions, especially the gas monopoly Gazprom, as domestic and foreign 
policy tools in the absence of other attractive instruments (ideologi-
cal, institutional etc.) and partly the result of spontaneous processes 
of property redistribution to the bureaucracy and security services 
(Easter 2008; Treisman 2007; Zudin 2006).
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In this context, several challenges have been discussed:
Some have argued that the renationalization of the oil and gas • 
sector and the resulting deinstitutionalization of the sector led to 
underinvestment in exploration and production in Russia. This 
was seen as a possible threat to future gas export possibilities.2 
However, substantial room remains for reducing gas demand 
inside Russia, which is Gazprom’s biggest market from a volume, 
but not from a revenue perspective. Meanwhile, more than 60 
percent of Gazprom’s revenues are generated on the EU market 
(Grätz 2009, 67). Thus, because of the attractiveness of the EU 
market for Gazprom, a supply shortfall is not very likely. Rather, 
it makes sense for Gazprom to foster the perception of resource 
scarcity by upholding information scarcity on investments, in 
order to obtain more price- setting power by simultaneously driv-
ing a strategy of high market penetration (Christie 2009, 10).
Gazprom drives an expansion strategy to the EU’s downstream • 
markets striving to enlarge its market share and profits. As the 
highest profits can be obtained by rising barriers toward pos-
sible competitors, Gazprom has a vested interest in segmenting 
member states’ markets (Noel 2008). Thus, Gazprom tries to 
use the opportunities of gas market liberalization in order to 
monopolize markets and thereby to undercut the EU’s liberal-
ization and market homogenization agenda. What is more, in an 
effort to monopolize the EU market, it tries to obstruct the EU’s 
diversification strategies by launching competing pipeline proj-
ects and co- opting potential independent suppliers from Central 
Asia (Milov 2008, 6; Götz 2008). As this increases Gazprom’s 
market power it endangers energy security by hampering sup-
plier diversification and imposing artificially high prices on 
consumers.
This economic strategy goes along with a strategy to harvest the • 
political gains that go along with economic dependence (Liuhto 
2010). In the “near abroad,” Gazprom traditionally used the 
dependence of Central Asian countries on export routes through 
Russia, relieving it from the pressure to invest in drilling and 
exploration at home and achieving the additional goal of bind-
ing these states to Russia politically (Christophe 1998; Westphal 
2003; Vahtra 2005). As a new development, Gazprom and 
state- owned Transneft’ were used as foreign policy tools against 
“unfriendly” neighbors such as Ukraine, Georgia, or Lithuania 
(Milov 2008, 7f; Finon and Locatelli 2008). Thus, Russia aims 
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at reaping the “double dividend” of revenue flows and political 
influence generated by market power (Christie 2009, 12).
External Initiatives toward Russia
The EU’s external energy policy toward Russia can be traced back to 
the beginning of the 1990s. Since the last days of the Soviet Union,  the 
European Commission’s (hereafter: the Commission) approach was 
not to limit dependence on Russian energy imports per se, but to use 
structural power by involvement of capital from the EU in Russia’s 
energy sector and, most important, by protecting these investments 
not on the basis of personal deals but on the basis of institutionalized 
rules agreed at the international level. Such an international regime 
would have limited the potential of political actors to interfere with 
commercial transactions in an unforeseeable way and thus would have 
limited the security of supply risk of arbitrary behavior by Russia. As 
these efforts failed, the Commission consistently tried to develop new 
formats for promoting its vision. But member states were not helpful 
in the Commission’s efforts, as they established their own bilateral 
cooperation schemes and could deliver on Russian demands far more 
effectively.
The Energy Charter Treaty
The first major tool was the Energy Charter, which evolved into a 
multilateral treaty. The Charter process was started in June 1990 by 
Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers, who surprised other heads of 
state when he distributed his proposal at the European Council sum-
mit in Dublin. The basic idea was to export European rules to Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet space in order not only to solve the problem of 
property rights protection, but also to spur the transition to a market 
economy and to stabilize the European neighborhood macroeconomi-
cally (Balmaceda 2002: 22; Kemner 1996: 210; Konoplyanik 1992). 
This idea was then packed with symbolic meaning by comparing the 
plan to the European Coal and Steel Community that started the EU 
integration process back in 1952. So, not only were energy policy 
goals strived for but also wider goals of foreign policy, such as the 
stabilization and ultimately the integration of Russia into a European 
rules- based order. Institutionally, the plan not only foresaw the guar-
antee of property rights for investors, but it should also be able to 
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regulate transportation, market access, and constant access to all 
hydrocarbon reserves.3
The plan reflected several structural conditions present at that 
time. First of these is the decrepit situation of the Soviet energy sector 
and the Soviet economy in general that was in desperate need of capi-
tal injections; second, low energy prices with oil hovering between 
$15–20 per barrel, resulting in low investment levels; third, the need 
of Western and Eastern Europe for energy imports and possible vul-
nerabilities arising from excessive reliance on oil imports from the 
Middle East; and finally the capital and technological resources 
Western Europe had to offer. At the same time, a historical situation 
was seen to be present which could result in an integration process 
between the Soviet space and Europe on the EU’s own terms.
The proposal met the approval of the other heads of state and the 
European Council mandated the Commission to elaborate on the basic 
principles of an Energy Charter. The Commission started to work 
immediately and won the approval of Soviet diplomats already in the 
beginning of July, who claimed that it was in accord with the Soviet 
“vision of the solution to Europe’s energy problems.”4 Momentum was 
added due to the unraveling Gulf War and plunging Soviet oil produc-
tion. The Commission was especially interested in the proposal, as it 
fit in perfectly with its internal goals of energy market liberalization 
that were worked upon at the same time (Matláry,1997). More spe-
cifically, the Energy Charter could be used to support competition 
on the production level that was sought after as a useful complement 
for the liberalized internal market (EC - COM(91) 548 final: 25). 
The proposal crafted by the Commission contained much more lib-
eral provisions than the original Lubbers proposal—for example it 
postulated the free access to known and future energy resources and 
to their extraction, as well as a free energy market (EC- COM(91) 36 
final: 9). The Council granted negotiation rights to the Commission 
in April 1991.5 Notwithstanding the August coup and the breakup 
process of the Soviet Union, the political declaration initiating the 
Energy Charter process was signed on schedule in December 1991 
with both the Soviet Union and the Soviet Republic as signatories.6 
The Charter contained the political commitment to work on a bind-
ing multilateral treaty that would regulate energy investments, trans-
port, trade, and innovation. It was opened to all interested parties; the 
signatories included Japan and the United States. The treaty would 
contain a basic agreement and several issue- specific protocols.
The negotiations that followed proved to be much more difficult, 
as negotiated provisions were to be made binding. The basic principle 
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of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is the extension of GATT prin-
ciples to energy trade and investment, specifically most- favored-
 nation treatment and national treatment.7 But the negotiation process 
of the ECT was delayed substantially not because of the resistance 
from Russia but because of the disunity on approaches to regulatory 
policy in the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co- operation 
and Development (OECD) camp in general. As the Charter foresaw 
a far- reaching liberalization of transport networks, some member 
states feared losing their grip over the energy sector. As a result, the 
proposal for mandatory third- party access (TPA) to export and tran-
sit pipelines put forward by the Commission and supported by the 
United Kingdom (UK), was dismissed by France and other member 
states. This resulted in a watering down of the provision, which now 
provides only for negotiable access.8 The same disagreements came 
to the forefront regarding foreign direct investment, where notably 
France and Norway resisted the mandatory national treatment princi-
ple of foreign investors, which as a result was made nonbinding (Doré 
1996, 142; Liesen 2004, 52). These disagreements revealed the lack of 
consensus on gas and electricity market liberalization in the EU and 
substantially delayed the negotiation process.9
Further delays occurred because of a lack of competence on the 
side of diplomats and experts from the former Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon) states, which had to familiarize 
themselves with capitalist treaty provisions. But in contrast to the 
internal divisions of the OECD camp, these delays did not reflect a 
disagreement with treaty principles on the Russian side. The only 
caveat from the Russian side was a temporary exemption from cer-
tain rules for transition countries, to allow for relevant laws to be 
adopted. The Russian negotiating team was reform- oriented and 
favored a quick negotiation process, as the energy sector was still 
weakly organized and domestic opposition to the treaty had not yet 
been voiced (Doré 1996, 147; Wälde 1996, 316). In this context, the 
Russian side, aware of possible future difficulties, wanted to use its 
“window of opportunity” of a certain autonomy vis- à- vis certain 
domestic pressure groups to agree on an international accord that 
would then limit the influence of these groups. But the negotiations 
stalled again in 1993, this time due to opposition voiced by the 
United States, who found that provisions on investment were lag-
ging behind other bilateral treaties it had concluded with different 
producer countries.10 This led to a delay of one year, with the basic 
ECT being signed in December 1994, without the United States. At 
that time, one of the Russian negotiators already spoke of possible 
Please clarify 
whether 
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subsequent 
mentions 
treaty can 
be replaced 
with ECT 
to remove 
ambiguity.
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resistance in the Duma and oil- extracting Russian republics.11 As a 
result, a crucial window of opportunity may have been missed by the 
West in drawing out negotiations on the treaty. Thus, the EU itself 
established disincentives for Russia to ratify the treaty by its disunity 
and its incoherent approach to the ECT. This is not to claim that 
Russia would definitely have ratified the treaty if member states had 
acted in a coherent way. This is a recurrent problem, which will be 
explained later in the chapter.
While the treaty was still promoted by the Russian government in 
the 1990s, it was more and more seen as an infringement on sover-
eignty, especially in the Duma, which at that time still constituted a 
force of its own. Leftist factions viewed the treaty as a threat to the 
Russian national interest because it would spur energy exports, would 
represent a “sell- out of the homeland,” and weaken the position of 
domestic capital.12 They were reportedly supported by Gazprom who 
feared obligations to open up its pipeline network to third parties 
and to grant transit rights to Central Asian countries, which would 
have weakened its power (Balmaceda 2002, 23). So, ratification was 
stalled in the Duma committees from 1996 to 1998, and an attempt 
at ratification failed in 1998. As time went by, it became increasingly 
obvious that Russia would not ratify the treaty. In the meantime, as it 
had signed the treaty, Russia was obliged to apply the ECT provision-
ally, as foreseen in Article 45. This gave some investment protection 
to corporations of member states and led to an arbitration case by 
YUKOS (Yuganskneftegas Kuibyshevnefte OrgSintez) shareholders. 
But in August 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed a decree 
to withdraw Russia’s signature from the treaty.
The EU- Russia Energy Dialogue
As the failure of the ECT became more and more evident, the president 
of the Commission, Romano Prodi, launched the bilateral “Energy 
Dialogue” with Russia in 2000 to at least communicate with Russia 
about planned steps in energy market liberalization and to promote 
energy market harmonization. The Energy Dialogue was established 
in October 2000 on a bilateral basis. The Dialogue was based on the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed between Russia and 
the EU in 1994. Both the Commission and the Kremlin appointed 
“single interlocutors,” who are responsible for the process of coopera-
tion. Apart from normal intergovernmental negotiations the interloc-
utors organized some “round tables,” where all relevant stakeholders 
ECT?
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from European and Russian energy business met with government 
officials to discuss their positions and to agree on issues of common 
interest (EC- COM (2004) 777 final). At the outset, four issue areas 
were identified: the implications of the internal energy market for 
the EU- Russia relationship, the sustainable use of energy, security of 
supply and the harmonization of markets. The policy content stayed 
the same: “establish predictable trade rules, improve networks and 
encourage investments by promoting a more stable and transparent 
legal framework.”13
In the beginning, the Commission tried to use the Energy Dialogue 
to promote the ratification of the ECT. But this was fruitless, as energy 
prices had recovered, alleviating Russia’s need for FDI. The central 
Russian political elite now strived for achieving as much control as 
possible over the energy sector. The central task for them was now 
to curb the autonomy of private capital and the regions. New foreign 
investors would only be detrimental to this process.
In connection with the first issue area the Commission also wanted 
to tackle the problem of long- term delivery contracts for gas, includ-
ing destination clauses.14 But attempts were not too successful. No 
overall agreement prohibiting destination clauses has been reached, 
only a renegotiation of contracts to eliminate such clauses on a case-
 by- case basis could be agreed upon.
Since the mid- 2000s, the Energy Dialogue has been used by the EU 
mainly as a device to keep some contact to the Russian side and to 
try to exchange information on energy issues. But even these attempts 
are often jeopardized by the Russian side: Some of the subgroups do 
not meet due to a lack of interest by Russia, which often refuses to 
appoint representatives or agree on schedules. Recently, progress has 
been reported mainly on the energy efficiency topic, most likely due to 
the reason that an amount of 5 million euro in EU funds was allocated 
to promote energy efficiency in Russia in 2009 (EC 2010b, 22f).
Observers of the Energy Dialogue point to the fact, that Russia was 
able to “monopolize” the dialogue several times for its own purposes, 
playing on its bargaining power as a major energy supplier (Westphal 
2005, 18). This is not only due to structural issues such as growing 
energy demand, tighter markets, and high prices that were present 
from 2002 until 2008, which resulted in a “new energy paradigm,” 
as some argued (Helm 2007; Spanjer 2007). These structural condi-
tions cannot fully explain the lack of attention given by Russia to 
the EU level—especially not after the abrupt drop in energy prices in 
mid- 2008. What is more, the EU does not possess the necessary insti-
tutional and structural features to act coherently in the energy sphere, 
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as member states followed their own interests and cooperation proj-
ects with regard to Russia (Barysch 2004, 53f; Westphal 2008). As 
a result, Russia was not interested in the EU level, but oriented its 
efforts toward member states. A sufficient explanation must therefore 
be sought from a more detailed examination of the member state’s 
strategies toward Russia.
The Member State Agenda: Fostering 
National Champions
The Western European gas industry traditionally operated on the 
basis of national or regional distribution monopolies, which negoti-
ated with the suppliers, mainly Algeria, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and Russia (Finon 2004, 185; Wybrew- Bond 1999). The monopo-
lies could keep the balance between supply and demand via their 
function as “gatekeepers.” They were controlling market access and 
concluded accompanying long- term, take- or- pay contracts based on 
rigid oil product- based pricing formulae. Competition only took place 
between fuels and to a very limited extent between gas producers 
when new contracts were negotiated. The pricing formula ensured the 
“competitive” pricing of gas in every market situation and for every 
consumer group and thus guaranteed margins for distributors. For 
suppliers, this arrangement meant that gas could only be sold at the 
border to the monopolies, a condition they were willing to tolerate as 
it guaranteed them substantial long- term stability of demand ( IEA 
1998, 32; Stern 1998).
Privatization and liberalization of the EU’s gas market, which 
began in the early 1990s, began to threaten this order and at the same 
time opened up new possibilities for the national monopolies and sup-
pliers. The easier entry of competitors was threatening their position 
at the same time as they could become competitors in other markets 
as well. Therefore, they tried to keep their traditional position in their 
home market to the largest extent possible, at the same time trying to 
penetrate other markets. Substantial vertical and horizontal integra-
tion took place (Finon and Midttun 2004), supported by national 
politics, in order to form “national champions,” which would be 
able to compete on a European scale without falling prey to a hostile 
takeover. The companies argued that big national champions were 
needed in order to counterbalance the power of suppliers (Bergmann 
2005, 3). Thus, as liberalization moved on, incumbents and national 
politicians formed an alliance to protect their vested interests—the 
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former fearing a deterioration of their position and the latter a loss of 
control over energy policy. This led to a joint “beggar- thy- neighbor” 
strategy of member states and market incumbents, which were on the 
one side eager to exploit the new possibilities opened up by liberaliza-
tion in other markets, whereas they strived to limit competition in 
their own market as far as possible.
This strategy of strengthening national capital was also played out 
in external relations. While claiming to enhance the EU’s security of 
supply, especially German and Italian politicians would offer their 
national incumbents concrete support in gaining access to Russian 
upstream assets by providing and sustaining an undisturbed political 
environment, as well as facilitating asset swaps and granting exemp-
tions from national regulations.
At least in Germany, this policy was pursued with a general frame 
of reference that went beyond energy security goals: A general pol-
icy of integration very much in line with the initial motivations of 
the Energy Charter process was pursued, but this time in absence of 
the common framework the Charter wanted to provide. This pol-
icy was justified within a renewed “Ostpolitik” framework, claim-
ing that integration of Russian and German- cum- European capital 
would eventually contribute to political rapprochement, peace, and 
integration (Rahr 2007; Steinmeier 2007; Whist 2009, 179). Former 
German chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who is now working for 
Russia’s Gazprom, has added geopolitical reasoning to this German 
strategy and “uploads” it to the EU: he claims that the EU needs to 
pursue integration with Russia in order to compete economically, 
politically, and culturally against the United States and rising Asian 
powers such as China (Schröder 2006; 2010). The policy that follows 
from this agenda is opposed to a policy that would result by focusing 
on energy security, where reduction of dependence on a particular 
supplier and not its increase would be in order. Needless to say, this 
foreign policy orientation did not reflect the goals of central Eastern 
European nations, which adopted an Atlantic orientation and wanted 
to integrate with the West, but not with Russia.
The German example shows that a policy that is problematic from 
an energy security viewpoint was deliberately taken out of this policy 
domain and justified with the wider rationale of contributing to eco-
nomic and eventually political integration. However, even if the goal 
of political integration between Russia and Germany (or, for that case, 
the EU) is accepted as a legitimate and achievable goal, it is difficult 
to comprehend how integration of energy sectors could contribute to 
political integration, as the Russian energy sector is marked by deep 
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politicization and subjected to strategic goals of the Russian political 
elite (Liuhto 2010).
These bilateral deals that are pursued by member states were to 
the detriment of the EU’s policy of promoting a common framework. 
These deals rendered it very cheap for the Russian side not to respond 
to demands made by the EU. On the contrary, “gatekeepers” to the 
Russian market such as Gazprom could gain high yields from their 
control of the rules and resources. They could use this control, as well 
as the readiness of European companies to compete with each other, 
for advancing their own projects through asset swaps.
In addition, the national strategies contributed to suboptimal out-
comes for the internal energy policy from a community point of view. 
For example, transit avoidance pipelines such as Nord Stream are not 
only more costly than onshore pipelines but also bypass several EU 
member countries that could have benefited from the additional sup-
plies. Other cases in point are exemptions from EU competition regu-
lations, granted for new projects by national authorities in order to 
make investments more profitable.15
Facilitating Dependence Reduction: 
Promoting Supplier Diversification
Apart from trying to limit the risks of dependence on Russia by pro-
moting common rules, the Commission tried to promote alternative 
supply projects, such as LNG regasification terminals and import pipe-
lines. Here, the Commission mainly proposed to act as a coordinator 
and facilitator of projects already proposed by the industry. It started 
in 1996, when the Council adopted two decisions on trans- European 
energy networks of “common interest,” later termed TEN- E projects 
(EC- 96/391/EC,1996; EC- 1254/96/EC 1996). Priority was given to 
electricity, specifically to interconnections in the internal market, and 
on connecting isolated energy networks to the EU- wide grid. Besides, 
it included also gas interconnection and supply projects. With these 
decisions the Commission got awarded relatively wide- ranging compe-
tencies: Apart from the task to facilitate cooperation between member 
states, it could also decide on granting financial assistance to the des-
ignated projects. Nevertheless, all measures had to be agreed upon in 
regulatory comitology procedure by a qualified majority of the com-
mittee’s member state representatives. The Commission acted swiftly, 
first, by granting funds for feasibility studies for several projects and 
then even by co- financing the capital costs of two electricity undersea 
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cables in 1998, linking Sweden and Poland as well as Norway and the 
Netherlands (ECEnergy 1998). It also proposed to broaden the list of 
projects several times and obtained the approval from the EP and the 
Council. However, except for granting priority status to some LNG 
terminals, no efforts were made to diversify away from traditional 
gas suppliers.
In the early 2000s, external gas infrastructure was given specific 
attention, in line with rising energy prices and the first Commission 
Green Paper on the security of energy supply. The Green Paper explic-
itly mentioned new supply routes from the Caspian Sea basin and 
southern Mediterranean as remedies for insecurities associated with 
growing import dependency (EC - COM (2000) 769 final: 73). In 
2002, the Commission proposed to create a new category for dedi-
cated “Priority Projects,” which should form a special subset of “com-
mon interest” projects. Such projects should be “very important” for 
realizing competition in the internal market or the strengthening of 
security of supply (EC - COM (2001) 775 final: 42). They should be 
entitled to receive as much as 20 percent of estimated total invest-
ment costs from the community budget (EC - COM (2001) 775 final: 
23). The Commission also identified three “priority axes,” includ-
ing two pipelines from Algeria, one northern corridor from Russia 
to the U.K., now being realized with the Nord Stream and BBL pipe-
lines, and one southern corridor from the Caspian Basin via Turkey 
and Greece to the Central European grid, now known as the partly 
competing Nabucco, Interconnection Turkey Greece Italy (ITGI) and 
Trans- Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) projects. These proposals were adopted 
in mid- 2003 with no major changes (EC - 1229/2003/EC 2003). From 
now on, the bulk of the community funding was allocated to gas proj-
ects, predominantly in the Mediterranean region, where gas markets 
were still in their infancy. The Nabucco project and associated pipe-
lines received the largest portion of financial support, amounting to 
11.4 million euro (EC - COM(2006) 443 final: 31).
Already at the end of 2003, the Commission submitted a new pro-
posal on improving the gas network development together with other 
proposals aimed at improving network access and energy efficiency. 
This was mainly in order to broaden the scope of priorities of net-
work development toward meeting the needs of accession countries 
(EC - COM(2003) 743 final). In addition, the Commission proposed 
to add a third category of projects that would receive highest prior-
ity. This was due to the fact that the Commission was dissatisfied 
with the lengthy authorization procedures new projects encountered 
in many member states. For these “projects of European interest” 
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the Commission proposed to appoint a coordinator in consultation 
with member states in case of difficulties. In case of severe delays 
the Commission also foresaw the right to withdraw the attribute 
“European interest” from the concerned project. The new category 
was deleted entirely in the Council’s first reading and substantially 
watered down after its reinsertion by the Commission. Neither did 
the Commission receive the right to appoint a coordinator on its own, 
nor to withdraw the attribute “European interest” from the project in 
the decision adopted in 2006. The list of projects of European inter-
est was mainly composed of those projects that were termed “priority 
projects” before (EC - 1364/2006/EC ). In 2007, four project coor-
dinators have been appointed by the Commission, three of them for 
electricity projects internal to the EU and one for the coordination of 
gas supplies from the Caspian basin (Nabucco). The coordinators have 
produced reports and recommendations to the Commission based on 
their findings and seem to act mainly as an additional external source 
of information for the Commission.16
The budget allocated to TEN- E energy projects has been minimal—
about 20 million euros annually. Thus, the EU could only contribute 
small amounts to each of the projects. This situation has changed in 
2009, when the Council approved a “European Economic Recovery 
Package” as an extraordinary measure to smoothen the impact of the 
2008 economic crisis (EC - COM(2010a) 203 final). Consequently, 
1,39 billion euros were granted to gas pipeline projects, in order to 
avoid bottlenecks when demand picked up in line with an anticipated 
economic recovery and to avoid a drain in skills in the construction 
sector. Under the package, 200 million euros were approved to the 
Nabucco project and a further 100 million euros to the ITGI pipeline 
(EC 2010a). These projects would eventually contribute to diversifica-
tion away from traditional European suppliers.
In sum, the success of the EU’s policy on diversification in the gas 
sector is not overwhelming, despite considerable Commission activity 
in providing assistance. As many factors and players are involved it is 
hard to judge the impact precisely. However, no clear interrelationship 
between funds granted and progress of a “priority project” seems to 
exist. This is especially true for the northern European region, where 
out of six priority projects four received EU funding, three of which 
were postponed indefinitely (Skanled, Baltic Pipe,and Yamal II). In 
contrast, the Nord Stream pipeline, which received no EU funding 
but is backed by Gazprom as a powerful supplier and by distribution 
companies, began construction work in 2010. In the Mediterranean, 
more projects that received EU funding have been completed or made 
04_Birchfield_Ch03.indd   73 4/12/2011   5:24:13 PM
Toward a Common European Union Energy Policy74
steps forward, but others like the Greenstream pipeline from Libya to 
Italy have been completed without such funding (EC - COM(2010b) 
203 final).
Three conclusions can be drawn from the EU’s attempts at supplier 
diversification: First of all, the EU does not pay sufficient attention to 
the interests of the various players involved when selecting strategic 
projects. It is implicitly assumed that the actors involved would act in 
the interest of the common market and help to further the EU goals 
of security of supply, sustainability, and competitiveness. As a result, 
possible pitfalls and drawbacks of certain projects are not properly 
analyzed, at least not in public. A proper analysis of the actors involved 
in pipeline projects and their strategies would also help to focus EU 
funding on projects that would not go ahead otherwise. This leads to 
the second conclusion: The EU is good at throwing money at many 
different “priority” projects, but not at making strategic decisions on 
which projects to support. As a result, the EU has assigned the status 
of “European interest” to projects that are competing for the same 
supplies and markets and not diversifying suppliers, as exemplified by 
the Nord Stream and Yamal II projects. This is again due to a lack of 
common vision of member states: They tend to advocate projects that 
can be promoted as being favorable from a European viewpoint but 
at the same time maximize their own benefit or the benefit of their 
“national champion.” In order to bring the majority behind the list of 
European priority projects, more and more projects have to be added 
to the list. The Commission’s effort to design additional subcategories 
for “top- priority” projects in order to concentrate efforts did not work 
out, as member states then strived for to get their respective projects 
onto this list. But this is not an appropriate approach for decision-
 making on capital- intensive supply lines with significant long- term 
implications for energy security. Third, in line with the disregard for 
different actor interests pointed out above, regulatory issues are de- 
emphasized. This leads to the implicit assumption that pipeline infra-
structure would always fulfill a public goods function, that is that 
it could be used to the benefit of the EU’s economy. This would be 
the case if the pipeline were governed according to rules mandating 
TPA, which ensure equal access of all prospective customers. But this 
may not be the case. Indeed, most new infrastructure projects do not 
fall under EU or ECT jurisdiction or are exempted from TPA rules 
despite EU funding. In addition, it makes a substantial difference if 
an infrastructure is governed by effective rules mandating TPA and 
thus stressing the public goods function of infrastructure, or if it is 
regarded to be a private investment undertaken by incumbents. The 
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latter version of investment may lead to substantial limitations regard-
ing the usage of the asset, which in that case tends to be used for fur-
thering the interests of market incumbents and suppliers. Thus, more 
attention has to be paid to the issue of pipeline governance before 
assigning priority status to a gas supply project.
Aggregating Market Power: The 
Internal Market
The internal market for energy is the most important field for com-
munity action but not the most visible in external relations, although 
it has an important impact on the relationship toward suppliers. The 
Commission’s approach to energy policy has widened over time—it 
began with gas and electricity market liberalization as a measure to 
enhance economic competitiveness and was extended in line with cli-
mate policies to overall demand management measures such as energy 
efficiency and the promotion of renewables. This section only concern 
with market liberalization policy and accompanying measures as they 
have the most direct impact on the relationship with Russia.
Implications for Suppliers and 
Consumers
The Commission has pursued gas market liberalization since the late 
1980s, according to the principle of “completion of the internal mar-
ket” agreed upon in the Single European Act (EC - COM(91) 548 
final). The overall goal of the liberalization was to facilitate compe-
tition in the grid- bound internal energy market, in order to reduce 
energy prices and to increase energy security by easing investments in 
interconnections between member states. This, in turn, would increase 
global competitiveness of the EU’s internal market. The attention thus 
shifted from supply security and the public service character of the 
energy industry to their overall contribution to economic competitive-
ness in a globalized world. Due to space constraints, readers unfamil-
iar with the EU’s policies on energy market liberalization should refer 
to the detailed analysis on energy market liberalization by Per Ove 
Eikeland in chapter 1 of this volume.
The most important implication of the liberal model for gas supply 
security is that it erodes the gatekeeper function of the big national 
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energy transport companies. Therefore, it needs two preconditions to 
function for the benefit of consumers: (1) Sufficient supplies are, or 
can be made, available (liquidity); and (2) some diversity of suppliers 
(no monopoly).
This implies that liberalization policies contain some new oppor-
tunities for suppliers with high market power. As the pricing principle 
is changed from long- term indexation with oil products to a supply-
 demand based pricing model, suppliers may be encouraged to foster 
the perception of scarcity in order to push up gas prices, Thus, tradi-
tional long- term contracts may be a useful tool for consumers also in 
a liberalized market, if liquidity is lacking (Finon 2008). In addition, 
the erosion of the gatekeeper function of utilities and ensuing compe-
tition induces powerful suppliers to play importers off against each 
other. Suppliers may now engage in strategic bargaining with differ-
ent companies supplying to the same market, which may result in 
substantial concessions of the latter. Also, the possibilities for down-
stream expansion of suppliers increase. This may have negative exter-
nalities for the EU’s energy security, if suppliers with high market 
power acquire downstream assets in order to segment markets and 
influence demand. These problems have to be addressed by liberaliza-
tion policies.
As a result, the core debate with regard to liberalization centered 
on the problem of market power and ensuing market distortions. The 
question was, whether the power of national incumbents should be 
curtailed by the state (the EU) in order to reduce their market power 
or instead be tolerated, enabling the companies to ensure national 
security of supply by aggregating demand and buffering markets from 
direct producer influence, while surcharging consumers for this ser-
vice. Whereas the former results in greater control by state and the 
EU’s institutions and passes on some of the risks to them, the lat-
ter leaves more control and risks to “national champions,” implying 
a lower burden for state actors, better realization of national goals 
and less transfer of authority to the EU level. On the downside, of 
course, unchecked market power sustains fragmentation of markets, 
higher prices, and leads to substantial political control by corpora-
tions (Finon and Glachant 2004, 269f).
Safeguards Toward New Threats
As a safeguard toward the first problem of increased domination 
by a consolidated supplier as a possible ironic outcome of market 
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liberalization, the Commission foresaw a “reciprocity clause” directed 
toward investors from third countries. The clause foresaw, that unless 
a bilateral agreement between the EU and the investor country on 
mutual market access and third party access to pipelines in the inves-
tor’s country of origin concluded, they would be completely banned 
from controlling transmission assets in the EU (van Hoorn 2009, 57). 
In effect, the Commission proposed to use the attractiveness of the 
EU’s market for achieving a favorable outcome in third countries by 
altering the rules for market entry. If applied, two outcomes could 
have been possible: (1) a suboptimal outcome, where Gazprom would 
refrain from further investments in transmission assets in the EU and 
sell gas at the border; (2) a preferred outcome where Russia would 
alter the rules for access to upstream assets and pipeline infrastructure 
and would then invest into the EU’s gas sector. This is tantamount to 
a ratification of the ECT and would also have contributed to supplier 
diversity and market liquidity. A third outcome that was widely dis-
cussed (van Hoorn 2009) but is unlikely due to the attractiveness of 
the EU’s market, is the cessation of supplies by Gazprom to the EU.
But the clause met the fierce resistance by some member states. As 
a result to resistance led by Germany, where Gazprom already pos-
sesses significant infrastructure assets and which regards the presence 
of Russian capital as a sign of “integration,” the clause was completely 
scrapped during the Energy Council in October 2008. The underlying 
fear was that incumbents could no longer engage in asset swaps with 
Gazprom, which would further curtail their ability to bargain with 
suppliers. Now, investors from third countries face the same restric-
tions on vertical integration as domestic companies. Hence, Gazprom 
will have to prove the compliance of its subsidiaries with the unbun-
dling regulations to the national regulator from 2011 onward (van 
Hoorn 2009, 58). In addition, the risk for security of supply of the EU 
has to be considered before the regulator approves an investment and 
the Commission has to be consulted prior to granting the approval. 
However, the Commission’s opinion is nonbinding. In countries 
that opted for full ownership unbundling, subsidiaries of Gazprom 
or other corporations, representing the interests of Gazprom, can-
not acquire transmission operators. But inherent problems with the 
approval procedure for foreign investors exist: The gathering of infor-
mation about foreign investors by the regulatory body is difficult and 
the quality of information provided by the investor is likely to be low, 
as the body does not possess the intelligence or effective instruments 
to prove their accuracy. Office raids, which as an ultimate threat may 
back up demands of disclosure by the regulator, can be carried out 
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only with great difficulty. This problem is severe especially in case of 
Gazprom’s investments, who are often carried out by letterbox- and 
offshore- companies (Globalwitness 2009; Smith 2008). Ultimately, 
the momentum of a better exploitation of market power is lost, as 
Gazprom will have ample possibility to agree with member states 
and national regulators on conditions for market entry on a bilat-
eral basis. This way, the opportunity to reaggregate the EU’s market 
power as a logical consequence of the liberalization process has been 
missed. This reflects the conflict between the models of integration 
based on corporate power and integration based on common rules 
outlined above. Here, corporate power has been privileged over regu-
latory coherence that may move the liberalized gas market into an 
oligopolistic direction.
For the second complex of problems induced by liberalization—a 
weakened bargaining position of the EU’s market players toward an 
oligopoly of suppliers, as well as demand uncertainty—no legislative 
solution has been proposed at all. When regional monopolies were 
intact, importers often negotiated as a consortium with suppliers, 
enabling the former to achieve favorable conditions and a balance 
between supply and demand. This is no longer possible in a competi-
tive market. Some governments and researchers therefore suggested 
to re- monopolize demand by forming a “gas purchasing group” that 
would act as an interface between supply and demand and thereby 
aggregate demand toward suppliers (Andoura et al. 2010; Christie 
2010). It could begin with European companies forming national, 
regional or EU- wide purchasing groups for gas that would negotiate 
with suppliers. Another possibility would be to establish an EU- wide 
purchasing agency. This public entity would negotiate all contracts for 
imported gas with the producers and could then sell the contracted 
volumes to buyers in the EU (De Jong 2008, 17). This would indeed 
be a logical development in view of demand insecurities and increased 
market power of suppliers, but it has not been scrutinized as to how 
such a mechanism could be put to work in a liberalized market.
The forming of gas purchasing groups implies a return to the ear-
lier practice of purchasing consortia and would only be possible if 
substantial distortions to competition exist, under which the partici-
pating companies would not be able to sell in each other’s markets. 
Otherwise, no incentives to cooperate exist. It would also mean that 
some market players would have to give up their special relationship 
to specific suppliers, guaranteeing them lower gas prices than com-
petitors. This would be rather difficult to achieve, given the experi-
ence of substantial resistance even to more modest proposals (Finon 
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and Locatelli 2008, 438). The establishment of a public purchasing 
agency would be a more reliable variant. However, it would have 
to temporarily take over the volume risk, as it would have to guar-
antee the purchasing of contracted volumes toward producers until 
gas volumes have been sold off internally. In any case, some solution 
toward demand aggregation has to be found if the power of suppli-
ers should again pick up due to increased gas scarcity and/or supplier 
coordination.
In sum, the EU could not use gas market liberalization to play 
out the substantial power of a big market toward suppliers so far. 
The different goals of member states have prevented such a solution. 
Instead of regulatory integration, utilities are integrating European 
markets on a corporate basis. This is also a form of market integra-
tion which could eventually lead to a more European orientation of 
member state interests (De Jong 2008, 17). It is more compatible to 
the Russian institutional setup and does not necessitate adaptations 
on the Russian side. At the same time, it is not the form of integra-
tion envisioned by the Commission, as it serves to aggregate market 
power, which may be detrimental to energy security by distorting 
the market. At the same time, a possible transformative impact on 
Russian institutions is lost. In order to reduce the mismatch between 
corporate power and EU market liberalization rules, the EU should 
apply competition regulation in a proper way, as well as elaborate on 
new legislative proposals to alleviate the new risks induced by market 
liberalization.
Conclusions
As has been argued, the EU’s external energy policy toward Russia as 
well as internal measures with external implications failed to a great 
extent. In energy policy terms, whereas the Commission promoted 
an external and internal liberalization policy that aims to redistrib-
ute power away from corporate actors toward regulatory agencies 
and from the national to the EU level, big continental member states 
backed their incumbents, which were seen as the most appropriate tool 
to ensure national energy security. This was mirrored in external rela-
tions, where deals were made between incumbents and suppliers that 
traditionally had established tense relations. The deals were backed 
and facilitated by national foreign policies. There was thus no need 
for Russia to attach importance to the European level, as a positive 
payoff to current policies was provided by member state initiatives, 
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whereas the EU’s policy would have involved costly changes to exist-
ing institutions and behavioral scripts in Russia. Here, the EU’s prob-
lem arose from the refusal of member states to confer the necessary 
decision- making authority to the EU level and to change their internal 
economic rules.
The difficulty to arrive at a common energy policy toward Russia 
was exacerbated by the fundamentally differing perceptions of and 
accompanying goals of policies toward Russia, held by the member 
states. Thus, whereas the Commission together with smaller and 
new member states from central eastern Europe advocated an exter-
nal energy policy concentrating on safeguarding security of supply, 
older member states such as Germany discounted supply security and 
infused energy policy with the greater vision of binding Russia closer 
to Germany and/or the EU by integrating energy sectors. As a result, 
a common energy policy was complicated by the disagreement about 
what this policy should be about: energy policy or “integration” by 
default in order to reach wider goals. This problem has to be solved in 
order to make sure that “integration” policies toward Russia pursued 
by particular member states rely on an internal consensus and do not 
contribute to a disintegration of the “ever closer Union.”
Notes
1. In this context, it has been argued that the EU approach of market liber-
alization is deficient in a world of increasing resource scarcity and high 
commodity prices, giving rise to a “new energy paradigm,” see Helm 
(2007); Spanjer (2009). However, market developments are not so unidi-
rectional and clear to allow such a wide- ranging conclusion. See: Paillard 
(2007: 12ff); Peters (2003: 22ff); Riley (2006); Milov (2008); Noel (2008: 
5f).
2. See: Paillard (2007: 12ff); Peters (2003: 22ff); Riley (2006); Milov (2008); 
Noel (2008: 5f).
3. See: Dutch Prime Minister suggests first step toward Soviet integration. 
The Guardian, June 26, 1990: 9.
4. Brussels and Moscow agree energy plan. Financial Times, July 6, 1990, 
International : 3.
5. See: Energy Charter Progress Delayed despite Strong Soviet Support. In 
European Energy Report, May 1991, S1.
6. See Soviet Republics Sign International Energy Exchange Accord, 
Associated Press, December 17, 1991. Eventually, this was the first offi-
cial recognition of Soviet Republics as separate entities and three days 
later the Soviet Union was dissolved.
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 7. See Art. 29 II a) ECT.
 8. Vgl. Final Charter Treaty text sent out to all participants. EC Energy 
Monthly, September 1994: 1. Matláry (1997, 48).
 9. When agreement could be finally reached in 1994 the United States did 
not sign the treaty, as it did not encompass the liberal rules once envis-
aged. On the negotiation process in general see Dor (1996); Matláry 
(1997); Energy Charter Progress Delayed despite Strong Soviet Support. 
In European Energy Report, May 1991, S1.
10. EC and US clash over Charter. EC Energy Monthly. December 1993: 9.
11. See: Mixed reception awaits Energy Charter in Russia, East European 
Energy Report, 25. November 1994: 5.
12. See: U energetičeskoj chartii v Rossii malo storonnikov. Segodnja. 
No. 31, 18.2.1997; Ėnergetičeskaja chartija pod perekrestnym ognem. 
Segodnja. No. 123, 18.6.1997; Zyplakov (1998).
13. COM/2004/777 final: 9.
14. Destination clauses prohibit the reselling of energy resources to other 
states than the contracting partner and are therefore in conflict with the 
internal energy market of the EU.
15. A good case in point are the Ostsee Pipeline Anschluss- Leitung (Opal) 
and Norddeutsche Erdgas Leitung (NEL) pipelines built by German 
Gazprom/Wintershall joint venture Wingas, which shall be connected 
to the Nord Stream pipeline in order to transport gas to Southern and 
Western Europe: Wingas applied for an exemption from competition 
rules for the new pipelines. See: OPAL NEL TRANSPORT GmbH 
beantragt Ausnahme von Regulierung, WINGAS PM, 28.07.2008, http:
//www.wingas.de; Opal will allein glänzen, in: Der Spiegel, 45/2008. 
November 3, 2008: 80.
16. See: Energy infrastructure—European Coordinators. http://ec.europa
.eu/energy/infrastructure/tent_e/coordinators_en.htm (accessed May 
18, 2010).
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Chapter Four
EU Emissions Trading: Achievements 
and Challenges
Jørgen Wettestad
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is based 
on an EU Directive that was adopted in 2003 and started functioning 
in 2005 (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008).1 It caps industrial emissions 
and allows trade of emission rights (hereafter: “allowances”).2 EU 
officials refer to the ETS as both the “cornerstone” and the “flagship” 
of EU climate policy.3 As it represents something completely new for 
the EU, analysts have called the ETS the “new grand experiment” 
(Kruger and Pizer 2004).
The ETS has now been functioning for five years. To what extent is 
a big celebration warranted? According to EU environment commis-
sioner Stavros Dimas, “the EU has a well- functioning trading system, 
with a robust cap, a clear price signal and a liquid market, which is 
helping us to cut emissions cost- effectively” (EurActiv 2009b). Point 
Carbon reports a relatively thriving market, apparently only mod-
erately affected by the current financial crisis, and see the ETS as 
a substantial driver for emissions reductions (Point Carbon 2009a). 
However, some highly critical reports can certainly be noted. For 
instance, climate- policy analyst Dieter Helm has claimed that the EU 
has “landed itself with a complex and relatively inefficient tradable 
permits system” (Helm 2009, 11). Furthermore, the British environ-
mental organization Sandbag has warned that the ETS at present is 
“a blunt tool” (Sandbag 2009).
This chapter seeks to take stock of the main achievements so 
far, in terms of institution building and ultimate effects on corpo-
rate practices. As further elaborated in the section “Achievements 
So Far: Mostly Mixed?” there are both strengths and weaknesses 
to be noted. In the section “Explaining Mixed Achievements: 
“Grand Experiment”—And Grand Uncertainty?” some key expla-
nations are discussed, organized according to the main actors and 
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institutions involved: nonstate actors (industry and environmental 
organizations), member states, EU institutions, and global actors 
and institutions. This leads up to an analysis in the section “A More 
Optimal ETS? Changes for the 2013–2020 Phase” of the consider-
able changes in the ETS for the post- 2012 phase that were adopted 
in December 2008. The concluding section, “Conclusion: Beware 
of Hasty and Bombastic Judgements,” sums up the main findings 
and discusses some key uncertainties ahead for this intriguing and 
important political experiment. As I think the literature on interna-
tional regime effectiveness can provide useful analytical tools and 
insights (see, for example, Miles et al. 2002; Young and Levy eds. 
1999), this chapter should also be seen as a first and probing effort 
to draw upon some of these insights and apply them to the study of 
ETS achievements.
The first ETS Directive was adopted in mid- 2003 (Directive 
2003/87). It established a three- year pilot phase (2005–2007) to pre-
cede the main commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008–2012). 
It covers around 50 percent of EU GHG emissions, and some 10,000 
installations are included in the system. The ETS was initially estab-
lished as a system in which member states would have considerable 
power and flexibility, so the initial ETS is generally characterized as a 
decentralized system. Key decisions about the amount (the “cap”) and 
allocation of allowances were in the hands of the member states, who 
drew up National Allocation Plans (NAPs). The overall cap on emis-
sions then became the aggregate of national caps. As we shall see, the 
European Commission (hereafter: the Commission) was a core actor 
in the establishment of the system, but was allocated more of a back-
seat watchdog role in the subsequent national allocation processes 
and first phase of implementation. Allowances were mainly handed 
out free of charge,4 and the system was rather narrow in scope. It tar-
geted first and foremost the power sector and some selected energy-
 intensive industries (such as refineries, cement, steel, and pulp and 
paper), with an initial regulatory focus on CO2 emissions. Although 
power producers and consumers were differently positioned in the 
energy systems and national economies, the 2003 Directive provided 
no signals to member states about distributing allowances differently 
between sectors. As to the links between the ETS and global climate 
institutions, a specific Linking Directive was adopted in 2004.5 A 
central element in this later Directive was the opening up for the 
possibility to import credits from third countries through the Kyoto 
Protocol flexible mechanism, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
credits from 2005, and Joint Implementation (JI) credits from 2008. 
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The link was initially based on a loose “less external credits than 
domestic abatement” rule, but was tightened in 2006.
How then has this system worked so far?
Achievements So Far: Mostly Mixed?
As discussed and clarified by the Norwegian regime theory scholar 
Arild Underdal (see, for example, Underdal 2002), there are at least 
two principal dimensions in assessing the effectiveness of interna-
tional collaborative efforts and policy instruments:
“• The distance to the collectfive optimum”: the contribution that 
the institution/instrument makes to solving the problem at hand. 
As this optimum is extremely hard to pinpoint, a simple proxy 
can be the attainment of official goals.
“• The relative improvement,”: pertaining to the extent to which 
the institution/instrument has improved matters compared to a 
situation with no collaborative effort at all.
It would seem that how we assess the results of the ETS depends at 
least in part on which of these rather different (and certainly both ana-
lytically challenging) assessment lenses we emphasize. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the ETS is the first large- scale, multinational 
system of its kind in the world. No wonder that it has been hailed as 
the “new grand experiment.” Not many years have passed, and the 
implementation of this unprecedented, complex transnational system 
is in many ways still in its infancy. Here we might recall that, accord-
ing to conventional wisdom in implementation theory, in order to 
fully assess the implementation success of policies, considerable time 
should have passed—eight to ten years or so (see, for example, Cerych 
and Sabatier 1986, 6). Let us first sum up some elements of the ETS 
that have been seen as quite successful, before turning to some impor-
tant criticisms.
Important Institution Building—And 
“Cognitive” Effects?
As noted and claimed by several scholars, in terms of fundamental 
institution building, the ETS has made considerable progress (see 
Asselt 2009, for a good summary).6
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First, an unprecedented transnational marketplace has been estab-
lished. EU emissions trading started officially on January 1, 2005. As of 
winter 2010, and even after the worldwide financial crisis really started 
to bite, allowance trading in the EU has clearly taken hold. In 2008, 
the EU ETS accounted for two- thirds of total global carbon market vol-
ume and three- quarters of the value (Point Carbon 2009a, 3, 5). As to 
allowance prices, as further discussed below, some volatility has indeed 
been experienced. But in recent years, allowances for phase two of the 
ETS have stayed within a band between 10 euros and 20 euros.7
Second, the infrastructure necessary for a properly functioning 
market has been established, including the assignment of compe-
tent authorities, national registries and the Community Independent 
Transaction Log (CITL). Most registries were operating in 2007, 
but faced scheduled and unscheduled downtime (EEA 2008,10). 
Reporting systems were established, and the reporting practices of 
the member states have been improving steadily (EEA 2008). Some 
governments have also started gaining experience with auctioning 
allowances (Asselt 2009, 38).
Third, related to these ETS institutional achievements but cer-
tainly a different, “cognitive,” type of achievement, it has been argued 
the perceptions and mindsets of corporate leaders as to the climate-
 change issue have started to change. In an interesting interview in June 
2009, chief ETS architect and Commission official Jos Delbeke stated 
that the most successful element of the ETS is the way it has “forced 
company boardroom activity to consider climate change . . . Attitudes 
toward CO2 and the climate have changed since there has been a price 
on carbon” (Point Carbon 2009b). In a somewhat similar vein, analyst 
Frank Convery has stated that “carbon emissions trading in Europe 
has finally lifted environment from the boiler room to the boardroom, 
and from ministries of environment to ministries of finance. For chief 
executives of many corporations, the environment has become an 
omnipresent, if not always welcome, guest at their strategic tables” 
(Convery 2009,121). Furthermore, according to reports from the 
Carbon Disclosure Project, governance of climate change at board 
level has increased over time (Carbon Disclosure Project 2009, 11).
. . . But Also Institutional Weaknesses 
and Limited Behavioral Bite?8
This section first sums up and discusses some main criticisms of the 
ETS, related to allocations and price fluctuations; some “internal 
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anomalies” (windfall profits); and some possible “external anoma-
lies” (“carbon leakage”). The extent of behavioral bite so far is then 
discussed, with regard to effects on abatement and shifts in technol-
ogy utilization and/or innovation attributable to the ETS.
Generous Allocations and Price Fluctuations: Already in 
2004/2005, preliminary assessments of the first National Allocation 
Plans (NAPs) indicated very moderate levels of ambition on the part 
of member- state governments (see Ecofys 2004; Zetterberg et al. 
2004).9 Nevertheless, allowances prices climbed to a surprisingly 
high level throughout 2005, peaking around 30 euros in April 2006. 
But suspicions of generous governmental handouts of allowances 
were further confirmed when the first verified emissions data were 
published in May 2006, showing that 4 percent more allowances 
had been handed out than actual emissions. This led to an immedi-
ate halving of the allowance price and a subsequent further drop, to 
almost zero. Trading actors saw the pilot phase of the ETS as clearly 
over- supplied; as there was no possibility to bank allowances for use 
in later phases, prices plummeted.
Although member states in 2006 started out the allocation of 
allowances for phase two of the ETS (2008–2012) in the same gener-
ous manner, as further described in the section “Explaining Mixed 
Achievements: “Grand Experiment”—And Grand Uncertainty?” the 
Commission acted tougher as a watchdog and managed to turn a pro-
spective 5 percent surplus to an anticipated 5 percent deficit (Carbon 
Trust 2007, 6). However, not least due to the global economic reces-
sion, updated estimates indicate that phase two will be some 300 mil-
lion tons long (i.e. more emissions than allowances), not short (e.g. 
Carbon Trust 2009, 02). As surplus allowances from the second phase 
are bankable for use in phase three (2013–2020), a phase two surplus 
has the potential to dampen phase three allowance prices and incen-
tive effects. As of May 2010, ETS allowances are traded for around 
16 euros.
Internal Anomalies: Windfall Profits: The dominant initial method 
of allocating allowances, by handing them out for free, led to more 
than just over- generous allocations. It has also had the effect of giving 
power producers considerable “windfall profits.” Energy- intensive 
industries first warned that power producers might reap huge wind-
fall profits in 2004 (Wettestad 2009b). These profits would emanate 
from the fact that electricity prices would increase related to the intro-
duction of the ETS. Power producers would then gain huge profits, as 
they received allowances for free and would have no initial expenses 
due to the introduction of emissions trading.
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From late 2005 on, these warnings became increasingly substan-
tiated. For instance, a British 2006 report indicated a yearly profit 
increase of at least GBP 800 million for six large United Kingdom 
(UK) electricity generators related to the introduction of the ETS. 
Subsequently, several studies substantiated the reaping of consid-
erable windfall profits (see e.g. Sijm et al. 2006). In a 2008 report, 
Point Carbon estimated ETS phase two windfall profits at between 
23 euros billion and 71 billion in five central ETS countries (Point 
Carbon 2008).10 Over time, it has also become increasingly clear 
that generous and continued handing out of free allowances means 
windfall profits among energy- intensive industries as well, and pos-
sibly also airlines from 2012 on (see ENDS Europe 2009b; 2009c, 
Sandbag 2010).
External anomalies: carbon leakage?: “Carbon leakage” basically 
refers to the process whereby a carbon- producing firm in Europe 
reduces output which is then replaced by a producer operating from 
a noncarbon- constrained jurisdiction (see Convery 2009, 127).11 
Early studies of the ETS and carbon leakage possibilities, focused on 
the UK, indicated that only a few industries were at any serious risk 
(Carbon Trust 2004). Of the five sectors studied (electricity, cement, 
paper, steel, and aluminum), except for steel, global concerns would 
kick in only in a long- term scenario with considerably higher allow-
ance prices (ibid.).
Political attention to this possible external anomaly increased in 
the EU from 2006 on. The issue was given considerable attention 
in both the High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and the 
Environment, and in the European Climate Change Programme’s 
ETS review stakeholder meetings in 2007 (Wettestad 2009b). But 
consultant and research reports have consistently presented a far 
more sober and less alarmist picture of this phenomenon than the 
industries themselves (which is of course not that surprising) (e.g., 
European Commission, 2006). One of the most recent reports is a 
German Marshall Fund study published in 2009 (Grubb et al. 2009). 
A central conclusion is here that “for most manufacturing sectors, 
cost differentials due to labor and other inputs far outweigh those 
induced by international differences in the cost of carbon” (p. 4; see 
also Wråke 2009, 26).
Low effects on company practices?: But what about the real “proof 
of the pudding”—the actual effects on companies’ abatement efforts, 
and how they utilize and invest in greener technologies? Is today’s sit-
uation of relatively floundering market activity bringing about more 
abatement, new technologies and environmental improvement, which 
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remain the ultimate goals of the ETS venture? Given the institutional 
weaknesses indicated above, and the limited time that has elapsed, 
expectations should be moderate in terms of finding significant effects 
on company practices.
It is important to emphasize that our knowledge is so far quite 
limited, although some scattered indications and data are available. 
Let us start with some survey data. In the Point Carbon annual sur-
veys, the number of respondents stating that “the EU ETS has already 
caused emissions reductions in my company” has remained quite sta-
ble, with around 45 percent supporting this statement in 2007, 2008, 
and 2009. Around 30 percent reported no ETS- related reductions in 
2008 and 2009 (Point Carbon 2009a, 8). A German survey, combin-
ing German company respondents and international experts, comes 
up with more modest results (KFW/ZEW 2009). Among the conclu-
sions we may note: “while the majority of firms have implemented 
CO2 reduction measures, price signals for CO2 seem to have had only 
minor influence on investment strategies so far. Only 6 percent indi-
cated that the reduction of CO2 has been the main reason for the 
realization of a measure” (ibid., 56, 57).
Denny Ellerman and Barbara Buchner have analyzed 2005 and 
2006 emissions data that the EU member states reported to the 
Community Independent Transaction Log (Ellerman and Buchner 
2007; 2008). Does the reported figure of 4 percent lower emissions 
than allocated allowances mean simple “over- allocation”—or can 
this be interpreted as a sign that real abatement has taken place, 
hence providing support to the more optimistic Point Carbon survey 
data? After carrying out a counterfactual analysis, attempting to 
take into account the development of such control factors as eco-
nomic growth, carbon intensity and energy prices, they tentatively 
conclude that the ETS has led to some modest reductions, between 
50 and 100 million tons in each of these years (Ellerman and Buchner 
2008, 286). Total ETS emissions in 2006 were slightly over 2 billion 
tons of CO2. With regard to the sectoral picture, analysts agree that 
most effects have taken place among power producers (e.g. Grubb 
et al., 2009).
Kettner et al. (2008) have carried out a complementary analysis 
of the CITL data and the extent to which sectors and countries have 
been “short” (with more emissions than allowances) or “long” (the 
opposite). On the whole, they question the ETS abatement effect: 
“Given the rather low carbon prices, it is also extremely unlikely that 
industries with a heavy CO2 cost component, such as cement and 
lime, have reduced their production levels because of the stringency 
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of allowances.” But in a few installations, the option for a fuel shift 
may have been used (Kettner et al. 2008, 59).
However, that behavioral effects so far have been moderate does 
not necessarily mean that there has been no effect on corporate strat-
egies and investment plans (note the “cognitive effects” mentioned 
above), so that more and deeper behavioral effects may be seen in 
the years ahead. For instance the study conducted by Martin Cames 
on ETS effects in the German electricity industry concludes that 
expected carbon prices are taken into consideration in the companies’ 
investment decisions and “play an important role when it comes to 
the question of which technology or fuel should be applied.” Clean 
coal and particularly, carbon capture and storage (CCS) are the most 
relevant technologies (Cames 2008; 174–175). In December 2009, the 
consultancy firm New Energy Finance published a survey covering 13 
large EU power companies.12 All these companies responded that they 
factored a carbon price into their investment decisions. However, the 
consultancy firm noted that “the carbon price (current and projected) 
is not sufficient in isolation to justify an immediate wholesale shift 
to lower CO2 emitting technologies” (New Energy Finance 2009, 
emphasis added).
The reported increasing effect on investment decisions is certainly 
an interesting element. However, there is a clear need for further 
counterfactual analyses here. For instance, CCS policy has experi-
enced a significant development of its own (see, for example, Claes 
and Frisvold 2009), which makes it more difficult to single out and 
measure the specific ETS policy signals.
Summing Up: Mixed Performance 
So Far
Reports like those recently published by Sandbag (2009) and Helm 
(2009) are important reminders that the ETS design has so far been 
clearly sub- optimal. Allowance allocations have been generous, result-
ing in a surplus that again has led to volatile and, over time, seriously 
decreasing allowance prices in the pilot phase. More scarcity has been 
created in the current second phase, but considerable uncertainty 
remains. The handing out of allowances for free has meant signifi-
cant windfall profits for power producers, and eventually also other 
industries. Lack of similar regulation of industries elsewhere in the 
world has led to unrest in EU industries about carbon leakage. Thus 
it is hardly surprising to find that the available evidence, although 
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limited, indicates that fluctuations and reductions in EU emissions 
can only to a very limited extent be attributed to the ETS.
However, all actors interested in the ETS should bear in mind that 
its overall score in terms of “relative improvement” is most likely 
better—although acknowledging also here the substantial analyti-
cal challenges involved in carrying out a satisfactory counterfactual 
assessment. After the “grand failure” of the 1990s to adopt an effec-
tive, EU- wide climate- policy instrument—a carbon tax (see, for exam-
ple, Skjærseth 1994; Wettestad 2001)—the EU has now succeeded in 
putting into place a cornerstone climate- policy instrument. Important 
institution building has taken place, both at the EU level and in all its 
member states. Market activity has become quite substantial, also in 
a global perspective, and the ETS seems to have survived the financial 
crisis fairly well. It can be argued that the ETS has been an important 
factor in making corporate leaders more aware of the climate change 
issue and to some extent also more positive to climate- policy regula-
tion and making new, “greener” investments.
Furthermore, as will be further substantiated in the section “A 
More Optimal ETS? Changes for the 2013–2020 Phase,” the ETS has 
also developed and improved considerably over time. Not least, sig-
nificant further harmonization of the ETS post- 2012 means that the 
EU will, at least from that point in time, have a quite well- developed 
common policy in this area. This gives greater support to claims that 
the ETS is now really starting to influence corporate investment deci-
sions. Although it may be more daring to declare grand successes 
or failures, for the overall achievement score it is tempting to echo 
Cerych and Sabatier’s title from 1986: “great expectations and mixed 
performance.”
Explaining Mixed Achievements: 
“Grand Experiment”—And Grand 
Uncertainty?
In the following, I identify and discuss some key explanatory factors. 
For analytical purposes, these are organized according to main actors 
and institutions, at various societal levels. The resultant perspectives 
are fundamentally grounded in and related to important on- going 
debates about the main and “real” driving forces in EU policy-
 making.13 However, a debate about the relative explanatory power of 
these perspectives is not the main point in this paper. The perspectives 
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are here used simply as complementary heuristic lenses, helping to 
organize and make sense of a complex web of relevant evidence.
Nonstate Actors: Cautious Industry; 
Skeptical Greens
Industry: a Cautious and Differing Embracement: How did industry 
feel about emissions trading back in 1997/1998, when the idea of an 
ETS was taking shape? A few industrial front- runners, mainly big 
oil companies such as BP and Shell, saw this almost untried instru-
ment as promising and set about establishing internal pilot emissions 
trading schemes (see Victor and House 2006). Overall, the mood can 
be characterized as cautiously positive.14 Industry wanted to avoid 
the detested carbon tax option, but would also ideally have preferred 
softer voluntary agreements.
Already from 1999/2000, it became apparent that there were also 
clear sectoral differences within EU industry with regard to attitudes 
toward the emissions trading instrument. Power producers were quite 
open- minded and curious, and carried out several trading simulation 
exercises.15 Energy- intensive industries, on the other hand, held far 
more mixed and generally cautious positions. They had difficulty see-
ing what was in it for them with this instrument. Most skeptical was 
the chemicals industry—which was, in the end, also left out of the 
system. However, EU industries were quite united in favoring getting 
allowances for free, and having a basically flexible and not overly 
harmonized system.
In the subsequent processes of producing the initial National 
Allocation Plans in 2004 (for the ETS pilot phase, 2005–2007), 
industrial actors tried to cope with considerable uncertainty about the 
practical workings of this new instrument by lobbying for a maximum 
amount of allowances. This is a classic example of perfectly under-
standable individual rationality leading to collective sub- optimal out-
comes. In the NAP I process, there is evidence from both the UK and 
Germany about the success of industry in this regard. Member states 
needed a cooperative industry, and in a situation with high uncer-
tainty, it was probably tempting to simply let industry have its way.
Political decision makers were more successful in withstand-
ing industry pressure in NAP II (in distributing allowances for the 
2008–12 phase). But industry has still managed to secure so much in 
terms of allowances that they may need to conduct very little actual 
abatement to comply with the caps set for this phase. In fact, due also 
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to the financial crisis and lowered production (and hence less emis-
sions), industry might even be able to bank (i.e., save) a considerable 
portion of allowances for the post- 2012 phase, thereby seriously chal-
lenging the dynamic effect of the ETS also in this phase.
This said, there are still certain sectoral differences within this 
general picture. Generally, the power sector has experienced stricter 
allocations in phase two of the ETS, as is particularly clear in the 
case of the UK (ENDS Daily 2006). This unequal treatment seems to 
have been silently accepted by the power sector (and institutionalized 
in the revised ETS, as further described in the section “Conclusion: 
Beware of Hasty and Bombastic Judgements”). A main reason for this 
acceptance is probably the above- mentioned windfall profits earned 
by the power producers. Moreover, this difference in strictness of 
sectoral allocations can contribute to explain why most behavioral 
change and abatement seem to have taken place within this sector.
ENGOS: Skeptics Struggling to Embrace Trading: The 
Environmental Non- Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) initially 
opposed emissions trading for both substantive and normative rea-
sons, arguing that trading pollution was ineffective as well as morally 
questionable. This resistance was gradually overcome by the belief 
that a cap- and- trade system in Europe, if appropriately designed, 
could guarantee a positive environmental outcome. Then, by around 
2000, ENGOs had become more positive to the idea of emissions 
trading in Europe.16 This can probably be explained by these actors 
starting to recognize the potential of this complex instrument.
Still, along the way, ENGOs have continued to function as an 
external critical watchdog—in the process, strengthening the hand 
of those inside actors pushing for the most environmental ambitious 
options, such as the European Parliament. With regard to focused 
issues, ENGOs have given particular attention to the link between the 
ETS and the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms and the possible “flooding” 
of the ETS with CDM credits—and the related detrimental effects for 
the carbon price and incentives for internal EU abatement (see Open 
Europe 2007; Sandbag 2009; WWF 2006).
However, the intrinsically complex and technical nature of emis-
sions trading as an instrument is poorly suited to the spectacular 
stunts often favored by ENGOs (Pinkse and Kolk 2009; Voss 2007). 
Although ENGOs have become much more positive to emissions 
trading over time, it seems fair to say that they have struggled in seek-
ing to learn to love the instrument. A more systematic comparison 
with other issue areas may reveal that ENGOs have been far more 
effective pushers for a further greening of policies in other issue areas 
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than emissions trading. Recognizing this rather “tame watchdog” 
role helps us make sense of the moderate ETS achievements so far, 
although it is far from being among the most important factors.
Member States: Securing Control
The previous section “Achievements So Far: Mostly Mixed?” empha-
sized the new and untried character of the emissions trading instru-
ment and the related cautiousness of nonstate actors. Very much the 
same goes for the EU member states. When the Commission started 
to prepare the ground for an EU emissions trading system in 1998, 
only two member states had begun to consider establishing domestic 
trading systems: Denmark and the UK. The latter, in several ways 
a key EU country, was generally open to market- based and flexible 
policy instruments in the 1990s. The UK was hence not opposed to 
the development of an EU- wide trading system, but it favored a flex-
ible and decentralized ETS, in order to ensure compatibility with its 
domestic system.
But other important EU countries embraced trading much more 
reluctantly. Turning first to Germany, due to the size of its economy 
and the magnitude of the related emissions, the country was destined 
to be one of the really key ones in the ETS. Up to 1998/1999, climate 
policy in Germany mixed traditional regulation with voluntary agree-
ments and eco- taxes, and there was no prior regulatory emphasis on 
flexibility instruments (Wurzel 2008, 13). Voluntary agreements sat 
well with German industry, which therefore saw little need to intro-
duce new, different instruments. In the decision- making process that 
led up to the initial ET Directive, Germany emphasized exemptions 
and national flexibility.
In the first round of producing National Allocation Plans, assess-
ments of ambitiousness (in aiming for emissions reductions) gave 
the German NAP a very average score.17 When the first verified 
ETS emissions figures were put on the table in 2006, Germany’s 
emissions proved to be 4.2 percent below its cap (hence possible 
“over- allocation”). Germany’s uneasy relationship with the ETS 
was further witnessed in the second round of producing NAPs. In 
something which has been described as a catalytic event in the his-
tory of the ETS (see Carbon Trust 2007), in November 2006 the 
Commission cut the proposed German NAP by 7 percent. After some 
weeks when “Brussels stood still,” Germany reluctantly accepted the 
Commission’s cut.
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Poland can certainly be added to the list of important EU coun-
tries that have embraced the ETS only quite cautiously. It was greatly 
delayed in producing an initial NAP, with both the government and 
observers blaming limited administrative capacity. But Poland’s will 
to adopt ambitious ETS policies can also be questioned. As in several 
other Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), the Polish 
energy system is centered on coal power. A key priority for Poland has 
hence been to protect the future of this industry—and that includes 
securing a sufficient number of allowances to this industry. Poland 
has quarreled with the Commission over its suggested emission caps 
in both the first and second round of producing NAPs. In the second 
round in 2006, Poland’s NAP was among those cut most severely by 
the Commission—by a full 27 percent! This brief overview has shown 
that central EU member states have embraced emissions trading only 
cautiously, giving priority to national control over environmental 
ambitiousness, and, related to this, a decentralized and flexible ETS 
design. These priorities can shed considerable light on the sub- optimal 
working of the ETS so far.
EU Institutions: Only a Tiny Crew 
Manning the Flagship?
As further analyzed in Skjærseth and Wettestad (2008), from 1998 on, 
there was only a small group of dedicated emissions trading entrepre-
neurs in the Directorate- General for Environment (DG ENV). Their 
main professional background was economics. A key figure was Jos 
Delbeke, who had been closely involved in the futile efforts to get a car-
bon tax adopted, and was now definitely ready to work on something 
else that could be more successful. The task facing DG ENV was truly 
formidable. So it is highly understandable that information dissemina-
tion and knowledge improvement became a key strategy. This involved 
both getting reports from external consultants such as the British FIELD 
institute and the US Center for Clean Air Policy, and efforts to develop 
a trading- friendly “epistemic community” of nonstate actors and mem-
ber states through stakeholder meetings. The DG ENV entrepreneurs 
concluded that a centrally governed ETS would be the environmentally 
optimal design, but realized early on that this idea was at odds with the 
sentiments of important member states and industries.
Within the Commission, in the process of preparing the initial ET 
(Emissions Trading) Directive proposal in 2001, DG ENV successfully 
fought back efforts from other DGs such as Enterprise to weaken the 
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proposal further. In the subsequent EU processes, the clear impression is 
that the ETS remained something of a DG Environment “baby,” and per-
haps even more than that: a “Delbeke drive.” Indeed, it is quite striking 
that the ETS became an EU cornerstone based on a very modest admin-
istrative foundation; a flagship steered by a tiny (but dedicated) crew.
But what about the European Parliament—could not the Parliament 
and particularly its comparatively large and influential Environment 
Committee (see for exampleWeale et al. 2000) have helped steer the 
ETS more smoothly through these rough waters? Here it should be 
kept in mind that the Parliament has been characterized as suffer-
ing from a “technological deficit” (e.g. Wurzel 2002, 71), and hence 
struggled in really getting a grip on the complex case of emissions 
trading. Among other things, this manifested itself in a problem of 
focusing on the truly key issues. Furthermore, in the decision- making 
process, the Parliament stood forward as the key proponent of a 
rather centrally governed ETS, but it failed to move the outcome very 
much in this direction. So, somewhat similar to the case of ENGOs, 
an actor that has otherwise often managed to push EU policies in 
greener directions achieved little in the case of the ETS.
From 2004 on, one of the central ETS tasks for the Commission was 
to act as a NAP watchdog.18 With the substantial leeway granted to the 
member states by the directive, this watchdog job proved to be a tall 
order indeed. As pointed out by Commission official Peter Vis, “the 
Commission’s job was a difficult one. . . . Several plans were submitted 
to the Commission without elements that were nevertheless essential for 
the Commission’s assessment . . . The assessment process of all national 
allocation plans [in the pilot phase] took 15 months in total, in contrast 
to the three months foreseen in the Directive” (Vis 2006, 202, 203).
But, particularly in the second NAP process, the Commission 
made important contributions to achieving a more environmentally 
ambitious outcome. Overall, the Commission managed to turn a pro-
posed aggregate emissions increase of 5 percent from 2005 levels into 
a 5 percent decrease (Carbon Trust 2007, 6). One strength for the 
Commission in this work has been a substantial continuity of key per-
sonnel, with Jos Delbeke as the “ETS captain” on board all the way.
Global Actors and Institutions: Not 
Securing Comparable Efforts to the EU?
Turning first to the Kyoto Protocol itself, the adoption of this protocol 
and not least the flexibility mechanisms in December 1997 served as 
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an important stimulant for the subsequent EU turn- about and devel-
opment of an ETS. A very important “catalytic” event happened in 
May 2001: The USA, under President George W. Bush, decided to 
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. The immediate and short- term 
effect of this was in fact positive for the EU actors seeking to get an 
ETS established. As noted by Brussels insiders, “the huge luck the 
Commission had was Bush’s withdrawal . . . It united the EU in an 
extraordinary way.” On the other hand, as a more enduring, long-
 term cognitive effect, the lack of comparable climate- policy action 
in the United States—the key economic competitor to the EU—has 
acted to impede EU efforts. The US climate- policy impasse has func-
tioned as a legitimating concern for actors within industry, member 
states and EU institutions warning of the detrimental effects of a too 
strong and front- running EU system that imposes tougher carbon 
constraints than competitors.
From 2004 on and with the development of NAPs, institutional 
interaction with the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms, in par-
ticular the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), became more of 
a reality. The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005 
further bolstered the linkage between the ETS and the protocol and 
its mechanisms. However, in the pilot phase, this link was of scant 
practical relevance. Very few states announced any intentions to use 
such external credits, and the subsequent abundance of ETS allow-
ances and the delayed formal link between the EU and global regis-
tries made this aspect rather irrelevant.
It was first and foremost in connection with the processes of pro-
ducing the NAPs for the second phase of the ETS (the 2008–2012 
phase) that this issue became more important. Generally, member 
states announced intentions to utilize substantial amounts of exter-
nal credits. This led ENGOs and independent analysts to fire several 
warning shots about the possible damaging effects of an overly liberal 
inflow of external credits, with a related weakening of carbon prices 
and abatement incentive effects (see, for example,, Open Europe 
2007; WWF 2006). To some extent, the Commission paid heed to 
these warnings. An ad hoc cap was introduced in the fall of 2006, 
and the Commission managed to cut the planned use of CDM and JI 
of key member states considerably.19 In total, the EU ETS installations 
are allowed to use 1400 Mt of CDM/JI credits for compliance in the 
2008–2012 period.20
Although it is still quite early days in the Kyoto Protocol com-
mitment phase, reported figures show that the external link (which 
finally became real and formal in October 2008) has not mattered 
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that much in practice. Data from 2008 show that companies used 
around 6 percent of the total (European Commission 2009a). So there 
has certainly been no “external flooding of the ETS,” and the specific 
links to the global flexibility mechanisms shed almost no light on the 
moderate results achieved so far.
A More Optimal ETS? Changes for the 
2013–2020 Phase
The processes of revising the ETS for the period 2013–2020, which 
took place mainly in 2007 and 2008, must then be seen against the 
backdrop of this in many ways malfunctioning ETS up to that point. 
As described above, the “old ETS” had been decentralized, based on 
the handing out of free allowances, and with an initial loose link to 
the global CDM/JI mechanisms, with an ad hoc cap introduced in 
2006.
Compared to this, the new ETS from 2013 onward, adopted by the 
European Council in December 2008, will be governed quite differ-
ently, in a far more centralized way (see Directive 2009/29).21 There 
will be a common and tighter ETS cap, based on the ETS’ contribu-
tion to achieving the overall ambition of a 20 percent cut in GHG 
emissions by 2020.
The cap is so far to achieve a 21 percent cut of ETS emissions 
by 2020, compared to a 2005 baseline. Further allocation specifica-
tions mean that the considerable flexibility enjoyed by member states 
under the old ETS will disappear almost completely in the new ETS. 
Furthermore, much more allowances will be auctioned.
Most of the power sector’s allowances will be auctioned, while 
initially only around 20 percent of the allowances of energy- intensive 
industries (but increasing over time). Industries identified as particu-
larly vulnerable to global competition and hence “carbon leakage” 
will be guaranteed free allowances all the way to 2020. A preliminary 
list produced by national experts and presented by the Commission 
in September 2009 identifies 164 sectors deemed to be at risk as to 
carbon leakage, representing 77 percent of the total emissions of 
manufacturing industries under the ETS (EurActiv 2009c; European 
Commission, 2009b). With regard to external links to the Kyoto flex-
ibility mechanisms, the ad hoc cap has now been strengthened and 
written into the formal ETS constitution. In addition, the sectoral 
scope has been broadened somewhat in terms of sectors and gases, 
and aviation will come into the ETS already from 2012.22
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Although these changes mean that the member states will lose 
earlier powers, it does not mean that all these powers are automati-
cally transferred to the Commission. Some of these powers will be 
taken over by the member states as a collective, as for instance the 
important, possible decision to tighten the ETS cap will ultimately 
have to be adopted by the Council and the Parliament. But the func-
tions of the Commission as the general watchdog and overseer of the 
implementation of the ETS will be strengthened, for instance related 
to member- states’ use of increasing auctioning revenues. In this con-
nection, it is interesting to note that the Commission sought also to 
centralize the auctioning process by establishing a single auctioning 
platform. But a coalition of key ETS member states (i.e. Germany, 
Poland, Spain, and the UK) resisted this and the Commission backed 
down in the spring of 2010 (e.g. EurActiv 2010).
In order to understand these significant changes, in the same man-
ner as the discussion carried out in the section “Explaining Mixed 
Achievements: “Grand Experiment”—And Grand Uncertainty?” a 
multilevel framework is useful. First, closer scrutiny reveals a sig-
nificant shift in member- state positions on what constitutes the best 
design of the ETS, and a related request for reform. As indicated, a 
likely central background factor is unsatisfactory experiences with 
the old ETS.
Second, putting on “EU- level” lenses, as has been indicated, the ideas 
of a centralized and harmonized ETS based on auctioning of allow-
ances were initially launched and favored by both the Commission 
and the Parliament (and supported by ENGOs). Due to, among other 
things, the increased saliency of the climate- change issue in the EU 
from 2005 on, these positions could be put forward more forcefully 
in 2007 and 2008. In addition, the EU institutions, as arenas for ini-
tiating and negotiating the reform, changed significantly and affected 
the ETS outcome somewhat. As the ETS reform was a key element 
in a broader policy package initially launched by the Commission in 
January 2008, the reform was linked to new mandatory targets, EU 
energy policy and a package of binding climate instruments; among 
other things adding further weight to the Commission’s quest for a 
more harmonized and effective design.
Third, putting on “international regime” lenses provides only 
limited additional explanatory value. The reform came not as a 
response to changes in the international climate regime, but partly 
as an effort to influence the international climate negotiations. In 
a way, the reform was to some extent a response to a lack of inter-
national change. The international regime context is thus relevant 
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for understanding the outcomes, but in a different way than may be 
readily anticipated.
Conclusion: Beware of Hasty and 
Bombastic Judgments
EU emissions trading has celebrated its fifth birthday: has it been a suc-
cess or failure so far? The verdict here depends partly upon the assess-
ment lenses chosen: the distance travelled toward a truly “optimal” 
design—or the more counterfactual “relative improvement” made. 
When analysts such as the Carbon Trust call the global flexibility 
mechanisms, with the EU ETS as the cornerstone, a “remarkable suc-
cess,” they are probably implicitly adopting a “relative improvement” 
perspective (Carbon Trust 2009, 6). Without these mechanisms, with 
the ETS as the clear front- runner, the global political and institutional 
responses to climate change would probably have been quite meager 
indeed. But that does still not mean that the ETS has made a signifi-
cant difference with regard to industrial practices so far.
Further, taking both assessment perspectives into consideration, 
ETS achievements stand out as mixed. There have been several institu-
tional flaws, leading to among other things overgenerous allocations 
and windfall profits for power producers. The carbon price has been 
volatile, falling close to zero in the final half of the pilot phase. The 
scarce evidence of ultimate effects on company practices and emis-
sions so far indicate quite moderate effects, although an increasing 
influence on investment decisions seems probable. But it is important 
to keep in mind that it is certainly early days in terms of expect-
ing significant behavioral effects, and the recent strengthening of the 
ETS post- 2012 will mean a substantially more optimal design for the 
future.
How then to explain such mixed results so far? Let us first sum up 
some of the main impediments, organized according to main actors 
and societal levels.
Industry has only cautiously embraced the largely untried emis-• 
sions trading instrument. Energy- intensive industries in particu-
lar have been quite lukewarm.
ENGOs started out as rather fierce critics of the ETS. They have • 
since moderated their stance, but have struggled to embrace this 
complex, “industry- friendly” and flexible instrument wholeheart-
edly, and function as a really hard- hitting external watchdog.
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Somewhat similar to industry, member states have had a cau-• 
tious attitude toward this new instrument, and have emphasized 
national control much more than environmental effectiveness. 
Certain key member states like Germany have been particularly 
skeptical toward trading, due to the mismatch with their own 
preexisting climate- policy instruments.
Although the entrepreneurial efforts by a dedicated group of DG • 
Environment officials have been formidable, the Commission 
has struggled to keep abreast, due to the formidable regulatory 
challenges involved and a rather restricted mandate from the 
member states.
The long period of climate- policy inaction in the United States • 
and a lax global climate regime have strengthened the arguments 
of those within the EU who resist a strong, ambitious front-
 running ETS.
The observations above also give some key clues to understanding 
the background for the achievements that have been made after all:
Some•  key industries have been clear trading supporters and allies 
to the Commission all the way (the power producers).
Some • key member states have been clear proponents of emissions 
trading (e.g., the UK).
The entrepreneurial group in the Commission has been strong, • 
with continuity in key personnel.
Catalytic events in the global climate regime have helped • 
Commission entrepreneurs at important crossroads—particu-
larly the Bush/US exit from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and to 
some extent also the entry into force of the Protocol in 2005.
What about the prospects ahead? One important possible next 
step—particularly if and when anything substantial comes out of 
the negotiations on a new global climate regime, and if there is a 
related move of the EU from an overall 20 to 30 percent reduction 
target—would be to further tighten the ETS 2020 cap. The institu-
tional machinery is in place (see Article 28 in Directive 2009/29). 
In spring 2010 it became increasingly probable that the EU would 
move to an overall 30 percent reduction target and a related deep-
ening of the ETS cap from 21 percent to 34 percent (Point Carbon 
2010). Several well- informed analysts predict an allowance price of 
around 40 euros as the most probable bet for 2020. This indicates 
a fundamental belief in real scarcity in the ETS post- 2012. But few 
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analysts had managed to foresee the “over- allocation” effects and 
ETS crisis in the spring of 2006, and there are definitely some uncer-
tainties ahead.
First, there is uncertainty related to the effect of banking within the 
ETS. How much of the probable second phase surplus of allowances, 
including CDM surplus, will be carried over to the third phase? We 
should also note that the more long- term climate- policy success of the 
ETS is definitely not “controlled” by the ETS alone. There are several 
interaction effects. In the fall of 2009, increasing attention focused on 
the possibility of “hot air” surplus allowances in the Kyoto Protocol 
being carried over post- 2012 and contributing to downward pres-
sure also on ETS allowances prices (see, for example, Point Carbon 
2009c). Another uncertainty is the interaction with other EU poli-
cies like energy efficiency and renewables. It has, for instance, been 
claimed that if energy efficiency really picks up speed, then there will 
be little need for an effective ETS in order to deliver the overall 20/30 
percent EU emissions- cut targets (see, for example, ENDS Europe 
2009a). To this, add how the financial crisis and the related drop in 
emissions have instructively demonstrated that factors totally unre-
lated to environmental policy affect emissions, the related need for 
allowances—and ultimately the carbon price and the related abate-
ment incentive effects.23
Thus, even if the EU has already succeeded in seriously reducing 
the gap to the “optimal design” of an ETS from 2013 on, other factors 
may lead to a situation where the ETS will not manage a similar leap 
forward in terms of “relative improvement.”
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Arntzen Løchen, Stig Schjølset, Jon B.Skjærseth and participants at a work-
shop held in Atlanta in November 2009 for helpful comments to this draft 
manuscript. Many thanks to Susan Høivik for language polishing.
1. I.e., Directive 2003/87/EC.
2. Allowances are denominated in metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2 eq.). One ton CO2 eq. is a unit of measurement reflecting the potency 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs).
3. See for instance European Commission (2008).
4. In the pilot phase, member states were allowed to sell up to 5 percent of 
their allowances. This limit was increased to 10 percent in the 2008–2012 
period.
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 5. I.e. Directive 2004/101/EC.
 6. Here I concentrate on the “internal” effects and success of the ETS and 
do not discuss the possible front- runner inspirational influence the ETS 
may have had and has on efforts around the globe. For this, see e.g. 
Wettestad (2009a).
 7. For instance, in March 2008, the price was 21 euros. One year later, it 
had sunk to 11.60 euros. However, by early September 2009, the price 
had climbed to 15.30 euros.
 8. For a broad overview of weaknesses and criticisms of the ETS, see Asselt 
(2009). The Asselt report discusses among other things scope, cap set-
ting, and allocation methods.
 9. Ambitiousness is here understood as the setting of a cap on allowances 
reasonably below projected needs and hence contributing to overall mar-
ket scarcity, relatively high and stable carbon prices, and related incen-
tives for abatement.
10. These five countries were Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK.
11. For summaries of the carbon leakage issue, see EurActiv, January 27, 
2009a (summary article) and Asselt, 2009, particularly pp. 62–69.
12. Among the companies included in the survey were E.On, RWE, Centrica, 
Scottish and Southern, Fortum, and EDF.
13. For a more comprehensive overview of these perspectives and debates, 
see for instance Skjærseth and Wettestad (2008), chapter two, and 
Boasson and Wettestad (2010).
14. For instance, the European industrial federation UNICE cautiously sup-
ported emissions trading in a 1998 position paper, stressing the need for 
a “well- designed” and “rigorous” system.
15. These were trading exercises organized by the power producers’ federa-
tion EURELECTRIC: the GETS I exercise in 1999 and GETS II exercise 
in 2000. See Skjærseth and Wettestad (2008: 79–80).
16. Zapfel and Vainio (2002).
17. Ibid.
18. As to the concept of institutional interaction, see Oberthur and Gehring 
(eds., 2006).
19. For instance, both Poland’s and Spain’s proposed uses of external credits 
were halved by the Commission.
20. This is equal to about 10 percent of the total allocation for the 
period.
21. This section is a summary of several related analyses; see Wettestad 
(2009c) and Skjærseth and Wettestad (2010; forthcoming 2010).
22. The inclusion of aviation took place in a separate decision- making 
process.
23. Note here that there is also an interesting interaction effect the other way 
around: The extent to which a low carbon price will provide suboptimal 
incentives to the development of renewables and enhancing of energy 
efficiency.
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Chapter Five
EU Renewable Electricity Policy: 
Mixed Emotions toward 
Harmonization
Måns Nilsson
The promotion of renewable sources of energy (RES) has, like energy 
policy overall, traditionally been a member- state concern in the 
European Union (EU). At the national level it has a relatively long 
history: many member states have supported the introduction of RES 
through various instruments and measures ever since the 1970s. In 
those early years, climate change and the environment were not among 
the primary drivers of policy. Instead, national governments were pri-
marily responding to the global energy crisis and looked for a replace-
ment for oil. In other words, renewable energy policy was primarily 
a response to concerns over energy supply security. Environmental 
concerns were slowly rising on the agenda during the 1970s but they 
remained secondary until the late 1980s, when the growing environ-
mental awareness in society paved the way for green parties and poli-
cies across Europe.
Thus, the drivers behind RES policy have shifted, but, in any case, 
the result has been that a plethora of national governance approaches 
have flourished. Different member states have developed differ-
ent approaches to governing RES and also different technological 
niches. For instance, when it comes to renewable electricity promo-
tion, Denmark became a forerunner in wind energy with its programs 
for supporting wind power industry, and is now home to the world’s 
largest wind industry, VESTAS (West- Jutlandish steel technology). 
Sweden had promoted bioenergy crops in the 1970s and 1980s and 
implemented a carbon tax on energy production in 1991, which 
induced an almost full phaseout of fossil fuels in the district heat-
ing sector (Nilsson, et al. 2004). Germany established a Feed- In- Law 
in 1991 which guarantees a price for vendors of renewable electric-
ity which enabled a rapid growth in both wind and solar industries 
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(Jacobsson and Lauber 2006).Despite member- state differences in 
approach, and a relatively inactive European Commission (hereafter: 
the Commission) (up to recently), the EU as a whole has experienced 
a strong growth in renewable electricity production, thanks largely to 
the various support schemes and policy instruments to promote the 
deployment of renewable electricity, such as wind, solar, and biomass 
(Figure 5.1).
This chapter presents the various instruments and initiatives pro-
posed and taken by the EU and its member states to promote RES 
since it came onto the EU- policy agenda in the late 1990s. The anal-
ysis focuses on renewable electricity generation, and only briefly 
touches upon other facets of RES, such as biofuels for transport or 
the heating sector. It assesses and discusses what progress has been 
achieved by the EU and how far it is from having a common RES 
policy. Seeking to understand and explain the reluctance and mixed 
progress in RES, it examines both obstacles that the EU has faced in 
making progress and what considerations have motivated EU bodies 
and member states in both furthering and impeding the creation of a 
common policy in this area. Based on this discussion, it discusses the 
prospects for further Europeanization of RES policy in the medium 
term future.
Figure 5.1  Growth in renewable electricity generation (in twh per year) 
Source: Nilsson et al. 2009.
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EU Policy Developments in 
Renewable Energy
Energy issues have always been part of the EU- policy discourse, but 
they did not take a front seat on the agenda until the 1990s. At first, 
the focus was on developing the internal energy market, and the first 
market package was put in place in the mid- 1990s (CEC 1996). The 
Commission did not really consider renewable energy promotion as 
a policy priority until 1997, when a White Paper was released (CEC 
1997), in view of developing a first RES directive. In these first delib-
erations, it was clear that the Commission strived for a harmonized 
European policy based on a market approach. The ideas for a har-
monized market- based policy- instrument were further developed in a 
1999 Working Document (CEC 1999). However, the wide variety of 
policy measures already in place at the national level, and the differ-
ent experiences made with these, rendered the political debate about 
policy measures a difficult one. The first RES Directive 2001/77/EC 
on the promotion of electricity produced from RES was adopted after 
several years of negotiations involving debates on harmonization of 
national support systems, country targets, and the definition of RES 
(CEC 2001; Rowlands 2005). It set an overall indicative target of 22 
percent electricity from RES by 2010, and included individual targets 
for each member state. Tradable Renewable Electricity Certificates 
(TRECs) were mentioned in the directive but member states resisted 
both harmonization of national support systems and a common sys-
tem. No agreement was reached about a common instrument (Lauber 
2007).
The debate about what policy measures were effective continued 
in the EU, and many member states continued on their own paths, 
although clearly inspired and learning from each other (Busch and 
Jörgens 2005). Operating support is currently the most important 
support mechanism although many other policy instruments are 
used at the national level including modifications to the permitting 
procedure for new and enhanced installations, tax rebates, R&D 
support, and investment support (capital subsidies). Within operat-
ing support, two principal measures are currently used: the feed- in 
tariff (FIT) and the TREC (CEC 2008a) (see Table 5.1 for a sum-
mary comparison).
Generic market- based instruments such as TREC under a quota 
obligation have been implemented in seven member states. This 
type of instrument typically fixes a quantity of RES to be achieved 
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and facilitates this by issuing green certificates that can be traded 
TRECs. TREC systems were introduced in countries such as the 
United Kingdom (UK), Sweden, Italy, and Belgium in the early 
2000s. Technology- specific support measures coupled with the 
obligation of distributors to purchase renewable electricity at fixed 
prices (depending on technology)—so- called feed- in tariffs or pre-
miums (FITs)—have been implemented in 19 member states. Spain 
and Germany are two of the major EU countries deploying FIT. 
From an economic theory point of view, the two systems are not 
that different; the FIT system fixes the price and lets the market set 
the volume, whereas the TREC system fixes the volume and lets the 
market set the price.
While member states were busy implementing their national 
approaches through the 2000s, the Commission kept arguing for a 
harmonized policy framework, which would be better aligned with 
the internal market policy. Not much happened, however, until 2006, 
when the EU’s top leadership started to take a profound interest in 
renewable energy issues. As will be discussed later, this interest was 
fuelled by both energy security and climate change concerns. The 
result was that between 2006 and 2008, renewable energy met an ever-
 increasing policy interest and activity. For instance, in 2006 during 
Table 5.1  Summary comparison of FIT and TREC
 The FIT The TREC
Support 
constituency
Favored by the majority of 
member states—implemented 
in 18 MS, RES industry, green 
NGOs
Favored by the many parts 
of Commission and some 
member states—implemented 
in 7 MS, most major 
power utilities, industrial 
organizations
Pricing 
mechanism
Differentiated tariffs, above 50 Ec 
for photovoltaic and below 10 for 
wind, fixed for a time period
A uniform (but fluctuating) 
certificate price set by market 
conditions
Outcome Deliver large quantities of RES—
also those that are early stage and 
more expensive
Deliver large quantities of 
the most cost- efficient RES 
technologies.
Market effect Should promote competition 
between suppliers of a specific 
production technology
Should promote competition 
between different production 
technologies
Type of market 
efficiency
Dynamic efficiency Static efficiency 
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the UK presidency it became, for the first time, part of the agenda at 
the European Summits (the meetings of the heads of government). 
There was significant political pressure to ramp up the EU energy and 
climate policy. In March 2007, the European Council reached a land-
mark agreement on an overall binding 20 percent renewable energy 
target for the EU by 2020, along with targets of 20 percent reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions, and a 20 percent increase in energy effi-
ciency. They requested the Commission to develop a policy proposal 
for how this would be achieved.
In January 2008, the Commission presented the draft directive 
“on the promotion of renewable source of energy” replacing the 2001 
directive (CEC 2008c). This was part of a larger climate and energy 
package which also contained the new Emissions Trading System 
(ETS II), provisions on energy efficiency, and support for developing 
carbon capture and storage technologies. The proposed RES directive 
contained national targets for renewable energy shares, provisions 
for trade in “Guarantees of Origin” (“GOs”) of renewable energy 
(a mechanism similar to the TREC system), and targets for renew-
able energy in transport (including biofuels). The overall binding 20 
percent renewable energy consumption target for the EU by 2020 
was allocated to different member states (Figure 5.2). The target for 
renewable energy in transport was set to increase the share of renew-
able energy, including hydrogen, electricity from renewable sources 
of energy, and biofuels, to 10 percent by 2020. Sustainability criteria 
for biofuels for transport (but not for biomass energy more generally) 
were added to ensure that the production and supply chain of biofuels 
is sustainable. It included criteria for minimum greenhouse gas emis-
sions savings compared with conventional fuels, as well as criteria 
against the cultivation of energy crops for such fuels on land that is 
currently covered by forest or where endangered species live.
According to normal regulatory procedure, the proposal was 
coprocessed in the European Parliament and Council. The Council, 
in the formation of the Heads of State, and the European Parliament 
passed the directive in December 2008. During the processing of the 
proposal, the most significant change was that the proposed com-
mon policy instrument of GO trading was abandoned. Instead, GOs 
would be used purely for verifying compliance with targets and a 
flexible mechanism was put in place for statistical cooperation. These 
so- called statistical transfers, which can only be conducted under 
the condition that the selling member state has reached its interim 
renewable targets, can also be applied in cases where member states 
cooperate on joint projects (European Parliament and Council of the 
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European Union 2009). One other important change was to loosen 
the sustainability criteria concerning greenhouse gas emissions sav-
ings— rendering the target easier to achieve(European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union 2009).
Assessment: EU Progress toward a 
Common RES Policy
The brief account above shows that the progress of the EU in the 
area of RES policy is ambiguous. On the one hand, there are many 
signs of progress, both in terms of policy development and in con-
crete achievements in RES growth. First, the EU has, at the level of 
its member states, taken strong actions to promote RES, and many 
member states have been active for over two decades, leading to sig-
nificant growth in RES production and industries. Second, there 
has also been a certain centralization and power shift to Brussels 
in the new RES directive compared to the old one. One might claim 
that the EU has achieved a common policy in terms of the objectives 
Figure 5.2  Renewable energy use and goals for 2020 in the climate and 
energy package of 2008
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for renewable energy, including binding quantitative targets up to 
2020. Although environmental groups have argued that the climate 
and energy package is too weak to resolve Europe’s energy and 
climate problems, the 2006 to 2009 developments on renewable 
energy, including the Council decisions in May 2007 and December 
2008, are indicative of a very strong progress in the area. The EU 
has through these decisions established a common policy on RES, 
in terms of binding targets for each country and commitments to 
pathways toward these targets. In this sense, considering the lack 
of constitutional mandate, the Commission has been successful in 
pushing member states toward promotion of renewable energy as a 
policy objective.
However, the EU is still far from having a common policy in the 
RES area. The instruments and approaches deployed in member 
states have not been much coordinated. The EU has not, despite the 
best intentions from in particular the Commission, been able to har-
monize less develop a common instrument such as happened with for 
instance greenhouse gas mitigation with the EU ETS. As a result, there 
are potentially important inefficiency losses in how EU RES growth 
is being advanced. The Commission has, unsuccessfully so far, advo-
cated harmonization with a flexible market regime based on quotas 
and trading. Important member states and increasingly important 
industrial and environmental interests have resisted such policies and 
successfully challenged the effectiveness of trading systems compared 
to technology- specific support measures through FIT (CEC 2008a). 
As already noted the debate is unresolved between those that advo-
cate a market- based trading mechanism of certificates or Guarantees 
of Origin; and those that advocate the use of fixed pricing such as FIT 
(Midttun and Gautesen 2007).
Provided that the EU pushed hard for policy harmonization in 
the 2001 directive and then again in the 2008 directive, failing both 
times and caving to pressures from member states, it must be deduced 
that the EU is relatively far from developing harmonized or common 
RES policy- instruments. That a harmonized RES policy is not realis-
tic in the foreseeable future is confirmed by interview respondents in 
Brussels. Member states are seemingly increasingly wedded to their 
national support systems. As expertise and interest groups build up 
around them they have become institutionalized over time, and there 
is currently little to suggest that the Commission will regain the force 
it had in the 1990s for pushing through internal market reforms in 
this area (Nilsson, et al. 2009).
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Drivers and Impediments toward the 
Creation of a Common RES Policy
The overall positive progress on RES policy can be attributed to a 
wide range of drivers. Substantial policy drivers can be found that are 
related to all three “pillars” of energy policy:
The energy security issue, growing on the agenda in the 2000s • 
not least due to the Russia- Ukraine gas disputes in 2006 and in 
2008, but also in the face of increasing oil prices and an increas-
ing sense of vulnerability and resource competition with growing 
economies such as China.
The internal market issue, that is the wish to expand the com-• 
petency of the EU into the energy domain and secure a com-
petitive and efficient energy supply for European industries and 
consumers.
The climate change issue, where the EU has set upon itself to be • 
a global leader in climate change mitigation, setting an example 
and paving the way for others to follow.
These fundamental and “slow” drivers notwithstanding, the pro-
cessing and adoption of the RES directive in 2008 was a remarkably 
speedy one. Several more practical and short- term factors played 
into this. First, the institutional setup with the revolving six- month 
presidency played a role. France saw the climate and energy package 
as a prestige project that it wished to conclude during its presidency 
(July–Dec 2008). Without it, the legacy of the French presidency 
would have been far weaker on the whole. President Sarkozy 
decided to lift the issue to the Summit level (the gathering of the 
European governmental heads) rather than the “normal” Council 
level (the formation of the energy ministers) and was able to secure 
a deal despite strong skepticism on behalf of several member states. 
Raising the political stakes to this level rendered it more difficult 
for skeptics to block or stall the process. Another crucial factor 
was the time constraint. European Parliament elections were due in 
June 2009, and a new Commission would be installed in autumn 
2009. If the decision had not been taken by June 2009, the nego-
tiation process would have had to restart, with delays of at least a 
year. This would then render impossible a strong European position 
at the United Nations (UN) climate change talks in Copenhagen 
in 2009, a meeting for which much hope was pinned at the time. 
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Third, the package proponents in the Council and Parliament were 
concerned about the agenda and interest of the incoming Czech 
presidency (for the first half of 2009) as they had voiced concerns 
about it during Council discussions and the Czech government was 
generally seen as both “Euro- skeptical” and skeptical to climate 
change mitigation.
In other words, there were both long- term agendas, and short- term 
politico- institutional factors enabling the rapid overall progress of the 
renewable energy agenda in the EU. How, then, can we understand 
the lack of progress in developing a common policy? The immedi-
ate explanation is that influential member states such as Germany 
and Spain opposed a common instrument, and along with them 
came other countries who had put in place FIT systems, and the new 
RES- based industries (wind power industries etc.) that have grown 
dependent on these systems. The Spanish and German systems have 
in fact induced a substantive increase in renewable electricity as well 
as helped create a new industry. The two countries also account for 
most of the growth in European wind power capacity over the last 
decade, accounting for 21,000 MW and 12,000 MW installed wind 
capacity, out of the total EU capacity of 48,000 (EUROSTAT 2009). 
In Germany, who put in place their Feed in Law already in 1990, 
renewable sources today account for ca. 15 percent of the electric-
ity supply. Spain’s current system of FIT was put in place in 1997 
through the Electric Power Act 54/1997, and updated in the Royal 
Decree in 2004. The current premium for wind is 40 percent of the 
average electricity tariff, and for solar 250 percent (Ragwitz and 
Huber n.d.). Complementary measures such as regulations requiring 
new housing to install solar panels provided additional triggers for 
the rapid expansion. In 2008, Spain accounted for 41 percent of the 
world market of installed solar power, installing 2,460 MW out of 
the world total 5950 MW (Germany installed 1,860 MW and the rest 
of Europe 310 MW) (Solarbuzz LCC 2009). Thus, there were strong 
new business interests at stake who defended the FIT system, working 
both through member states and through renewable lobby organi-
zations such as European Renewable Energy Council (EREC)—the 
umbrella organization of the European renewable energy industry, 
and European Renewable Electricity Federation (EREF)—an orga-
nization for independent power producers that exclusively produce 
renewable electricity; groups that, according to a Commission offi-
cial, were “very good at getting their point across.”
Aside from, and to some extent underlying, these interest- based 
explanations, there are also more ideational mechanisms at play. The 
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reason for the Commission to push for a TREC system is of course 
that it in the Commission’s view represents the most internal- market 
compatible approach. Since the 1990s, market efficiency consider-
ations lie more or less at the heart of the Commission’s raison d’être. 
Following a market efficiency logic, TRECs held the promise to 
deliver RES in the most cost- effective way possible. However, this is 
yet debated, not least because comparisons between systems are diffi-
cult to make. Through their designs, the measures are pursuing partly 
differing objectives and are based on different policy perspectives. 
The TREC approach is primarily concerned with market efficiency 
by way of inducing the delivery of the renewable electricity technol-
ogy that has the lowest production cost into the system, whereas the 
FIT approach is concerned with building up new industries and tech-
nologies and helping them onto the market. Sweden’s TREC system, 
started in 2003, has been criticized for not inducing growth in wind 
power but merely converting existing boilers to biomass- based gener-
ation (consistent with the theory—the cheapest option). Indeed, in the 
first round, most of the certificates were allocated to existing produc-
tion capacity, where there was a great deal of unexplored capacity in 
combined heat and power production. Nonetheless, as it has become 
clear that the system will be extended another ten years, investors 
have become more confident, and recent figures demonstrate that 
wind power investments have been taking off very rapidly. One can 
expect there to be some truth in the theoretical assertion that the 
TREC system induces a stronger competitive pressure between differ-
ent generation technologies to stimulate cost- efficient designs. Such a 
pressure is not present in the feed- in system where revenue is secured. 
Therefore, proponents of TREC argue that maintaining FIT systems 
for too long may slow down technology development and forego effi-
ciency potentials. Proponents of TREC emphasize the economic effi-
ciency of the system—the ability to deliver the least expensive green 
electricity and induce a competitive market between different tech-
nologies. Proponents of FIT, on the other hand, emphasize how it 
induces investor confidence as a result of the fully predictable revenue 
stream from the fixed price, and that support levels can be adapted to 
the specific needs of different technologies and nurturing new indus-
tries by way of providing long- term stability to protect niche markets 
(Fouquet and Johansson 2008). In the FIT system the competitive 
pressure lies not between technologies but within each power genera-
tion technology, for instance between different equipment manufac-
turers and suppliers, although due to production capacity constraints 
the last few years, this pressure has been rather weak.
06_Birchfield_Ch05.indd   122 4/12/2011   5:25:03 PM
EU Renewable Electricity Policy 123
Thus, the debate over RES policy instruments, and in particular 
the divide between those that advocate FIT and those that advocate 
TRECs, is also a debate about framing and what objectives are the 
most important ones on the agenda. From this perspective, another 
explanation emerges: the European policy agenda has in recent years 
been dominated not by the internal market but by concerns about 
innovation, employment, industrial growth and security. As these 
concerns have taken over, this played into the hands of those advocat-
ing national support systems in general and FIT systems in particular. 
This pattern manifested clearly in the Council deliberations over the 
new directive between January and December 2008. Although opin-
ions of member states on the TREC/GO issue were far from aligned 
as the Council began its process, a positive tone toward TREC/GO 
was maintained. For examples, the press release of the Council in 
February 2008 concluded that “the importance of trade in guarantees 
of origin has been underlined as a flexible instrument which should 
enable and not hinder Member States to reach their targets.” (Council 
of the European Union 2008). However, at the top of the agenda 
now was the issue of competitiveness—not the advancement of the 
internal market. In addition, problems with wind- fall profits not only 
from ETS but also from GO trading had been acknowledged by the 
Commission in its impact assessment (CEC 2008b).The concern for 
industrial competitiveness played out in favor of national support 
schemes and against GO trading, as national support schemes were 
seen as more important drivers for industrial growth and innova-
tion. Several GO friendly countries were turning more negative or 
becoming uncertain about the merits of the system (in particular 
given the provisions in the proposal creating legal uncertainty). The 
overall picture of positions at the time show that the opposition was 
rising, with many governments viewing the proposal as too uncer-
tain (Nilsson, et al. 2009). Former strong GO proponents like the UK 
agreed that the Commission’s proposal was problematic and instead 
worked toward an alternative voluntary mechanism together with, for 
example,Poland and Germany. As noted earlier, in December 2008 
the Council and Parliament agreed on the new RES directive without 
the mandatory GO trading.
Summing up the key obstacles against harmonized or common 
policy instrument, the key aspect is that national governments that 
cut a lot of ice in the EU- policy arena have invested in and institu-
tionalized support systems. A growing range of actors, such as envi-
ronmental NGOs and renewable energy industries of different types, 
have developed high stakes in the continuation of FIT systems. These 
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groups formed alliances with powerful member states such as Spain 
and Germany, and many other supporting countries. Their positions 
and arguments were underpinned by experts and analysts that took 
a growing interest in innovation and early market support. As the 
overarching political agenda of the EU switched away from internal 
market efficiency to issues of security, competitiveness, and inno-
vation, it played further into the hands of those advocating against 
harmonization(Toke 2008).
Prospects for Future Progress in 
EU RES Policy
European RES policy is still only in what might be considered the 
“take- off” phase. As member states are being pushed to deliver on 
the targets up to 2020, there is no doubt that strong policies will 
need to be developed in the coming years. However, this is unlikely 
to occur through harmonization any time soon—renewable policy-
 instruments will remain a national affair in the short to medium term. 
The Commission’s own working paper (CEC 2008a) showed a shift in 
its thinking as regards instrument harmonization; “. . . harmonization 
of support schemes remain a long term goal on economic efficiency, 
single market and state aid grounds, but that harmonization in the 
short term is not appropriate. By adopting best practices or combin-
ing national support schemes Member States can continue to reform, 
optimize and coordinate their efforts to support renewable electric-
ity” (p. 17). Clearly, modifications to FIT, TREC, and other systems 
will be made but on the whole, member states appear prepared to 
continue on their trodden paths, and FITs are become increasingly 
popular. For instance, the UK introduces a system of FIT for certain 
technologies alongside its more generic TREC system. Finland has 
recently opted for a FIT system. At the time of writing, Norway (not 
an EU but an EEA [European Environment Agency]member) is reluc-
tantly contemplating joining Sweden in a joint TREC market.
Both FIT and TREC have contributed to considerable market 
expansion, the emergence of learning networks and growing politi-
cal strength of industry associations for suppliers and owners of 
renewable energy. Such institutional change has induced European 
leadership in RES. However, it should also be noted that this leader-
ship comes at a cost, as it implies politically orchestrated transfers 
of resources between stakeholders (i.e. from electricity consumers or 
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tax payers to renewable industries). Costs have been significant both 
in FIT and TREC systems. The systems are therefore contingent on 
strong political support.
Therefore, in the short and medium term, further Europeanization 
of RES policy appears unlikely. What are the more long- term future 
prospects for a common EU RES policy? Based on the perspectives 
discussed in this chapter, future advances will depend on the develop-
ment of four sets of variables, discussed briefly below.
The Relative Prominence of 
Overarching Policy Agendas in the EU
As competitiveness and economic concerns are ever increasing com-
pared to 2006 and 2007, and United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations keep stumbling, a fur-
ther tightening of the European energy policy toward climate- policy 
goals appears unlikely. One question is whether or not climate has 
a particular status in the public opinion (which has not been a topic 
of this chapter). This momentum also depends on developments in 
climate science and observed impacts around the world. But on bal-
ance it seems that after agreeing on the “Package” the EU- policy 
machinery has turned to implementation mode—maintaining targets 
but not going much further. This will shape also the level of ambi-
tions in RES policy. Of course, RES policy is shaped also by other 
agendas, at EU, national and local levels, including innovation and 
competitiveness, and these, combined with security concerns, may 
become more important than climate change in driving RES- policy 
developments in the future. The internal market agenda, which has 
dominated the European integration project as well as much of the 
world’s economic policies since the 1980s, has come under increasing 
attack not least in the wake of recent economic turmoil globally. In 
particular those concerned with competitiveness have begun to advo-
cate more strongly that their end objective is not always compatible 
with free markets. Instead, innovation policies and security policies 
may be as critical to the achievement of a competitive Europe. As a 
result, the interest in public initiative and publicly funded programs 
is increasing across layers of society, among politicians, businesses, 
NGOs, energy analysts, and even mainstream economic analysts. 
Here the renewed Lisbon strategy and what Europe is doing in its 
Lead Market and green economy initiatives may entail RES policies 
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more on the innovation and technology- support side. In any cases, 
the near future is likely to hold a more balanced approach to market 
promotion than in the past, including possibly a further relaxing of 
state- aid rules, as well as further and more variety and fragmentation 
in member- state initiatives, rather than common policies based on 
internal market efficiency concerns.
The Institutional Relationship between 
Member States and the EU
At the institutional level, as regards the balance between Europe-
anization and member- state autonomy, the recent patterns of RES 
policy and the Commission’s own conclusions suggest that a contin-
ued considerable discretion will be left to member states about how 
best to promote renewable energy. This includes a relaxation of state-
 aid rules, which have become increasingly generous over the last few 
years (Flåm 2009). The European integration project moves forward 
in jumps and impasses, but lately the momentum has considerably 
stalled, following the failure to get positive outcomes when posting 
the new constitution to public referendum. It appears unlikely that 
much more competency will be moved to the EU level unless the advo-
cates can tie in such a movement to the supply security agenda. (It 
should be noted that although advocates of national autonomy have 
played the supply security card, it can be argued that an advancement 
of supply security is actually rather contingent on stronger European 
integration.)
The Relative Influence of Different 
Interest Groups with a Stake in 
RES Policy
Concerning the role and relative influence of different actors, the 
recent European RES- policy development shows an interesting and at 
least partly new pattern of advocacy power to smaller niche organiza-
tions with specialized interests (such as renewable energy producers) 
at the expense of the large incumbents with their more principled 
arguments (such as Business Europe) (Nilsson, et al. 2009). Also the 
major power producers have lost some ground, from a previously very 
privileged market position. In the case of RES, this new advocacy 
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pattern played out in favor of national interests and against the inter-
nal market and Europeanization process, which tends to benefit the 
larger players. One reason may be that as the complexity of policy 
is increasing, the larger players have increasing difficulties forming 
a clear position, as they represent diverging interests on particular 
topics. Niche groups that can capitalize on agendas, such as new and 
renewable energy producers, will continue to have a strong voice in 
European energy policy.
New Empirical Evidence about the 
Merits of Different Support Measures
Much of the political debate about policy measures has so far been 
informed by modeling results and principal arguments. Economic 
modeling, performed for instance in the Commission’s own impact 
assessments demonstrated benefits from efficiency gains from TREC 
instruments (CEC 2008b). However, empirical evidence from a wide 
experience of RES policy across Europe is now building up (see, for 
example, Bergek and Jacobsson 2010). This chapter has not studied 
this evidence in detail, but the Commission’s own review of the per-
formance of support schemes stresses that support schemes need to be 
adapted to a competitive internal electricity market, and also that well-
 adapted FIT regimes have generally been the most efficient and effective 
support schemes (CEC 2008a). Experiences with FIT had proven that 
they helped build up new industries and quickly reach results. However, 
the findings and the underlying definition were contested by internal-
 market advocates. For instance, the Commission defined efficiency by 
comparing support costs to generation costs, rather than looking at the 
full cost of the support; “The closer the level of support is to the genera-
tion cost, the more efficient a support mechanism is in terms of cover-
ing the actual costs. If the level of support is below the generation cost, 
which is the case in many of the Member States, it is not effective [sic!] 
as it is too low to trigger substantial investments in renewable electric-
ity generation” (p. 9). There is clearly a need for further research and 
evidence about the real impacts of different instruments.
Conclusions
EU progress on RES policy is mixed. On the one hand, the last 
decade has witnessed a very rapid engagement with RES issues at 
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the European level, and the EU has established relatively ambitious 
and binding targets for member states in the medium term. On the 
other hand, the EU has not been able, despite its best intentions, to 
establish a common RES policy- instrument. Thus, the process of 
Europeanization of RES policy is there, but may be characterized as 
“hesitant” (Wettestad, et al. 2010).
Both the progress and the obstacles can be explained by long- term 
factors about what agendas are important and how these shift over 
time, and by short- term factors about what interests and what actors 
cut the most ice in the decision making process. As regards agendas, 
RES policy received a boost as it responded to all three pillars of energy 
policy heralded both by the Commission and by most member states—
security, climate, and cost. The advancement of European RES policy 
in 2007 and 2008 was in particular a result of the coupling of the 
climate change and energy security agendas. Brussels policy entre-
preneurs were able to capture the prominence, media attention and 
political salience of the climate change concern, and couple it to the 
supply- security concerns emerging due to, for instance, Russia’s foreign 
policy agenda, and draw upon analytical and political support from 
the rapidly growing interest groups and coalitions relating to renewable 
energy production.
Paradoxically, at the same time as these factors advanced RES 
policy in general, they undermined the Commission’s wish to deepen 
the European harmonization of policy by advancing internal- market 
compatible policy- instruments. The overarching EU strategic agenda 
shifted away from internal market concerns to concerns over security, 
innovation and competitiveness, which impeded the advancement of 
the common policy- instrument. The debate is of course still on- going 
as to whether policies that nurture development, learning effects and 
market diffusion of RES technologies in a protected environment are 
better for European innovation and industrial development than har-
monized market- based policy- instruments intended to ensure efficient 
market- based resource allocation (Nilsson, et al. 2009).
Regarding actors and interests, the role and power of the 
Commission in setting the agenda appears to have diminished over 
the examined time period and strong member states have recovered 
the power of initiative. In addition, new interest groups have emerged 
with successful advocacy strategies, often forming alliances in unex-
pected combinations.
The future prospects for EU RES policy depends on the develop-
ment of different agendas, institutional relationships in the European 
policy- making system, actors and interests, and the gathering of new 
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evidence about the effectiveness and efficiency of different policy 
measures. The combined picture suggests that further harmonization 
is possible but that a common instrument, in particular one based on 
the TREC approach, is unlikely in the short- to- medium term.
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Chapter Six
Energy Savings and Efficiency
Jørgen Henningsen
In June 2005, when introducing the European Commission’s (here-
after: the Commission) Green Paper on energy efficiency (EC 2005), 
then energy commissioner Andris Piëbalgs declared energy efficiency 
to be the top priority during his term as commissioner. This was no 
bad choice. The Barroso Commission (2004–2009) would be the last 
commission to have an impact on the European Union’s (EU’s) com-
pliance with its Kyoto commitment, and the recent enlargement to 
include ten new member states was a strong reminder of the huge 
potential, still unexploited, in energy efficiency. In addition, the 
Green Paper correctly observed that within the EU- 15, a lot of low-
 hanging “energy efficiency fruit” remained on the trees. And this, 
despite energy efficiency having been part of the EU’s “Energy and 
Environment” program since the early 1990s. In quantitative terms, 
the Green Paper estimated that 20 percent of Europe’s gross energy 
consumption was “wasted” unnecessarily.
As happens so often in politics, however, events have taken over. 
Beginning in early 2006, reinforced in 2007, and culminating with 
the Commission’s 2008 Energy and Climate Package (20–20–20: 20 
percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 20 percent renewable 
energy, and 20 percent improvement in energy efficiency) and the sub-
sequent Council and parliament decisions on the package in 2008 and 
2009, energy efficiency has been put on the back burner in favor of 
more glamorous policies such as renewable energy, emissions trad-
ing, and energy security of supply. Nevertheless, energy efficiency is 
still fully alive, to a large extent thanks to legislation proposed by 
the earlier Prodi Commission (1999–2004) but only slowly working 
its way through the cumbersome process of Council and Parliament 
negotiations and subsequent implementation (or nonimplementation) 
in member states’ legislation. Still, there is no evidence that energy 
efficiency has managed to make the quantum leap that would be jus-
tified by virtue of its being the most  cost- effective policy option to 
reduce CO2 emissions and improve energy security of supply.
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In principle, energy efficiency is part of the EU’s overall 20–20–20 
strategy,to be attained by 2020. Where the greenhouse gas and renew-
able energy objectives have been translated into binding legislation, 
however, this is not the case with the energy efficiency objective. It is 
not difficult to explain why. First, the 20 percent target is to be achieved 
against a business- as- usual scenario, something that is difficult, if not 
impossible, to quantify. Second, energy efficiency cuts across virtually 
all economic sectors (industry, power production, appliances, build-
ings, transport, etc.), some of which are partly covered by other pieces 
of legislation. The result is that energy efficiency ends up as the second 
priority (if at all a priority), and it should be no surprise if some five 
to ten years in the future, we will see another Green paper on energy 
efficiency discussing how to pick the low- hanging fruit.
The Energy Efficiency Action Plan
In October 2006, the Commission presented an Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan as a follow- up to the 2005 Green Paper on Energy 
Efficiency (EC 2006). The plan exemplified the fact that it is easier 
to identify the efficiency improvement potential than to prescribe the 
measures that will turn the potential into reality. In fact, much of 
the plan simply reported on measures already proposed or agreed or 
measures following previous decisions to review existing policies or 
directives already in force. The annex listed 57 specific actions to be 
carried out in the course of the remaining years of the (first) Barroso 
Commission, a number that by itself should raise some suspicion of 
a lack of focus. Analysis by Commission Directorates- General led to 
the expectation that implementation of the action plan would deliver 
a 13 percent reduction in gross energy consumption by 2020 rela-
tive to business- as- usual projections. This was probably an optimis-
tic expectation, and it was subject to the uncertainty of calculating 
future energy consumption using business- as- usual assumptions.
The action plan covered a number of areas. Among the most impor-
tant were the following.
Appliances and Other Energy- Using 
Equipment
Inclusion of appliances and other energy- using equipment was par-
ticularly important because energy efficiency requirements for them 
07_Birchfield_Ch06.indd   132 4/12/2011   5:25:43 PM
Energy Savings and Efficiency 133
are considered internal market legislation and, as such, are subject 
to full EU harmonization. It was also important because existing 
EU- legislation in the area stopped well short of requiring levels of 
energy efficiency for different types of appliances. In fact, much of the 
existing legislation reflected a desire to protect producers of less effi-
cient appliances rather than the subsequent users. Whereas one might 
expect the market to favor energy- efficient appliances because of their 
lower cost of use, experience has shown that the price of an appliance 
weighs more heavily in purchasing decisions than the expected cost 
of using it.
The action plan identified 14 groups of appliances for which the 
Commission would propose new or reinforced minimum energy 
performance standards during the period 2007–2008. Insufficient 
allocation of resources for the work has made the timing slip, but 
the assessment, that this was, so far, the most important part of the 
action plan, remains valid. In the meantime, the actual implementa-
tion of the performance standards continued to be done through the 
2005 “Ecodesign” Directive (2005/32/EC).1
Services for Energy End- Use Efficiency
This part of the action plan was limited to making a reference to the 
directive on Energy End- Use Efficiency and Energy Services (2006/32/
EC), which is discussed below.
Buildings
The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (2002/91/EC) has so 
far had little impact on the overall energy consumption in buildings 
within the EU.2 This failure is partly due to the directive’s limited 
scope (new buildings and major renovation and only buildings of 
more than 1,000 square meters) and partly to the fact that imple-
mentation is still left to a great extent to member states. In addition, 
enforcement is slow and insufficient. The EU institutions do not have 
to go very far to observe the sad state of affairs. Brussels, like former 
socialist member states, is full of poorly insulated houses.
The problem does not lie with the Commission. How to improve 
the energy performance of the hundreds of millions of houses and 
apartments throughout the EU, under completely different climatic, 
infrastructure, and economic conditions, is virtually impossible to 
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put in a single formula, even one with considerable flexibility. The 
inconvenient truth is that even a modified directive with a broader 
scope than the one presently in force is unlikely to have much impact 
on energy consumption in buildings unless individual member states 
make it a national policy priority. For this reason, the potential 11 
percent reduction in total final energy consumption identified in the 
action plan is likely to remain only a potential for years to come, 
which is regrettable.
Energy Transformation
The action plan expressed confidence that improved energy efficiency 
in the power production sector would be taken care of by the emis-
sion trading scheme (ETS), which is discussed below. The fact that the 
action plan said nothing about the energy intensive industries covered 
by the ETS would lead one to believe that the Commission shared the 
same optimism on the achievements of the ETS in this sector.
Transport
By 2006, the Commission had determined that the automobile indus-
try was unlikely to be able to deliver the necessary efficiency improve-
ments to achieve the promised goal of 140 grams of CO2 emissions 
per kilometer (g/km) by 2008/2009. Subsequently, the Commission 
proposed, and Council and Parliament agreed to, binding standards 
for CO2 emissions (and thereby energy efficiency) by passenger cars 
up to 2020.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that, while the agreed 
target was not achieved, the energy efficiency of European passenger 
cars has improved much faster over the last ten years than that of cars 
in most other markets, such as the United States. Adopted legislation 
is likely to continue to promote this trend, but it is uncertain whether 
the lower penalties for exceeding the limit values, insisted on by the 
Council, will mean that car manufacturers (and buyers) will prefer to 
pay the penalties rather than shift to more efficient vehicles.
The action plan further announced the intention to include aviation 
in the emission trading scheme, a step that has now been taken and 
which will be operational from 2012. This development is unlikely, 
however, to have any significant impact on aviation energy efficiency 
over and above what will already happen because of concern in the 
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sector over high fuel cost. The issue is further dealt with in the section 
on the ETS.
Regrettably, the action plan said nothing about energy efficiency 
in heavy- duty vehicles (trucks and buses). The potential for energy 
savings in this area is less than that with passenger cars, but it is still 
too large to ignore.
Energy Efficiency in the New 
Member States
The action plan had very little to say about what to do to address 
the often very inefficient use of energy in the new member states. It 
is obvious that this is generally not a priority for the governments 
of those countries, but it is nevertheless an area that could poten-
tially deliver both economic benefit and meaningful employment. 
Nevertheless, not a single specific action out of the 57 proposed was 
aimed at the new member states.
The Directive on Energy End- Use 
Efficiency and Energy Services
Another important development in 2006 was the adoption of a new 
directive on Energy End- Use Efficiency and Energy Services (2006/32/
EC).3 In principle, this directive could be a cornerstone in EU energy 
efficiency legislation. It replaces the 1993 SAVE Directive and requires 
action on the part of member states, both to set energy savings tar-
gets (although only indicative ones) and to ensure that final energy 
consumption is measured and paid for by the consumer (but only 
if it is not too difficult or expensive). The directive addresses public 
as well as private energy consumption, and it obliges to some extent 
companies delivering energy to consumers to promote savings in final 
energy use. Not least, it obliges individual member states to develop 
national Energy Efficiency Action Plans (EEAPs) and to update these 
on a regular basis.
Whereas the scope of the directive responds to calls made from 
many sides for many years for stronger EU legislation on more effi-
cient end use of energy, the fact that the directive contains few sub-
stantive measures that are sufficiently precise and binding to allow the 
Commission to take member states to court should limit the enthu-
siasm. The directive might well end in the category of EU legislation 
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where success is mainly observed in those member states that would 
have taken the measures anyway. It is beyond doubt that close moni-
toring by the Commission will be essential, something that might well 
consume considerable resources.
The first round of national EEAPs, due by mid- 2007, was not 
encouraging. Most were late and few went beyond putting on paper 
what was already in the pipeline in the different capitals. Few plans, 
if any, reflected serious government involvement across ministries on 
the issue.
Of course the final judgment on the merits of the directive should 
not be based on reports due less than 18 months after the legal text is 
finalized. A much better test will be the 2011 reports, but under pres-
ent economic conditions one can fear that governments will content 
themselves with the decline in energy consumption resulting from the 
slowdown of the economy, rather than moving more ambitiously on 
energy efficiency. Press reports on the promotion of the “green new 
deal” are not encouraging (e.g., Lean 2008).
Energy Efficiency in the Emission 
Trading System
Another potential source of improvement in energy efficiency is the 
EU’s ETS. The ETS is described elsewhere in this volume, so only the 
more specific potential achievements of ETS with regard to energy 
efficiency in the sectors covered by the scheme will be addressed 
here.
First, it is important to recognize that the purpose of the ETS is 
to achieve cost- effective CO2 emission reductions, not necessarily to 
promote energy efficiency. Nevertheless, the Commission has, such 
as in the EEAP and at numerous less formal occasions, promoted the 
view that the ETS is the measure to ensure the achievement of energy 
efficiency in the respective sectors. Since it has been demonstrated 
that energy efficiency in industry is among the most cost- effective 
means of reducing CO2 emissions, one would expect demonstrable 
effects on industrial energy efficiency. Yet this is not really the case.
In order for the ETS to deliver on energy efficiency, it is necessary 
that the system work according to intentions, including by delivering 
a sufficient CO2 price. But how would one judge whether a given CO2 
price is sufficient?
Here comes the second observation: A given carbon price has a very 
different relative impact on the actual cost of using coal or natural 
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gas. Approximate price levels in October 2010 were as follows: 70 
euros per ton of coal, 150 euros per 1000 cubic meters of natural gas, 
and 15 euros per ton of CO2. Adding the cost of the respective CO2 
emissions increases the price of coal by 60 percent, but adds only 15 
percent to the price of natural gas. Presently the relatively high coal 
prices and lower gas prices, 15 euros per ton of CO2, may be sufficient 
to encourage a shift from coal to gas, but it is unlikely to have any 
significant impact on the efficiency of new gas- fired power plants, 
let alone the improvement of existing ones.
A similar argument applies to the energy- intensive industries. In 
the few instances where coal is used as an industrial fuel, the ETS may 
provide some additional incentive to improve energy efficiency, but 
not in the broader use of natural gas. This differential impact would 
change, of course, if CO2 prices were higher. Even at 30 euros per ton, 
however, CO2 would add only 30 percent to a gas price of 150 euros 
per 1000 cubic meters, so the effect would still be modest at best.
There are three reasons why the ETS is unlikely to provide the 
incentive needed for significant energy efficiency improvements in 
the industrial sector. The first is that the CO2- price is unlikely to be 
high enough. Adding the economic downturn and the possible life-
 extension of German nuclear power plants to what one could rea-
sonably expect to be the assumptions underlying the Commission’s 
January 2008 proposal for extending the ETS after 2012 points to a 
declining price level in the years to come. The second reason is that 
even a price of, say, 30 euros per ton of CO2 does not add sufficiently 
to the fuel price to cause a significant difference. The third is that 
most industries require a payback time of two or, at most, three years 
in order to justify investing in energy efficiency. Not many projects 
will pass that hurdle because of a modest increase in the energy cost 
due to the CO2 price.
This last point is the real obstacle to effectively using economic 
instruments more broadly to promote energy efficiency, and it 
reflects a problem that extends well beyond the ETS. It is a general 
observation that enterprises, public authorities, or private citizens 
are not likely to pay up front for lower future energy costs unless the 
up front payment is recovered over a very short period: usually less 
than three years, often even less than that. Thus we are presented 
with a paradox. It is increasingly being accepted that global climate 
change is the most serious environmental problem mankind has ever 
faced. Nevertheless, policy responses are in many cases limited to 
actions that deliver a comfortable profit to those expected to act. 
One might ask where our urban air- quality policy would be today if 
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no reduction measures from car emissions had been required unless 
they were profitable.
A Horizontal Assessment
This description of recent developments in EU policy on energy effi-
ciency is not exhaustive, but it should provide a realistic flavor of 
the ambitions, directions, and challenges. It shows a policy area 
that enjoys a high level of recognition of its potential, but which can 
still claim only modest achievements. It is an area subject to sub-
sidiarity discussions, since many of the potential measures (build-
ings, small and medium- sized enterprises [SMEs], taxation issues, 
etc.) are predominantly of national concern, and yet are often not 
given, at the national level, the attention that would be expected in 
an area of importance for a common EU energy policy. Add to that 
the ideologically charged discussion of the virtues of the ETS as 
an overarching policy to achieve the EU climate policy objectives, 
and it is no surprise that the achievements so far fall short of the 
potential.
The more important question, however, is how much progress we 
can expect in the future. Is it possible to have justified expectations 
of significant energy efficiency improvements in the EU over the next 
ten years? The answer is “yes.” We will certainly see an improve-
ment. Appliances of all sorts to be sold over the next ten years will 
definitely be more energy efficient than those that are being replaced. 
Automotive fuel efficiency will continue to improve, although not 
necessarily as much as the recently adopted legislation might indi-
cate. New buildings will certainly be more energy efficient than those 
being torn down.
Does this mean that, by 2020, most of the “low- hanging fruit” 
will have been picked? Certainly not. If the low- hanging fruit today 
represents 20 percent of energy end use, by 2020 it will most likely 
still be above 15 percent. This seeming paradox is partly due to the 
inability of the ETS (in its present form) to promote energy efficiency 
in the sectors covering roughly 50 percent of total CO2 emissions and 
thus also roughly 50 percent of energy consumption. But it is also due 
to the fact that there is insufficient overall policy drive outside the 
ETS sectors to make energy efficiency a priority. And, finally, tech-
nological development generates new low- hanging fruit. In a different 
area, renewable energy, we have seen how wind energy has moved 
from being an expensive (“high- hanging fruit”) technology to become 
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virtually competitive with most other sources of electric power in the 
span of a decade. High- efficiency light bulbs offer another example.
Key to the modest expectations for the penetration of available 
energy efficiency technology in the coming decade is the lack of push 
from the policy areas that ought to drive improved energy efficiency: 
climate change and security of supply. Contrary to what has been 
stated by the Commission, repeated by most EU- leaders, and believed 
by the media, EU climate policy is at best ambitious only in the long 
term (2050). Certainly in the short term, it is inconsistent with a 2050 
target of 80–95 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, as 
agreed by the EU in the fall of 2009. In order to be consistent with 
the 2050 target, the 2020 target of a 20 percent reduction should be 
much more ambitious. When the Commission proposed its 20–20–20 
package in January 2008, it was perfectly well aware that collective 
EU emissions were already well below 1990 levels, by around 7 per-
cent in 2006. This achievement was largely due, however, to the 2004 
enlargement, since the new member states had emissions significantly 
below their 1990 levels thanks to the collapse of their production base 
from socialist times. The Commission also had reason to expect that 
by 2010 (the central year in the Kyoto period 2008–2012), EU- 15 
emissions would be 8 percent below 1990 levels (including some con-
tribution from collective development mechanism [CDM] projects) 
and that EU- 27 emissions would be around 5 percent lower than that 
because of the situation in the new member states. Recent data from 
the European Environment Agency show a dramatic fall in 2009 
emissions, taking total EU- 27 emissions more than 17 percent below 
1990 levels, or more than necessary to meet the 2020 target of a 20 
percent reduction if one takes into account the possibility of achieving 
around 5 percentage points of the reduction through CDM projects.
Whereas the 20 percent reduction target was never ambitious, 
recent developments have removed any consistency with any of the 
long- term targets, be it a 60–80 percent or an 80–95 percent reduc-
tion by 2050. It is also difficult to imagine that the present climate 
and energy policy offers much of a driver for the innovation hoped 
for by the Commission in its “Europe 2020” development strategy. 
Political action is greatly needed.
This state of affairs will have important implications for future 
energy efficiency developments. Apart from those subject to legally 
binding legislation (appliances), the push for initiatives will be 
reduced, if not disappear altogether. Within the ETS system, carbon 
prices would be expected to fall and not to have a big impact, since 
even present prices are already too low to deliver much of one. Outside 
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the ETS sectors, governments will find it less demanding to meet their 
national 2020 targets, and the urgency to do something about energy 
consumption in existing buildings or in SMEs (not covered by the 
ETS) will evaporate. This development obviously runs contrary to the 
idea of a “green new deal,” of which investment in a climate friendly 
(and more energy efficient) economy is a cornerstone.
The lack of ambition in the EU climate policy has a couple of 
potentially perverse effects as far as energy efficiency is concerned. 
One is in relation to renewable energy. The fact that the renewable 
energy targets are legally binding gives renewables the upper hand 
over energy efficiency. The renewables energy policy is the only really 
ambitious part of the 20–20–20 package, and it cannot be concluded 
that it alone will be enough to deliver on the otherwise unambitious 
targets for greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficiency. In this 
case, we would run the risk that much of the fully developed energy 
efficiency technology will remain on the shelves of the respective com-
panies, and that much- needed further technology developments will 
not take place. Similarly, one can fear that the considerable prestige 
invested by the Commission in the ETS will make the Commission 
feel less inclined to push for the full implementation of the 20 percent 
improvement in energy efficiency, since this might lead to a further 
weakening of the CO2 prices and thus cast doubt on the environmen-
tal efficiency of the system.
As far as energy security of supply is concerned, the recession has 
also changed the outlook considerably. Coal and gas have turned into 
a buyer’s market and will most likely remain so for several years, 
and the outlook for the oil market is that only in 2012 at the earli-
est will oil consumption be back at 2007 levels, thus providing some 
breathing space relative to the global shortage previously expected 
around 2015. Security of oil supplies in particular, however, remains 
a concern due to constantly rising consumption in several developing 
countries and the fact that global discoveries have kept up with just 
one- third of global consumption. Thus it is unlikely, in spite of good 
reasons in the medium term, that concerns about energy security of 
supply will provide sufficient momentum in the short term to promote 
energy efficiency beyond its present, relatively moderate level.
Conclusion
Energy efficiency is anchored, but not solidly, in EU energy and climate 
policy. Energy efficiency is likely to improve over the next decade, but 
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it will not come anywhere close to taking advantage of the technical 
potential for cheap or even profitable energy/CO2 reductions. If the 
new Barroso Commission, which took office in 2009, is to be serious 
about the medium- to long- term CO2 reduction needs, it will have to 
review the recently adopted energy and climate legislation as a matter 
of urgency, not least in light of the impact of the economic recession. 
Leadership in the area of energy efficiency need not be expensive. In 
fact, it is more likely to be profitable for the EU if correctly designed.
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Chapter Seven
French Energy Policy within the EU 
Framework: From Black Sheep to Model?
Sophie Méritet
The debate over the creation of a common European energy policy 
has been going on for a number of decades. Right from the start, the 
first common institution of the original six countries of the European 
Union (EU) was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1951. It was followed in 1957 by the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (known as 
Euratom). The founders of the EU were aware of the strategic charac-
ter of energy. After years of slow drift, the question of pooling energy 
stakes is again at the heart of European policy making. The discus-
sions on a common energy policy have been recently brought back 
into the spotlight by the evolution of energy market fundamentals, 
climate change constraints, and security of supply priorities (espe-
cially the management of relations with some suppliers like Russia).
A complex equation must be solved: provide the EU1 with secure 
and inexpensive energy (which is a strong element of competition), 
and reduce at the same time greenhouse gas emissions. The current 
European dependence on imported energy resources is increasing 
further and the energy sector has entered into a turbulent period in 
terms of prices and security of supply. These factors create a number 
of risks and uncertainties in the European energy landscape. They 
also create a need to think about a common strategy over the long 
term. They raise the fundamental question of future prices and the 
availability of energy. Dealing with tendencies toward “national 
economic protectionism,” the European Commission (hereafter: the 
Commission) in March 2006 presented the the Commission’s Green 
Paper—European strategy for secure, competitive, and sustainable 
energy (EC 2006a) that provides a basis for discussions on European 
energy policy. Looking at the diversity of the energy situation within 
the EU, the idea itself of a common policy was unrealistic a few years 
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ago. Nevertheless, a shared vision has always existed among the mem-
ber states for the creation of a single energy market. A convergence on 
energy goals in the long term is obvious, but a divergence in the means 
to reach them still exists. The Commission reacts quickly as soon as 
there is a risk of collusion between energy actors. However, it stays 
prudent on the definition of the energy mix, which is out of its field 
of competences. Today, it is not clear that member states would like 
to engage in discussions on a common energy policy with a common 
energy mix. There are still a lot of areas in which countries do not 
want to deal with sensitive issues at the supranational level preferring 
instead to retain their national sovereignty.
In the European energy markets integration process, France has 
sometimes been referred to as the “black sheep,” with its national 
energy model built on strong state intervention, two energy cham-
pions (state- owned firms Electricité de France [EDF] and Gaz de 
France- Suez Gulf Power Company [GDF- Suez]2), nuclear power as 
the main source of electricity, and the French defense of the concept of 
“public service.” At the same time, France is less dependent on energy 
imports compared to other member states. The country acted deci-
sively in the 1970s to limit its dependence on fossil fuels and now it is 
well positioned to deal with fuel costs and global warming. France is 
one of the European countries that emits the least greenhouse gases. 
However, France is also facing the same international demands and 
developments with the same risks and uncertainties as other European 
countries. It needs to diversify its energy mix and improve its security 
of supply. How can France define its national energy policy within the 
emerging European context? What could be the role of France in the 
creation of a common European energy policy? As the French energy 
model does not fit neatly into all aspects of a nascent European policy 
(e.g. deregulation process, renewable energy development), France has 
been under pressure to adapt. When the French energy policy was 
defined in 2005, the challenge was to protect national interests and 
take into account the European process. The highly strategic energy 
sector was, and is still, at the core of numerous debates. France is 
demonstrating that nations can successfully address their energy vul-
nerabilities, but its example also illustrates that today no single energy 
option will be the cheapest, cleanest, and safest.
This chapter focuses on the main French concerns related to energy 
policy within the EU context. It is divided into three related parts. 
The first section “The French Energy Situation in the EU” presents 
the French energy situation to understand the national constraints 
compared to other member states in the EU. The second section 
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“The French Energy Policy: Priorities and Instruments” analyses the 
French energy policy model in more depth with its objectives and new 
instruments. The final section “French Energy Challenges in the EU 
Framework” discusses the French energy challenges in the European 
framework, and more precisely with the nuclear power park. Two 
current and major issues will be presented to explain the ambiguous 
position of France in the EU. On the one hand, the French regulated 
tariffs are considered as anticompetitive by European authorities. The 
“nuclear rent” management and the dominant position of the French 
utility are at the heart of the debates. On the other hand, the EU has 
the possibility to become the world leader in fighting climate change 
opening the nuclear option to member states. This chapter focuses 
on the French energy challenges and the general attitude of France 
toward a common energy policy. France has been evolving gradually 
from its position of “black sheep” to an interesting position of pro-
tecting its national interests while still complying with the European 
energy- environment objectives and therefore perhaps presenting itself 
as a model for other member states to emulate.
The French Energy Situation in the EU
The history of European nations and their respective energy reserves 
have implied a very high level of energy diversity throughout the EU. 
When comparing member states, it is surprising to notice the differ-
ences that exist, depending on the energy mix, the industrial orga-
nization, the role played by the state, the dependence on imports, 
the technology choices and so forth. In France, the history of energy 
policy has always been characterized by a very strong intervention of 
the state. Public firms, or those controlled by the state, allowed the 
development of the French energy sector. They played a major role 
in its modernization, in the promotion of independence and in secu-
rity of supply. The French nuclear program, launched shortly after 
the first oil crisis in 1973, is a good example since nuclear power 
covers approximately 40 percent of the French current energy needs 
(whereas in 2008 the world’s total share of nuclear power in pri-
mary energy consumption is about 7 percent). This very “hexago-
nal” and state- oriented vision has to change with the globalization 
of energy markets, the integration process of the EU, the multiplica-
tion of uncertainties, the new climate changes challenges, and also 
with the financial constraints facing states for energy investments. 
France, like other European countries, has to find solutions for its 
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energy dependence. Its energy mix underlines its national choices 
and priorities.
French Energy Resources and 
Dependence
In 2008, the French population represented 1 percent of the world 
population (around 65 million inhabitants), its gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) constitutes 4.7 percent of the world GDP and its primary 
energy consumption (258 Mtoe3) is about 2.3 percent of world energy 
supplies. But it has only 0.01 percent of the known world fossil fuel 
reserves (23 Mtoe).4 In contrast to several European countries that 
benefit from raw materials (coal in Germany and Spain, natural gas 
in the Netherlands, etc), France is poor in energy resources. It does 
not possess many immediately available energy resources. Since the 
end of the 1970s, French coal production has fallen from 40 million 
tons per year to less than 3 million tons per year. The last coal mine 
closed in 2004. Similarly, with natural gas the field at Lacq supplied 
between 6 and 7 Mtoe of gas per year contributing up to 15 percent 
of France’s primary energy production and now provides less than 1 
percent of the national production of primary energy. Oil production 
has barely exceeded 3 Mtoe per year and presently stands at less than 
1.5 Mtoe per year (around 1.8 percent of its total oil consumption). 
Therefore, the country is used to importing all its needs in fossil fuels. 
The French nuclear program was a response to the oil crises. France, 
like other industrialized countries, reacted to the two oil crises with 
measures in favor of the security of supply that deeply modified its 
national energy mix. In 2009, France has 58 nuclear power reactors 
with an installed capacity of 63 GW (it is the second largest park in 
the world after the United States). Since 1973, the priority is clearly 
the security of energy supplies with regard to the availability and the 
costs /prices of energies. Therefore, the French energy policy has given 
priority to the development of a national energy supply, most notably 
nuclear power and renewable energies.
Today, the EU is more vulnerable due to the increasing dependence 
on energy. If nothing is done, energy dependence will reach 70 per-
cent by 2030: 90 percent of oil needs and 80 percent of natural gas 
consumption will have to be covered by imports (EC 2006a). This 
increase of import dependence can be explained by the imbalance 
between European reserves (0.6 percent of oil reserves in the world 
and 2 percent for natural gas) and its economic needs. Primary energy 
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production in Europe is forecast to decline while demand is going 
to increase. Energy dependence is a key issue in the EU: National 
production of fossil fuel is decreasing and imports are growing con-
sidering that fossil fuel still represents three quarters of the energy 
consumed. France still imports half of its consumption of primary 
energy, against nearly three quarters before the nuclear program. In 
2008, France produced 138 Mtoe and consumed 258 Mtoe. Thus, 
it has an energy independence of 50 percent against 26 percent in 
1973. With no real fossil fuel reserves, France needs to import energy 
resources5 even if the nuclear program plays its role and some mea-
sures have been implemented to limit the energy consumption as well 
as initiatives adopted to promote renewable energies.
France is the world’s seventh largest consumer of energy with 258 
Mtoe in 2008 behind for example Germany (311 Mtoe). With 3.9 toe 
consumed per inhabitant, France is above the average of the EU 27 
(3.5 toe).6 Until recent years, France’s economic growth, rising popu-
lation, growth in road transport of passengers and goods, and domes-
tic electricity use, together with the requirements of major industrial 
consumers of energy (steel, chemicals, paper, cement, etc.) have all 
contributed to a sustained increase in energy consumption. The most 
significant increase is unfortunately in the transport sector (from 20 
percent in 1973 to 31 percent in 2006), while the industrial sector 
share decreased (from 36 percent to 24 percent in 2006) and the resi-
dential and services sectors have remained stable (43 percent). This 
trend is unacceptable for economic and environmental reasons (energy 
costs, security of supplies, climate change . . .). The French government 
has therefore been implementing corrective measures for several years 
and reinforced them in the last energy law of 2005. One crucial ele-
ment is the need to change the different energy uses and especially 
in transport where oil, a nonsubstitutable fuel, represents the largest 
energy source used. The increase of consumption in the transport sec-
tor goes beyond energy security of supply, it also implies industrial 
policies, the regional planning with city mass transportation territory 
management with city mass transportation, tax policy, social issues, 
and of course the competitiveness of the French economy.
The Energy Mix in the EU
The energy mix choice is made at the national level in the European 
framework. There is a convergence on the criteria to develop, but some 
differences exist between member states. Looking at the countries in 
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the EU, the diversity of the national energy mix is the most obvious 
difference: 27 countries each with its own unique energy mix. In cer-
tain countries like Greece, energy consumption relies exclusively on 
imported oil and coal. In France, the diversification is higher with 
reliance on nuclear, hydroelectricity, natural gas, and oil. Some states 
are almost completely dependent on energy imports, like Portugal. 
The new member countries further accentuate this picture of energy 
diversity with a strong dependence on Russian gas supplies (especially 
Hungary) and/or the use of coal (like in Poland).
France is neither an oil and gas exporting country nor is it a pro-
ducing one. During the 1970s energy crises, it assessed its vulner-
ability to oil imports and its lack of gas and coal reserves. France 
decided that nuclear power was the best option. Between 1973 and 
2008, its primary energy consumption evolved: coal now represents 
only 5 percent (16 percent in 1973), oil share 34 percent (68 percent 
in 1973), gas consumption doubled (from 7 percent in 1973 to 15 
percent today), electricity consumption was multiplied by ten (from 4 
to 42 percent) and renewable energies represent 5 percent of the total. 
There was a massive development of electric usage. The government 
is trying now to make consumers understand that available cheap 
energy is a thing from the past. From 10 percent of the final consump-
tion in 1973, the total electricity consumption increased (mainly resi-
dential and tertiary) to represent 23 percent at present. Today France 
represents 17 percent of the world’s nuclear activity with 58 reactors 
Figure 7.1  The French energy mix in 1973 and 2008 (in percent)
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy and DGEMP.
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and 78 percent of the electricity produced is from nuclear power (450 
billion kWh of 574 billion kWh). A strategy of a full- fledged fuel cycle 
was chosen by France.7 Most of the reactors started between 1980 
and 1995 (49 units). The lifetime of a third of the current operating 
nuclear power plants will end around 2020. In 2007, France started a 
third- generation EPR reactor (European Pressurized Water Reactor8) 
that should be operational in 2012.9
National Energy Priorities in the EU
National energy priorities continue to dominate European energy 
debates. The strategic energy sector remains linked to national consid-
erations. Among the numerous debates, one is especially in the middle 
of all discussions: the nuclear option. Member states’ positions used 
to be extreme on this subject, but some governments seem to have had 
a change of mind. Certain countries are interested in nuclear energy 
development (like Finland which built the latest nuclear power plant 
in operation in Europe), which limits fossil fuel imports and the emis-
sion of carbon dioxide (CO2). France is not the only member state to 
Table 7.1 Primary energy consumption in 2008 (in mtoe and in percent)
Countries
Total 
(Mtoe)
Oil 
(%)
Natural 
Gas (%)
Coal 
(%)
Nuclear 
(%)
Hydro 
(%)
Bulgaria 20.1 26.9 14.6 37.0 17.7 3.7
Czech Republic 43.3 22.9 18.0 44.0 13.8 1.2
Finland 26.8 39.4 13.3 12.6 20.3 14.4
France 257.9 35.7 15.4 4.6 38.6 5.6
Germany 311.1 38.0 23.7 26.0 10.8 1.4
Greece 34.6 61.9 10.9 24.8 — 2.3
Hungary 24.7 31.3 43.7 11.3 13.6 —
Netherlands 91.4 50.9 38.0 10.1 1.0 —
Poland 97.4 25.5 12.8 61.0 — 0.7
Portugal 22.6 60.7 18.3 13.9 — 7.1
Spain 143.9 53.6 24.4 10.1 9.3 2.6
Sweden 46.7 31.1 1.8 4.2 31.1 31.7
United Kingdom 211.6 37.2 39.9 16.7 5.6 0.5
EU 27 1728.2 40.7 25.5 17.4 12.3 4.1
US 2299.0 38.5 26.1 24.6 8.4 2.5
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2009).
Note: For each country, the highest percentage has been set in bold.
Please clarify 
whether 
emphasis 
with in the 
table need to 
be set as is?
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use nuclear energy,10 but it is Europe’s most enthusiastic advocate. 
The nuclear program is vital for France in its search for energy inde-
pendence. The nuclear option is gaining ground again and a number 
of governments are opening the debate (United Kingdom and Spain) 
while other governments are looking to protect their coal industry 
(Germany and Poland). Government policies are changing, impact-
ing also the energy mix. Italy and Germany are for instance revising 
their position on nuclear energy: Germany was organizing the closing 
of its nuclear power plants and Italy voted for a “no” to the nuclear 
option.
At the same time, some member states have decided to proceed 
further with the use of renewable energy sources than that laid out in 
European directives (Denmark, Germany, etc.). In March 2007, at the 
European level, leaders accepted the target of 20 percent of renewable 
sources in energy consumption by 2020 (in exchange for flexibility on 
each country’s contribution to the common goal). At a climate change 
summit, the EU adopted a long- term strategy for energy policy and 
climate change, called the “20- 20- 20,” Climate action and renew-
able energy package: cutting the CO2 emission by 20 percent from the 
1990 level by the year 2020, developing renewable energy sources (20 
percent share in the EU energy mix), and promoting energy efficiency 
(20 percent improvement). In response to the new Renewable Energy 
Directive, one of the first and most important steps in 2009 will be for 
the member states to develop their renewable energy action plans.
France is among the group of countries in favor of the wording 
“non CO2 emission resources or technologies” instead of “renewable 
energies.” In this country, a balance still needs to be found between 
relying on nuclear power with low electricity generation costs and 
renewable energies that need to be subsidized to help their develop-
ment. The breakdown of consumption of renewable energies in 2007 
was the following: biomass still represents 58 percent (mostly wood) 
followed by hydroelectricity with 28 percent, then, waste 6 percent, 
wind and photovoltaic 1 percent, heat pumps 2 percent, biogas 1 per-
cent, biofuel 3 percent, and other 1 percent (DGEMP 2008). Thanks 
to all the measures taken by the government, the French market is 
among the leading ones in terms of progress to develop renewable 
energies (Observ’ER 2009). The share of renewable energies in pri-
mary energy consumption11 is still low at 7 percent, compared to an 
EU average of 7.5 percent in 2007.12 Compared to the other countries, 
France was responsible for 9.5 percent of the CO2 emissions in the 
EU- 15 in 2007 (Germany 20.7 percent and UK 13.5 percent).13 Per 
inhabitant, the country is the 11th highest in the EU- 15 with six tons 
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of CO2 (12.7 for Finland, 10 for Germany, and 8.1 for EU- 27). It is 
also among the last group of countries in the EU- 15 in terms of CO2 
emissions per unit of GDP. France does not heavily emit CO2 emis-
sions thanks to the use of nuclear power, but the oil consumption 
for transportation is still increasing and the renewable energies (other 
than hydropower) need to be developed.
Energy intensity, a measure of the relationship between energy con-
sumption and national economic production, varies between the 27 
member states. For instance, in 2006, the energy intensity varied from 
125 for Denmark and 300 for Luxembourg (in Mtoe, 1995 prices). 
The new members present energy intensities higher than those in the 
older member states.14 The potential for improvement is very high 
because their emissions of greenhouse gases per inhabitant are higher 
than the European average. The structure of the French economy is 
more directed toward the services sector than other industrialized 
countries, which gives it a comparative advantage in the energy inten-
sity (150 for France). Moreover, since the 1970s, France has made 
efforts to control energy consumption: Between 1982 and 2006, the 
annual improvement of energy intensity was 1.1 percent.
Considering its energy situation in the EU, the challenge for the 
French government and administration was to define a new national 
energy policy, more in line with the European framework yet not 
neglecting its own interests.
The French Energy Policy: Priorities 
and Instruments
Like all the other member states in the EU, France has always had 
its own, distinct energy policy. After World War II, the energy sector 
appeared clearly as a highly strategic one. For many decades, the gov-
ernment has decided on the energy policy in the name of the nation. 
With the process of European integration, some governments lost a 
part of their sovereignty but not in this sector. The Commission gives 
recommendations on energy policy, even if a true common energy pol-
icy does not yet exist (at least not before the first step in the implemen-
tation of the third energy package). Member states are still responsible 
for the definition and implementation of their own national energy 
policy. France defines its own national energy policy but has to take 
into consideration new European constraints. The complementarities 
and the differences between national energy vision and the European 
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one are helpful to understand the EU energy position and the possible 
development of a common policy.
Objectives of the Energy Act of 2005
A year before the publication at the European level of the Green Paper 
in 2006, France issued its national energy law. At present, French 
energy policy is defined by the Energy Act of 2005,15 which empha-
sizes French interests through four priority axes. The first two apply 
to most of the European members. Even if they are shared at the EU 
level, the last two are more specific to France as they underline a 
higher degree of state intervention. The comparison between the 
French law and the European point of view is interesting. The timing 
was perfect to highlight the French position in the European debate. 
In this bill, the French energy priorities are expressed in the form of 
four major objectives:16
“To contribute to national energy independence and guarantee • 
security of supply.”
As France has very limited energy resources, meeting its energy needs 
involves a risk that should be managed proactively. This objective is for-
mulated on the short and long terms relevant to quantity and price. There 
is a double goal: to limit the exposure of the French economy to fluctua-
tion in energy prices (in particular developing national energy production) 
and to ensure the availability of sufficient capacity to cope with problems 
of energy shortages (electricity blackout, lack of gas storage . . .).
“To protect human health and the environment in particular by • 
fighting against climate change.”
Energy consumption and production can have a major impact on the 
environment, mainly the emission of green house gases, but also the 
emission of pollutants and the production of radioactive wastes. One 
key purpose of the French energy policy is to control the changes in 
environment protection with CO2 emission and ensure that the risks 
of the nuclear sector are properly managed. In addition to this energy 
bill and within the framework of its Kyoto commitments, the “Plan 
Climat” in 2004, decided on measures to save nearly 15 million tons 
of carbon equivalents per year by 2010 (which means a quartering of 
CO2 emission by 2050).
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“To ensure competitive energy prices.”• 
The price, quality, and availability of energy are determining factors 
in France’s competitiveness. This goal relies on the national nuclear 
program that allows France to have a low electricity generation cost 
for households and industries. France is keen to maintain its economic 
advantage in terms of the cost of production and the “public service” 
missions.
“To guarantee social and technical cohesion by ensuring access • 
to energy for all.”
It is important that the energy policy provides everyone, and in par-
ticular the most deprived in society, with access to a quality energy 
source at a competitive price. Solidarity but also taxation, regulated 
tariffs, and public service missions, such as, for electricity, the obliga-
tion of supply, the equal treatment of customers, and so on are all part 
of the French way of managing energy.
Means and Instruments to Achieve 
the Energy Policy Goals
To reach the four goals of the energy bill, the French government 
employs four means: 1) control of the energy demand through a series 
of incentives and programs (including an energy saving certificate 
scheme [White Certificates], standards, and tax incentives); 2) diver-
sity of the energy mix (by increasing the use of renewable energies and 
keeping the nuclear option open); 3) development of energy grids and 
storage capacities (to improve the safety of France’s energy supply); and 
4) research and development on energy (to meet long- term challenges in 
terms of energy intensity and consumption of renewable energies).
To provide a framework for these decisions “four goals and four 
means,” the Energy Act of 2005 laid down quantitative objectives:
a quartering of CO• 2 emissions by 2050;
an average reduction of final energy intensity of at least 2 percent • 
per year from 2015, and 2.5 percent from 2015 to 2030:
a production of 10 percent of energy needs from renewable • 
energy sources by 2010; and
a use of biofuels to a level of 5.75 percent by the end of 2008 and • 
7 percent in 2010.
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In this new energy law, the government decided to implement 
some tools to help to reach the objectives of energy security of 
supply and more especially for electricity which is strategic.17 The 
French government has put in place two specific instruments to 
regulate the market so as to ensure the security of electricity supply. 
The first tool is the “multiannual objective contracts” signed with 
the company of the public distribution system (Réseau de Transport 
d’Electricité [RTE]) and with the companies that fulfill public ser-
vice missions.18 Electricity and gas public utilities19 status are very 
precisely defined by French law: their definition remains however 
rather broad but typically French with their “public service” mis-
sions. Each year, their cost is measured by the national regulatory 
commission. The second instrument is “multiannual programming 
of investment in production” (PPI20) which lays down objectives of 
capacity to be installed by primary energy sources. The PPI defines 
the need in electricity capacities and allows the government, if these 
capacities are not built, to call for tenders. Therefore, the French 
state has not given up all its prerogatives in terms of electricity 
investments.
To reduce France’s energy dependence, it has been decided to pro-
mote energy savings and to invest in nuclear electricity generation 
and renewable energies. These options provide a reliable long- term 
supply without greenhouse gas emissions, and nuclear energy ensures 
stable electricity prices. They also correspond to French energy pri-
orities. It was also decided in 2004 to begin to build an EPR model 
to have the option of eventually using this technology to replace the 
present generating facilities but also to support these facilities. The 
law of June 13, 2006 defines guidelines on nuclear transparency 
and security. In addition, the law on the management of radioactive 
materials and waste was published on June 29, 2006. French public 
opinion seems to be more positive toward nuclear energy compared 
to other countries (or for some analysts more realistic?). In parallel, 
since 1974, France has implemented energy saving measures. A tax 
credit for energy saving and renewable energies was reinforced in 
2006.21 An energy saving certificate scheme has been also imple-
mented. The principle of energy saving certificates is based on an 
obligation imposed on energy sellers by the public authorities to gen-
erate energy savings over a given period. To develop renewable ener-
gies, several support programs have been put in place. Among them, 
the systems of obligatory purchase by the European Development 
Fund (EDF) and the other electricity distributors of electricity gen-
erated by renewable energies have given new impetus to renewable 
08_Birchfield_Ch07_part.indd   156 4/12/2011   5:26:09 PM
French Energy Policy within the EU Framework 157
sources, such as wind power. Renewable energies benefit from the 
tax credit since 2005. This procedure has been a great success, since 
the solar energy market for heating has experienced spectacular 
growth.
For several decades, France has been striving to diversify its 
energy mix and to make its energy supply secure. The govern-
ment chose nuclear power to ensure national independence and 
environmental protection at a stable and competitive price. The 
most recent energy laws reinforced its national goals by giving new 
tools and quantitative objectives. In reaction to the Green Paper 
in 2006, France made its own proposals public in a memorandum 
circulated to EU finance ministers. The French memo is relatively 
close to the Commission’s Green Paper but places more emphasis 
on nuclear power and research in next generation nuclear power 
stations. As a founding member and a very significant player in the 
EU, the role and position of France is critical to the development 
of a common policy. Nevertheless, compliance with the European 
framework calls for adjustments to the French mindset and policy 
approach. The two positions are not so remote: the main goals are 
the same, some national priorities are underlined and the means 
may be different.
French Energy Challenges in 
the EU Framework
While France tries to implement its energy policy, the government 
has to face several challenges linked to the European integration pro-
cess and energy market fundamentals. In terms of European energy 
policy, it is worthwhile trying to understand the French position, as 
it relates to energy companies’ status and state intervention. Some of 
them are indeed at the core of very animated discussions. At the same 
time, the energy- environment challenge of the EU puts France in a 
good position. The nuclear option would appear to be a key factor in 
the debate.
France and the European Energy 
Deregulation Process
European law goes beyond the notion of “state” and the con-
struction of the single market must be done through competition. 
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European requirements are a shock for the French culture of diri-
gisme (“colberto- jacobine” state interventionism). They imply major 
changes of electric and gas industries and, more generally, of all net-
work industries. European regulations imply a complete separation 
between competitive activities (generation, purchase and supply of 
gas and electricity) and regulated activities (transmission). Networks 
are regarded as opened “essential facilities” with third- party access 
supervised by an independent authority of regulation. The directives 
of 1996 (electricity) and 1998 (natural gas) initiated the deregulation 
process and the directive of 2003 provides for the total opening up to 
competition. Since July 2007, all consumers have the choice of their 
energy suppliers. This process has raised strong opposition from cer-
tain members of the French parliament, who demanded the renegotia-
tion of the directive. Indeed, this opposition reflected several refusals 
at once: the refusal of Europe, of the markets, and of competition. 
The French political community is conscious of these stakes but is 
still attracted by the maintenance of a mainly illusory and expensive 
public intervention policy and forgets that the fundamental word is 
“European” and not “Franco- French.” It is true that politicians are 
confronted with an electorate attached to the status quo. Employees 
of public companies stand by their privileges, consumers are against 
changes and afraid of competition, and companies talk about delocal-
ization to obtain regulated tariffs. It is not easy to explain to French 
citizens that GDF- Suez will supply electricity, that EDF will supply 
gas, and that in spite of the nuclear park, the French pay an over CO2 
cost and that the electricity prices will be the same as that generated 
from coal in Germany.
The Commission launched two procedures against France: one for 
the nontransposition of whole directives and the other one for state 
aid. Regulated electricity tariffs are considered as subsidies and there-
fore it is state aid because EDF is still a state firm. According to the 
Commission, these artificially low tariffs give an economic advantage 
to some companies and distort competition in the European single 
market. The Commission asks for the end of regulated tariffs22 and 
the development of market prices through competition. The state 
intervention on prices and tariffs for electricity and natural gas are 
under scrutiny. Traditionally, the prices of oil products were admin-
istered prices. It is still the case for gas and electricity, at least for 
certain categories of customers. Is it time to free up these prices? With 
the deregulation process, the main question is how much “flexibil-
ity” can the government give to energy prices. For some people this 
question should not even be raised because energy prices should be 
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competitive and not state regulated. For other people, it is inconceiv-
able that French consumers should not benefit from the nuclear rent. 
A change in policy would be problematic from a social and political 
perspective in France today.
There is not a European energy policy yet. Nevertheless, there is 
a common competition policy that is applied to the European energy 
market. At the EU level, an energy price convergence is expectedly 
not an energy mix convergence.23 What are the challenges for France? 
France is not ready to lose the benefits of its choices: nuclear power 
gives the country very low electricity generation costs. This policy 
involved closing all the coal mines at a huge social and economic cost 
particularly for the end users. Today French electricity is sourced 
mainly from nuclear and hydro: the cost of electricity generation is 
no longer dependent on fossil fuels. It is complicated to compete with 
the state owned French utility, with its very low production costs not 
linked to oil prices. The challenge for the government is to find a solu-
tion to let French consumers go on benefiting from nuclear low costs 
while respecting European directives.
In the energy sector inquiry (EC 2006b), the dominant positions 
of historical companies were already limiting the entry of new actors 
and hence the benefits of competition. In France, it is hard to com-
pete with EDF’s production cost based on nuclear power plants, 
which are almost all fully amortized. Consequently there are no 
real new entrants at least for the base load production due to the 
cost advantages of this historical actor. The national fear is that the 
Commission will pass a new directive imposing a maximum of mar-
ket shares for historic companies in their domestic market. To avoid 
that, competition needs to exist in France otherwise it will lead to 
the dismantling of EDF. The French utility has been gaining market 
shares all over Europe for several years but its competitors cannot 
really penetrate its historical market. Some countries reacted passing 
some “reciprocity laws” limiting the access of EDF to some assets. 
The EC called the French government to task for unfair competi-
tion, but with a stronger Competition Commission, the threats could 
become reality.
With limited European interconnections and the refusal of some 
countries to build nuclear plants (which appears today the most 
competitive electricity generation technology), French nuclear enjoys 
a “scarcity rent” from the difference between European price and 
complete cost of French nuclear power plant generation. On the 
European market, the price is set to the marginal cost which is the 
production cost of the last plant called (it is often a natural gas or 
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coal thermal unit). This price is almost always higher to the French 
cost of production because French nuclear power plants are not 
often the last units called. European electricity prices are superior 
to French regulated tariffs (which are linked to the cost of produc-
tion of the French mix hydro- nuclear power). Competitors cannot 
increase their market shares in France: they cannot compete with 
the economic advantage of EDF. The theoretical solution is easy: 
new entrants need to have access to French nuclear power plants. 
This issue raises a multitude of questions with the main one being 
the regulated tariff of access to nuclear assets. In reality it will be 
compulsory to define an “access tariff”: nuclear power plants could 
be considered as “essential facilities” built under the monopoly posi-
tion of EDF. In the Champsaur Commission report (Champsaur 
2009), the debate is open on the development of competition in the 
French electricity market with the nuclear rent. Two solutions are 
being currently discussed24 1) to tax the nuclear which means to 
increase the cost of production of EDF and use the rent (to do what? 
by whom?); and 2) to allow competitors to have access to nuclear 
asset (limited in time and in space) with a regulated price fixed 
by the French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE25). The price 
should be close to the “economic cost” of nuclear. Competition will 
be on the supplier margin. There will be no more regulated tariffs 
“downstream” but a regulated tariff “upstream.”
The Champsaur Commission recommends keeping the regulated 
tariffs for residential consumers on condition that they reflect the 
cost.26 In France, the current regulated tariffs are too far from the 
cost of electricity generation in new power plants to be built. If the 
authority needs to build new capacities, the power plants have to 
be profitable which is not the case with the current level of prices.27 
Regulated tariffs do not give the correct incentives for firms to invest 
and for consumers to choose. During the summer 2009, the president 
of EDF asked28 for a 20 percent increase of the electricity tariffs over 
three years ( 2 or 3 euros more per month on each energy bill).29
After the Champsaur report, a law called NOME (Nouvelle 
Organisation des Marchés Electriques) was supposed to come into 
force on July 1, 2010, three years to the day after the opening of 
retail market. However, its review under the assembly for the fall 
2009 has been postponed to spring 2010, leaving some doubt about 
the date of its effective implementation. The project law NOME, 
is the next step of opening electricity markets to competition in 
France. It largely reflects the findings of the report of the Champsaur 
Commission . Discussions of the project bill are currently underway 
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by French parliamentarians. It may therefore be subject to change. 
The law theoretically programs the disappearance of regulated tar-
iffs for professionals (not households). The law also included new 
measures on rent sharing between nuclear suppliers. EDF will thus 
be forced to sell electricity to its competitors at a price lower than 
it currently does. The maximum volume and the price would be set 
annually by the ministers in charge of economy and energy, after 
consulting the Commission de Regulation de l’Energie. The law is 
likely to fundamentally change the structure of the electricity mar-
ket in France. The historical player, EDF seems to be scared by this 
project bill: it is a direct threat to its dominant position in the French 
electricity market and it will allow the increase of market shares of 
its competitors (Poweo, Direct Energy, etc.). Very powerful unions 
are against this project law that would “destroy the French energy 
system.” At the dawn of this great debate, a question on everyone’s 
mind is: how will the exchange of nuclear capacity work and what is 
its long- term viability?
The debate over the management on the French nuclear rent and 
the organization of the energy market is just beginning. In the United 
States, Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) warned us that the deregula-
tion process will take time: “If deregulation is to play a role in helping 
to improve the efficiency with which electricity is produced and used, 
it must be introduced as part of a long- term process that also encom-
passes regulatory and structural reform” (p. 221). For France, it could 
take ten years until the new electric capacities are built and running. 
Will the Commission have the patience to wait?
France and the European Climate 
Change Constraints
Europe has the potential to become a key actor in the area of energy 
and climate change in the 21st century. Climate change findings have 
recently revealed that the current energy- environment equilibrium 
is unsustainable. In this area, the incentives to cooperate are obvi-
ous. The protection of the environment introduces issues that have 
to be managed at a global level rather than the European level in the 
old continent. In the EU, actions are underway to build a sustainable 
energy future. Cooperation and solidarity are possible and can be 
successful as it is already for environmental questions. The European 
process also leads to collective agreements. Member states showed 
solidarity with the European trading system. They succeeded in 
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setting up the first market of emission permits for CO2. This market 
is a major step in the direction of greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
and might even eventually lead to a single energy market. (See Jørgen 
Wettestad’s chapter 4 in this volume).
The Green Paper published by the Commission in 2006 does not 
quite reflect a truly common European energy policy but it highlights 
a certain number of principles on which the member states agree to 
build the future energy system. These principles stress three key areas: 
1) to improve the energy efficiency; 2) to diversify the energy mix; 
and 3) to ensure the security of supply. These principles are accom-
panied by precise national objectives with regard to: energy saving, 
development of renewable energies, and security storages. Nothing 
is obviously indicated on nuclear power but each country preserves 
its freedom of choice. One cannot at the same time reduce the gas 
emissions and close the door to nuclear power as pointed out by L. de 
Palacio, the former energy commissioner.
In a carbon- constrained world, in which the European countries 
are committed to reach their Kyoto targets,30 an increase of coal fired 
power generation in the absence of carbon capture and storage is not 
a viable option. The only real alternative is to have nuclear power gen-
eration with some renewable energy. During a European summit in 
March 2007, a new step was made: a binding target of 20 percent for 
renewable fuels has been set in exchange for flexibility on each coun-
try’s contribution to the common goals. References to the national 
energy mix have been added. It is one of the most ambitious packages 
on energy security and climate change protection. In an attempt to 
balance the pro and anti nuclear power countries, it is recognized that 
nuclear may also play a role in Europe’s drive to cut greenhouse gas 
emissions. Under pressure from several new members, the EU agreed 
that individual targets would be allowed for each of the 27 member 
states. These new members rely heavily on cheap coal and oil and are 
reluctant to switch to more costly environmentally friendly alterna-
tives. The economic competitiveness of the countries and the whole 
EU is in question.
In the Kyoto protocol, France agreed to stabilize its greenhouse gas 
emissions at their 1990 level by 2008–2012 (Germany must reduce 
by 21 percent and UK by 12.5 percent). Compared to other mem-
ber states, France has small margins of maneuver. To comply with 
this objective, the Plan Climat in 2004, the energy bill of 2005, and 
the nuclear energy laws in 2006 were launched. For France, nuclear 
power is an answer to energy needs, climate change, and fears of 
energy supply disruption, but skeptics counter that it is too costly and 
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dangerous to be viable. Within this framework, France can evolve 
from its role of “black sheep” and better fit into the emerging policy 
of the EU. French and European energy policies can be compatible 
and are not necessarily so different after all.
Conclusion
In spite of the energy diversity of the EU, a common vision has always 
been shared by all the member states over energy development for the 
future. The single energy market is still the main common goal. The 
publication of the Green Paper in 2006 reaffirms the principle of soli-
darity between the countries in the EU. EU energy policy is a basket 
of a number of policies that are concerned with energy markets and 
energy issues. The last energy and environment packages represent 
a considerable compromise agreement that would make Europe the 
world leader in the fight against climate change.
What are the incentives to cooperate? Completion of the internal 
market, environment protection, and security of supply are the com-
mon energy battles that call for a common solution. Unity of the 27 
member countries appears as the only means to meet the energy chal-
lenges of the 21st century. The European Trading Scheme shows that 
member states can work together in the same direction in terms of 
environmental protection. Why should this not also be the case for 
energy policy? Energy policy still remains the responsibility of mem-
ber states, and decisions vary from one country to another.
A consensus exists on the need to reduce oil usage, develop lique-
fied natural gas, develop nuclear power in parallel with renewable 
energies, and keep faith in market mechanisms to decide on choices 
while some “garde- fous” need to be there too. Within a context of 
rising energy prices and growing world demand for fossil fuel, there is 
not just one energy source solution. An energy mix is clearly needed. 
The Europe of energy does not exist yet, but several member states 
are actually able to reach certain common positions in energy policy. 
More flexible forms of integration are necessary to achieve commit-
ments on a regional or functional basis. The entry of the EU institu-
tions into the making of an EU energy policy is recent and shaky. 
The member states have always had and still have strong political 
and legal rights to define and implement autonomous energy policies. 
What we may need today is a Schengen31 area for energy. For some 
analysts, this kind of agreement would allow legal binding coopera-
tion between member states. It could represent an intermediate step 
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toward harmonization and a common energy policy. It would give 
greater legal flexibility than is present under the Lisbon Treaty allow-
ing each member state to enter or not into a new area of European 
common policy built on formerly kingly rights and powers of mem-
ber states. Freedom of choice has always been appreciated by French 
people!
To move from a shared vision to a European energy policy, 
large steps are necessary but could be accelerated by a common 
foreign energy policy. Foreign policy relates to dialogue with the 
large exporting countries (Russia,32 OPEC), with the big consum-
ers (the United States, China, Japan, India) and also with the poor-
est countries (where more than one billion individuals do not have 
access to electricity). It would permit the EU to speak with a “single 
and unified voice” in international energy negotiations. Up to now, 
France like Germany or UK has its own position linked to its energy 
culture (state intervention, vertical integration, unions . . .), history 
(domestic resources, former colonies . . .) . . . The globalization of 
energy- environment problems makes the multiplication of the inter-
national dialogues in bilateral or multilateral forms essential. Even 
the “conservative party” in the UK one of the most euro- skeptical 
countries thinks it is compulsory to have a European energy policy 
to assure security of supply and fight against climate change. It 
is maybe through these two main issues that the development of 
a common policy will be possible with the support of the biggest 
member states. What compromises can be identified and reached 
between Paris and the EU so that both “speak as one” on energy 
and environmental questions? That is the current challenge faced by 
the French government. France needs to figure out how to be part 
of the European process while still protecting its national ideas. 
France could and would like to play a significant role and even try 
to be a model in the EU. The debate over the new French project 
law is a step toward the compliance to European regulation. Some 
national fears need to disappear (end users, Unions . . .) and certain 
national advantages need to be highlighted (nuclear plants competi-
tiveness, CO2 emissions, renewable energies, white certificates . . .). 
Thus, France might evolve from “black sheep” to an energy model 
based on better energy intensity, energy independence, low electric-
ity costs, energy capacities storages, and low emissions. France just 
needs to figure out how to deal with its long history of state inter-
vention in energy sectors. At a stage when the process of European 
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integration is at a standstill, the debate about energy issues is part 
of a larger debate about the nature and destiny of the EU. The 
European energy market is moving ahead, albeit slowly with its 
recurring national protectionisms, obstacles, and contradictions. 
Nonetheless it aptly reflects and represents our future as “United 
in Diversity.”33
Notes
 1. Today, the EU- 27 members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK.
 2. GDF- Suez is the result of the merger between Gaz de France and Suez 
Gulf Power Company in 2008.
 3. Mtoe equals Million of tons oil equivalent.
 4. Almost all the data on the French energy situation are official data 
from the French administration, source: DGEMP web site www.
developpement- durable.gouv.fr, Direction Générale de l’Energie et des 
Matières Premières which is the general directorate for energy and raw 
materials in France.
 5. The official forecasts are a doubling of imports by 2025.
 6. Data are from the International Energy Agency (IEA).
 7. France is one of the few countries where all fuel cycle facilities are found: 
conversion, enrichment, fabrication, reprocessing, and recycling of 
nuclear materials.
 8. The European Pressurized Reactor (EPR), is the third- generation 
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) developed under Franco- German 
cooperation.
 9. France has also devoted research programs to the fourth generation tech-
nology (sodium cooled fast reactor). Those units should be operational 
by 2040.
10. 47 percent of the nuclear electricity in the EU is generated solely by 
France, but for example, the UK owns 19 reactors (12 GW), Sweden 10 
reactors (9 GW), and Germany 17 reactors (20 GW), etc.
11. Looking at the objectives of 2020, the share of energy from renewable 
sources in final consumption of energy in 2007 was 10.3 percent and the 
target is 23 percent.
12. The leaders are Sweden with 31 percent, Latvia 30 percent, Austria 23 
percent, and Finland 23 percent—usually countries that use a lot of 
hydropower.
13. The EU- 15 was responsible for 82 percent of the total of CO2 emissions 
of the EU- 27 in 2007.
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14. The 7th new members from EU- 15 to EU- 25 presented energy intensities 
until 1400 for Estonia and Latvia.
15. Planning Act 2005- 781 of July 13, “Loi d’Orientation sur l’Energie” loi 
n°2005- 781 of July 13, 2005 is available on the website of the French 
administration: www.legifrance.fr.
16. The titles of the four goals are the original titles from the law with stra-
tegic words.
17. With regards to petroleum products, France meets EU and IEA obli-
gations on strategic stocks. For natural gas, some similar measures to 
electricity have been implemented.
18. The right of access of users to services, the equality of their treatment 
which is synonymous with the refusal of all discrimination and the con-
tinuity of service in time and space are virtues consubstantial with the 
traditional definition of the French concept of public service.
19. According to the law, the status of EDF and GDF- Suez were changed to 
become corporations with a gradual opening of their capital whilst keep-
ing them within the public sector.
20. PPI stands for Programmation Pluriannuel d’Investissements.
21. For example from 40 percent to 50 percent for energy production equip-
ment using a renewable energy source and certain types of heat pump.
22. In June 2007, the Commission opened an investigation on standard 
regulated tariffs and return tariffs for large and middle size industrial 
consumers (not private consumers). French consumers can buy their elec-
tricity either on the free market or on the regulated market (standard reg-
ulated tariffs) set by the state. Customers who left the regulated market 
can ask for a special state administrated return tariff (Tarif Réglementé 
Transitoire d’Ajustement de Marché TARTAM) below the market price. 
Already 10 percent of large consumers benefited from this offer.
23. It is interesting to remember the market coupling of some power 
exchanges. The market coupling of APX, Belpex and Powernext will 
create a single electricity market in the three countries with a single 
price, only differing when there is insufficient interconnection capac-
ity available on the Belgian—French or the Belgian—Dutch border. The 
three exchanges thereby provide a better quality of price formation and 
a greater liquidity in the coupled markets.
24. The Champsaur Commission has a preference on the second solution.
25. CRE stands for Commisison de Regulation de l’Energie.
26. Regulated tariffs exist in other European countries. Some of them are 
considering removing them, because they are not compatible with the 
deregulation philosophy.
27. Up to now, only two EPR prototypes are planned (for up to 40 of simi-
lar design). The price paid by consumer should not be set on EPR costs 
because EPR is not yet the marginal unit (it will be when all units will be 
changed). The new capacity in France should be the EPR which will be 
in operation in several years (ten years) and its cost is projected to be 55 
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euros / MWh (without transport and distribution costs) compared to the 
30–40 euros / MWh in regulated tariffs in 2008.
28. The level of regulated tariffs is decided by the government after consulta-
tion with EDF and the CRE.
29. In July 2009, the government authorized an increase of 1.9 percent for 
private consumers.
30. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU agrees to reduce its emissions by 8 
percent from level of 1990 by 2012.
31. The Schengen agreement allows EU citizens to travel within the 
Schengen area without being subject to police controls. The agreement 
was included in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Today 24 countries 
are in the Schengen area not all the EU countries are in and some non EU 
countries are in.
32. Member states showed solidarity during the Russian Ukrainian gas cri-
ses at the beginning of 2009.
33. It is the motto of the EU.
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Chapter Eight
Germany and EU Energy Policy: 
Conflicted Champion of Integration?
John S. Duffield and Kirsten Westphal
Germany is critical to the development of a common European Union 
(EU) energy policy. It is by far the largest energy user of the 27 member 
states, accounting for approximately 18 percent of total energy con-
sumption in the EU (BP 2010). It is also a substantial energy producer, 
ranking second in the production of coal (after Poland) and second in 
nuclear electricity generation (after France). Finally, Germany plays a 
crucial role by virtue of its central geographical location, which puts 
it in the middle of regional natural gas and electric power distribution 
networks.
Germany has traditionally been one of the most consistent pro-
ponents of European integration. It was one of the six members of 
the three original European communities and, along with France, has 
often been regarded as the “motor” of European integration. In more 
recent years, Germany championed monetary union and the enlarge-
ment of EU to include many of the Central European countries of the 
former Soviet bloc.
When it comes to recent developments in EU energy policy, how-
ever, Germany has exhibited much more ambivalence. It has backed 
some EU energy policy initiatives, especially those concerning climate 
change, renewable sources of energy, and energy conservation. But 
it has resisted a number of others, such as the liberalization of the 
gas and electricity markets and the creation of a common external 
energy policy. And even in cases where Germany has been generally 
supportive of a common energy policy objective, is has often fought 
hard to put its own stamp on the details, such as the mechanisms for 
promoting renewable energy sources and the implementation of the 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).
This chapter explores the mixed pattern of German support 
for a common EU energy policy over the past decade. It begins by 
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describing Germany’s energy situation at the beginning of the 2000s 
and the energy challenges Germany has faced in recent years. It then 
describes the key features of German energy policy over the same 
period and how these have played themselves out at the EU level. The 
next section explores the “Determinants of German Energy Policy” 
and Germany’s ambivalent attitude toward a common EU energy 
policy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implication of 
German policy for the future of EU energy policy.
Background
Germany’s Energy Mix in 2000
As Germany entered the 2000s, its mix of energy sources had changed 
substantially since before the first oil shock in 1973. Oil continued to 
command the biggest share of Germany’s primary energy consump-
tion (PEC), at just under 40 percent. But this figure was down sub-
stantially from the peak of 57 percent, in the former West Germany, 
reached in the early 1970s (BP 2010). Virtually all of the oil consumed 
in Germany was imported, with nearly one- third coming from Russia 
(IEA 2002, 58). But this import dependence raised few concerns, since 
petroleum and petroleum products from one foreign supplier can be 
substituted relatively easily by those from another.
Next came coal, which accounted for just over a quarter of 
Germany’s PEC, a figure that had been fairly steady since the mid-
 1990s. Coal, especially brown coal (lignite), generated more than half 
of Germany’s electricity, while hard coal was used in steel production. 
Although domestic coal production had declined as inefficient mines 
were closed, especially in the former eastern states, it still provided for 
about two- thirds of German coal consumption.
Third on the list was natural gas, which had met about 22 percent 
of Germany’s energy needs since the mid- 1990s. Germany was not 
entirely dependent on gas imports, producing about 20 percent of its 
consumption at home. But most imported gas arrived via fixed pipe-
lines from just three countries—Russia (45 percent in 2002), Norway 
(27 percent), and the Netherlands (22 percent)—and could not eas-
ily be replaced in the event of a supply disruption (AGEB 2010; IEA 
2002, 76).
Nuclear power plants accounted for 30 percent of electricity pro-
duction in 2000. At the time, Germany had 19 operating commer-
cial nuclear reactors, but none had come on line since 1988, and the 
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former East German reactors had all been shut down for safety rea-
sons (IEA 2002, 111).
Bringing up the rear were renewable sources of energy. These 
accounted for just 3.4 percent of PEC and 7.3 percent of electric power 
generation in 2000. But the contribution from renewable sources 
was growing rapidly, having doubled since 1990. In 2000, Germany 
was the world leader in wind power production and had the highest 
installed solar electric capacity in Europe (IEA 2002, 91–92).
General Goals and Challenges of 
German Energy Policy in the 2000s
German energy policy has been guided by three primary goals:
1. economic efficiency, especially in the form of affordable energy 
prices (Wirtschaftlichkeit);
2. environmental protection and sustainability (Umweltver-
träglichkeit); and
3. security of supply (Versorgungssicherheit).
Economic efficiency has been perhaps the most constant goal of 
postwar German energy policy. During the second half of the 1980s 
and most of the 1990s, its achievement did not seem particularly 
problematic. Energy, and especially oil, prices were generally low. In 
the late 1990s and 2000s, however, it became a matter of increasing 
concern as oil prices rose more or less steadily.
In comparison, environmental sustainability is a relatively new 
goal. It first appeared in the 1970s in the form of worries about the 
safety of nuclear power plants and the disposal of nuclear waste. 
Since the late 1980s and 1990s, however, increasing attention has 
been devoted to the closely related challenges of climate change and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, much of which are attributable to 
energy consumption. Public concern about climate change reached a 
crescendo in 2007, with the publication by the United Nations (UN) 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change of its Fourth Assessment 
Report, but the issue has often dominated the German energy policy 
agenda in recent years.
In response, the government has adopted a series of ambitious goals 
and programs. In 1995, it established a goal of cutting CO2 emissions by 
25 percent over the period 1990–2005. And at the end of the 1990s, it 
agreed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 21 percent (compared 
09_Birchfield_Ch08.indd   171 4/12/2011   5:26:36 PM
Toward a Common European Union Energy Policy172
to 1990 levels) within the EU Burden- Sharing agreement under the 
Kyoto Protocol (IEA 2002, 38). In 2000, the government adopted 
a comprehensive National Climate Protection Programme, and the 
Integrated Energy and Climate Programme (IECP) approved by the 
government in 2007 was largely, if not entirely, aimed at the address-
ing the problem of climate change (Duffield 2009). As Chancellor 
Angela Merkel stated, “with this program, we are taking on the cen-
tral challenge of the 21st century, climate change” (Bundesregierung 
2007). The government offered to reduce Germany’s CO2 emissions 
by a breathtaking 40 percent below the 1990 level by 2020, condi-
tional, however, on the EU achieving a 30 percent reduction over the 
same time period and other states committing themselves to similarly 
ambitious goals.
After spiking in the 1970s and early 1980 as a result of the oil 
shocks, concerns about energy security remained largely dormant 
during the next two decades. Even Germany’s increasing reliance on 
energy imports, which reached 60 percent of total consumption in 
2000 (IEA 2002, 28), raised few alarms. German officials empha-
sized that the country’s energy supplies were highly reliable. Russia, 
like the Soviet Union before it, could be counted on for promised 
deliveries of oil and gas, and Germany possessed large petroleum 
stockpiles and gas storage facilities that it could draw upon in the 
event of an emergency.
Thus, energy security did not regain prominence as a policy issue 
until the beginning of 2006. The occasion was the gas dispute that 
erupted that January between Russia and Ukraine. Over the next sev-
eral years, additional events raised further questions about Russia’s 
dependability as an energy supplier.
Key Elements of German Energy 
Policy in the 2000s
How has Germany sought to promote its energy policy goals and 
address the corresponding challenges in the past decade?
One major thrust of Germany policy, which dates back to the 
1970s, has been to reduce energy consumption by increasing energy 
efficiency. Germany had long maintained substantial excise taxes on 
most fossil fuels, and in 1999, the government introduced a new “eco 
tax” on motor fuels, heating fuels, and electricity, which was gradu-
ally raised over the next four years and was intended in large part to 
encourage energy savings. Early in the 2000s, the government quickly 
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implemented EU directives on energy labeling of appliances and the 
energy performance of buildings, and it established a program to pro-
vide financial support for building renovations that improved energy 
efficiency and reduced CO2 emissions. The 2005 grand coalition 
agreement established the ambitious objective of doubling energy pro-
ductivity by the year 2020 compared with 1990, which would require 
annual increases of around 3 percent.
A somewhat newer but equally important component of German 
policy has been the promotion of renewable energy sources, especially 
for electricity production. The use of renewables could serve to reduce 
both greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel imports. The first major 
step was the 1991 Electricity Feed Law, which obliged power compa-
nies to buy all the electricity generated from wind, hydropower, bio-
mass, and solar energy in their distribution areas at a price, or feed- in 
tariff, based on the end- use cost to consumers. The 2000 Renewable 
Energy Act extended coverage to additional renewable sources, such 
as landfill gas and geothermal energy, and revised the feed- in tariff 
formula to reflect the cost of each technology and to provide long-
 term certainty for both developers and users (IEA 2002, 93–94).
As a result of these incentives, German renewable energy output 
grew at an annual rate of 12 percent between 2000 and 2006 (IEA 
2007, 65). Thus Germany was able to meet its initial goals of gener-
ating 12.5 percent of its electricity and 4.2 percent of total energy 
consumption from renewable sources by 2010 well ahead of sched-
ule. That rapid progress prompted the “Black- Red” grand coalition 
(2005–2009) to establish even more ambitious targets for renewable 
energy sources for 2020: at least 20 percent of electricity generation 
and at least 10 percent of the total energy supply. The coalition also 
introduced a biofuels obligation that would rise to 6.75 percent of the 
fuel supply in 2010, exceeding the corresponding EU target of 5.75 
percent, and then to 8 percent in 2015 (IEA 2007, 72).
While consistently promoting energy efficiency and renewables, 
recent Germany energy policy has been less consistent in other areas. 
One has been the issue of energy market structure. The German gov-
ernment has frequently expressed support for competitive energy 
markets, largely as a way of holding down energy prices. But it has 
also supported the establishment and maintenance of large national 
energy companies that could use domestic market power to increase 
their leverage in negotiations with foreign energy companies, such as 
Gazprom (Buchan 2009, 16). Thus when the Federal Cartel Office 
rejected the merger of one of the four dominant electric utilities, 
E.On, with the leading natural gas supplier, Ruhrgas, it was overruled 
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by the Federal Minister of Economics (BWMi)1 (Müller 2007, 32–33; 
Westphal 2007, 100). For domestic political and social reasons, the 
government also maintained subsidies for hard coal production, 
although in 2007 an agreement was reached to phase them out over 
the following decade.
Inconsistency has also characterized Germany policy toward 
nuclear power, despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear 
power—the so- called nuclear renaissance—that concerns about cli-
mate change and energy security have occasioned in a number of 
other countries. The Green party grew out of the nuclear protest 
movement in the 1970s, and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had 
opposed nuclear power since the mid- 1980s. When these two par-
ties formed a “Red- Green” coalition government (1998–2005), one 
of their top priorities was to wean the country off of nuclear power. 
In 2000, the Red- Green government reached an agreement with the 
electrical utilities, formalized in a 2002 law, to phase out all nuclear 
power plants by limiting their effective lifetimes. No new plants could 
be constructed, and the last operating facility would go out of service 
around 2022 (Westphal 2009a).
Many outside the government, including the opposition parties, 
questioned the wisdom of the nuclear phaseout, which would deprive 
Germany of a carbon- free energy source and potentially increase 
Germany’s dependence on energy imports. And when the center- right 
(CDU/CSU) formed a grand coalition with the SPD in 2005, some of 
its leaders called for at least extending the lifetimes of the existing 
nuclear power plants. Still, the SPD held firm, insisting that there 
be no change in the policy as a condition for joining the new gov-
ernment. The 2009 election of a CDU/CSU- Liberal “Black- Yellow” 
coalition, however, created a new opportunity to revisit the phaseout, 
and in September 2010, the government called for a temporary exten-
sion (12 years on average) of the lifetimes of the remaining 17 power 
plants (BMWi/BMU 2010).
A final important aspect of German energy policy that has seen 
changing emphasis has been the external dimension. The Red- Green 
coalition, headed by Gerhard Schröder, emphasized building and 
maintaining bilateral ties with Russia (see the contribution by Grätz in 
this volume). It promoted in particular the construction by a consor-
tium of Russian and German energy companies of a natural gas pipe-
line under the North Sea that would link Germany directly to Russian 
gas supplies. In the view of one experienced observer, “Germany has 
asserted that it reserves the right to work out its long- term energy 
security with Russia on a bilateral, mutually beneficial, pragmatic 
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footing—and that it brooks no outside or third- party intervention 
(Bhadrakumar 2006).”
Although led by a former Schröder protégé, Frank- Walter 
Steinmeier, the foreign ministry in the subsequent Black- Red grand 
coalition placed more emphasis on multilateralism. The overall goal 
was to promote greater dialogue among producer, consumer, and 
transit countries in order to emphasize their common interest in stable 
and predictable energy trade. Steinmeier repeatedly called for the cre-
ation of a system of cooperation energy security, which, he argued, 
would help to build mutual understanding and trust. And with regard 
to Russia in particular, the new government’s principal approach was 
to try to embed Russia in a multilateral rule- based framework for 
trade and investment based on liberal principles of market access. 
The foreign ministry hoped to induce Russia to ratify the Energy 
Charter Treaty and its important transit protocol and, that failing, 
to replace the expiring EU- Russia partnership and cooperation agree-
ment (PCA) with a new one that contained a substantial section on 
energy (Duffield 2009).2
Germany and EU Energy Policy 
in 2000s: Implications of German 
Energy Policy
Recent Germany energy policy has had mixed implications for the 
establishment of a common EU energy policy. Overall, one could say 
that Germany has been at best ambivalent about developments at the 
EU level. In some respects, Germany has made EU energy policy a top 
priority, especially where doing so has been seen as a means of achiev-
ing Germany’s goals of fighting climate change and, to a lesser extent, 
energy security. Indeed, energy policy was a special focus during the 
German presidency of the EU during the first half of 2007, which 
saw the adoption of a set of ambitious EU energy policy goals at the 
spring meeting of the Council (Silberberg 2006). Among the goals 
that Germany set for the presidency were
Boosting energy efficiency;• 
Promoting greater use of renewable energies;• 
Completing the internal markets for gas and electricity; and• 
Making the EU more visible as a player at the international level • 
and putting its partnerships with key producer, transit, and 
09_Birchfield_Ch08.indd   175 4/12/2011   5:26:36 PM
Toward a Common European Union Energy Policy176
consumer countries on a solid and reliable footing (Silberberg 
2006).
In other respects, however, Germany has resisted movement in the 
direction of a common EU energy policy. In this regard, there was 
little change from the previous decade, when the government was 
described as one of those most reluctant to see a European energy 
policy develop, preferring to retain autonomy in the pursuit of supply 
security (Jochem et al. 1996, 82). In the 2000s, Germany opposed 
the inclusion of an energy chapter in the proposed European consti-
tution, when that ill- fated project was still being considered (Müller 
2005, 178). Although an energy chapter was eventually included in 
the Lisbon Treaty, which stood in for the unsuccessful constitutional 
project, it nevertheless reflected Germany’s consistent insistence that 
each member state should be free to determine its own energy mix, a 
position that became only more rigid following the decision to phase 
out nuclear power plants. As one of the state secretaries in the Foreign 
Ministry argued shortly before the beginning of the German- EU 
presidency:
Brussels must respect Member States’ particularities, including the issue 
of their national energy mix. We are firmly convinced that enhanced 
energy cooperation at the European level, which we champion, can-
not override Member States’ decisions on the makeup of their energy 
sources. This especially applies to Germany’s decision to phase out 
nuclear power in accordance with the coalition agreement (Silberberg 
2006).
With regard to more specific aspects of EU energy policy, Germany 
has resisted many of the Commission’s initiatives for liberalizing the 
gas and electricity markets. And the external aspects of German 
energy policy have often had the effect, whether intentionally or not, 
of making it difficult for the EU to speak with one voice on energy 
issues.
Areas of Support
Germany has been most supportive of EU initiatives in the areas 
of energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, and climate policy. 
Germany strongly endorsed the Commission’s 2007 proposal to 
increase renewables and efficiency and to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions all by 20 percent by 2020, and it has sometimes proposed even 
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more ambitious goals. Likewise, the grand coalition’s own 2007 IECP 
was viewed in large part as its effort to implement the EU’s 20–20–20 
in 20 goals at the national level.
Nevertheless, important differences have existed between Germany 
and the Commission over the details of these policies. For example, 
Germany’s support for ambitious renewable energy targets has been 
conditioned on being able to maintain the use of feed- in tariffs, which 
have been viewed as very successful at promoting the development of 
renewable sources in Germany. Thus, on at least two occasions—at 
the beginning of the 2000s prior to the adoption of the 2001 EU direc-
tive on the production of electricity from renewable sources and again 
prior to the 2008 directive on the promotion of renewable energy 
sources—Germany has resisted Commission proposals to establish 
obligatory quota systems, which would mandate that certain quan-
titative levels be achieved by certain dates (Mahony 2007; see also 
Eikeland’s contribution to this volume).
As Jørgen Wettestad points out in his contribution to this vol-
ume, Germany has also had an uneasy relationship with the ETS. In 
Wettestad’s estimation, Germany’s initial National Allocation Plan 
(NAP) for the first phase of the ETS (2005–2007) was only average 
and may even have involved an over allocation of emissions permits. 
Then in 2006, the German government proposed a reduction in its 
overall allocation for the second phase (482 million metric tons of 
CO2) that was just 3.4 percent lower than in the first. The Commission 
found this inadequate and unilaterally cut the proposed allocation by 
another seven percent, to 453 million metric tons, a level that the 
government was eventually forced to accept (Müller 2007, 31). More 
recently, Germany has criticized Commission proposals to reduce 
substantially the total allowed number of permits, to begin auction-
ing permits (rather than continuing to give them away to industry 
and utilities), and to centralize the auctioning of emissions permits 
(rather than allowing each member state to conduct its own auctions) 
(Phillips 2008; Wettestad in this volume). Germany has also sought 
to give generous emissions allowances to coal- fired power plants (IEA 
2007, 12 and 29).
Areas of Resistance
Germany has exhibited even more ambivalence toward the EU’s proj-
ect to create a single internal energy market. The German government 
has frequently expressed its support for this goal. For example, during 
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its 2007 EU presidency, the completion of the internal energy market 
was sometimes described as the government’s “highest priority.” In 
practice, however, Germany has put up considerable resistance to the 
proposals emanating from Brussels almost every step of the way (see 
also Buchan 2009, 21).
This resistance began in the 1990s, when the first EU directives on 
the electricity and gas markets were negotiated. Even then,
in contrast to its professed free market approach to the energy sector, 
the German government has been rather ambivalent about the liberal-
ization of energy utility markets both at home and in a European con-
text. It has offered only halfhearted support to the Commission in its 
attempts to open up electricity markets while it was strongly opposed 
to similar moves in the gas sector (Jochem et al. 1996, 82).
For example, Germany opposed the Commission’s proposal that 
third party access (TPA) to the electricity grids be regulated as a way 
of reducing hidden barriers to entry and instead insisted on including 
the option of negotiated TPA, which Germany alone exercised. As a 
result, the German market remained effectively closed to foreign sup-
pliers (Buchan 2009, 22; IEA 2002, 108).
In the early 2000s, as the Commission prepared a second package 
of internal energy market directives, Germany opposed, unsuccess-
fully this time, the organizational separation of energy companies’ 
transmission activities from their generation and supply activities, 
even though this arrangement, known as legal unbundling, is regarded 
as one of the weakest means for ensuring an open market (Eikeland in 
this volume; IEA 2007, 10). And when the second package, adopted 
in 2003, mandated that each country establish national regulatory 
agencies for gas and electricity, Germany was the last member state to 
do so (Buchan 2009, 22). According to an IEA analysis, “The instal-
lation of a network regulator in 2005 signals Germany’s acknowl-
edgement that negotiated reform and internal regulation of the energy 
markets were unsuccessful (IEA 2007, 9).” Yet even then, the new 
Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, or BNA) could devote 
only limited resources to energy regulation, since it was also respon-
sible for other network industries (Buchan 2009, 47).
When further delays in the establishment of open energy markets 
prompted the Commission to develop a third energy package in the 
late 2000s, Germany once again sought to water down the provisions 
to the greatest extent possible. This time, the Commission called for 
full ownership unbundling as a way of breaking the stranglehold of 
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the powerful, vertically integrated gas and electricity companies in 
countries like Germany. The German government, along with those 
of France and other countries whose gas and electricity markets are 
dominated by one or a small number of companies, however, expressed 
strong opposition to this proposal. As a result, the Commission was 
forced to resort to its fall back position of mandating the establish-
ment of independent system operators (ISO) that “manage and oper-
ate transmission system assets without influence from transmission 
owners, but do not own the assets themselves (IEA 2007, 38).” Yet 
even this compromise was not deemed sufficient by Germany and 
others. They insisted instead that the third package include the option 
for an independent transmission operator (ITO), which would not 
establish as many barriers between the network owners and operators 
(Buchan 2009, 72).
Another aspect of the original Commission proposal that Germany 
successfully opposed was the so- called “reciprocity clause.” As 
described in Eikeland and Grätz’s contributions to this volume, this 
provision would have prevented companies from nonmember coun-
tries from controlling gas and electricity networks unless an agree-
ment on mutual market access to the transmission assets in the 
potential investor’s home country had been concluded (see also Grätz 
2009, 77). Informally known as the “Gazprom clause,” it was seen as 
being primarily aimed at requiring Russia to open its energy market 
and transmission networks to third parties in return for allowing the 
Russian state- owned gas company to invest in EU markets.
This last element of German policy toward the liberalization of the 
EU energy markets is linked to its approach to external energy rela-
tions in the late 1990s and 2000s. During the Red- Green coalition, 
Germany became the driving force for a renewed, special EU- Russia 
partnership (Westphal 2007, 105). As a practical matter, however, 
the government’s external policy was characterized by a shift away 
from multilateralism to a more unilateral pursuit of national interests 
(Westphal 2007, 101, 111). The government’s efforts to help German 
energy companies become internationally competitive and expand 
their activities abroad (as a way of enhancing Germany’s energy secu-
rity) had negative implications for the EU’s attempts at promoting 
multilateral governance and common institutions in relations with 
Russia. The Schröder government’s use of its strong personal ties with 
the Putin administration to promote German- Russian energy rela-
tions undermined the Commission’s efforts to establish a common 
foreign energy policy and, paradoxically, limited the opportunities 
of the EU as a whole to diversify its energy supply and increase its 
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energy security (Westphal 2007, 93, 112). This approach was per-
haps most evident in the Schröder government’s strong backing of 
the Nord Stream pipeline project, which would provide a direct link 
between Germany and Russian gas supplies.
The prospects for German support for a common external EU 
energy policy seemed to improve during the subsequent grand coali-
tion. From the outset, Chancellor Merkel exhibited more skepticism 
toward Russia, an attitude that was only reinforced by the Russia-
 Ukraine gas conflict in early 2006. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier offered much rhetorical support for the development of 
a European external policy that would enable the EU to speak with 
a single voice. He placed considerable emphasis on getting Russia 
to ratify the EU’s Energy Charter Treaty or at least to negotiate an 
energy agreement grounded in the principles contained in the unrati-
fied treaty (Duffield 2009). And as noted above, improving external 
energy relations was one of the goals of Germany’s EU presidency 
in 2007. But these ideas were not accompanied by concrete propos-
als to increase either the EU’s legal competence or its institutional 
capacity to conduct a common external energy policy. To the con-
trary, Germany never relinquished its prerogatives to act unilaterally 
in this area.
Determinants of German Energy Policy
How are we to explain and understand Germany’s mixed record of 
support for a common EU energy policy in recent years? A logical place 
to begin is with general societal preferences. Of particular relevance 
in this context is the high level of concern about the environment that 
has characterized German society, although this environmentalism 
has, paradoxically, cut both ways. On the one hand, acute concerns 
about climate change have done much to motivate significant efforts 
by governments of all political stripes to promote energy efficiency, 
renewable sources of energy, and reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions at both the national and European levels. On the other hand, 
widespread concern about nuclear power, ranging from ambivalence 
to outright opposition, underlay the Red- Green coalition’s decision to 
phase out nuclear power and the inability of any government to facili-
tate the construction of new power plants. These policies, in turn, 
have created an obstacle to cooperation with EU partners on some 
energy issues and reinforced Germany’s determination to maintain 
national autonomy over the choice of energy sources.
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Arguably, however, an even more important determinant has been 
the structure of the energy economy, especially those aspects concern-
ing electricity and gas. Ironically, as the EU has sought to increase 
competition in the gas and electricity markets, those industries have 
been concentrated in fewer hands in Germany. The number of major 
supraregional gas companies that owned the major pipeline systems 
and accounted for most of Germany’s gas imports declined from six 
to as few as four during the 2000s (IEA 2002, 73–74; IEA 2007, 99). 
Similarly, electricity generation and transmission have been dominated 
by just four supraregional companies—E.On, RWE, Energie Baden-
 Wuerttemberg (EnBW), and Vattenfall—that control about three-
 quarters of the country’s generation capacity and have accounted for 
an even higher percentage of the electricity actually produced (IEA 
2007, 127). These companies have divided Germany into four regions 
in which they act as quasi- monopolies (Müller 2007, 29).
Two characteristics of the major energy companies have under-
pinned German resistance to the creation of a common EU energy 
policy. First, as suggested above, they are vertically integrated. Not 
only do the Big Four electricity companies produce and transmit most 
of the electricity, but they also dominate retail supply and distribu-
tion, in part through cross- ownership of municipal utilities and in 
part directly (IEA 2007, 30; Müller 2007, 29). Such vertical integra-
tion furthers the narrow commercial interests of the companies them-
selves. But some have argued that it also serves the national interest, 
by enabling German companies to compete with other national cham-
pions in the EU and by increasing their leverage in negotiations with 
foreign suppliers (see also Eikeland’s contribution to this volume). In 
any case, the German electricity and gas companies have strongly lob-
bied at the national and EU levels against such measures as legal and 
ownership unbundling in order to maintain their profitable vertically 
integrated corporate structures as well as their oligopolistic market 
structures.
The other important characteristic with implications for Germany’s 
support for a common EU energy policy are the close ties that the gas 
companies have with Russia. Ruhrgas, now E.On Ruhrgas, is cur-
rently the largest foreign shareholder in Gazprom, with about 6.4 per-
cent of the shares, and it has a strategic interest in maintaining close 
energy ties with Gazprom and in expanding into the exploration and 
production of Russian gas because it produces only five percent of the 
gas it sells. Likewise, BASF Wintershall has a history of various cross-
 ownership deals with Gazprom. Both companies hold long- term gas 
delivery contracts with Russia that extend beyond 2030.
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These structural linkages between German and Russian com-
panies created an alliance of interests that undermined, or at least 
weakened, the Commission’s efforts to extend competition within 
and beyond the EU’s borders (Westphal 2007, 105). The German 
gas importers prefer to minimize competition on the German mar-
ket because of the vulnerability inherent in their long- term purchas-
ing contracts from Gazprom (Müller 2007, 39). In addition, E.On 
Ruhrgas and Wintershall lobbied strongly for the Nord Stream 
project, in which they were junior partners to Gazprom, because it 
would strengthen their position on the international and EU markets 
(Westphal 2007, 111).
This discussion of the electricity and gas industries raises the issue 
of the relationship between business and government. The interests of 
the energy companies would not matter so much if they did not receive 
expression in government policy. In fact, however, many companies 
have enjoyed close links with, and presumably have exercised consid-
erable influence over, at least parts of the government, and these ties 
may have grown even stronger during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
when the government was negotiating the first stages of the liberaliza-
tion process and the nuclear phaseout (Westphal 2007, 105).
The energy industry has been one of the main constituencies of 
the Federal Ministry of Economics (BMWi). And as long- term energy 
policy analyst Friedemann Müller has argued, the close links between 
energy companies and BMWi have resulted in a conservative German 
policy toward the EU. In particular, the resistance of energy com-
panies to EU energy market liberalization efforts has influenced the 
BMWi position in Brussels negotiations. In Müller’s view, the BMWi 
reflexively defends the interests of the energy industry under almost 
any circumstances (Müller 2005, 177–78; see also Müller 2007, 33).
It is not just a matter of industry using its allies in government to 
do its bidding, however. The relationship is more complicated than 
that. While the companies seek to influence the government in order 
to promote their self- interest, many government officials view strong 
energy companies as serving German national interests.
A final factor shaping German policy has been differences in the 
orientations of the major political parties. The SPD has tradition-
ally been more open to cooperation with first the Soviet Union and 
then Russia, while the CDU/CSU has been more wary. These dif-
ferences were on display in the contrasting approaches of Schröder 
and Merkel, described above. In addition, the CDU/CSU has been 
more supportive of European integration and market liberalization. 
Thus the CDU/CSU- Free Democratic Party (FDP) government under 
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Helmut Kohl (1982–1998), which oversaw the implementation of the 
Single European Act and negotiated the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), may have been more supportive of the initial steps 
toward the creation of a single energy market than was the following 
SPD- Green coalition.
Nevertheless, these differences should not be exaggerated. For 
example, since the 1970s, both major parties have tended to hold a 
more positive view of the Soviet Union/Russia than have other West 
European powers, such as France and Great Britain. Hence officials 
of all governments have insisted on the reliability of Russian gas sup-
plies, and even the 2006 Russia- Ukraine gas conflict did not seem to 
call into question this basic tenet of German energy policy.
Conclusion
Germany has traditionally been a leading proponent of European 
integration. Yet in recent years, it has been ambivalent about, if not 
downright antagonistic toward, the creation of a common EU energy 
policy. Successive German governments have resisted or at least not 
supported some of the most central elements of EU policy, especially 
energy market liberalization and external energy relations.
This ambivalence has been grounded in large part in the structure 
of the German energy sector, which has been dominated by a small 
number of gas and electricity companies, and the particular interests 
of those powerful companies. Those companies have opposed various 
efforts to liberalize the gas and electricity markets and have sought 
to retain a free hand in negotiations with foreign suppliers such as 
Gazprom. In turn, successive German governments have tended to 
give voice to those commercial interests in negotiations at the EU 
level.
Even where German officials might see some advantage, such as 
lower energy prices, in supporting Commission initiatives, they con-
front a “chicken- and- egg” problem. Until the European energy mar-
kets are fully integrated and liberalized, the security of Germany’s 
energy supply will depend to an important extent on the maintenance 
of strong national companies that can compete and negotiate on 
roughly equal terms with state- owned enterprises and powerful for-
eign energy interests. But as long as they exist, those same companies 
will lobby against further liberalization measures.
Nevertheless, the last couple of years have seen some develop-
ments that provide reasons for optimism. In 2008, several of the large 
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German energy utilities, including E.On, RWE, and Vattenfall, under 
pressure from the Commission for allegedly engaging in uncompeti-
tive practices, decided to sell their transmission networks. This unex-
pected development raised hopes that other giant energy concerns, in 
Germany and elsewhere, would follow suit.
An even more recent development has brought German policy 
more in line with that of the other major EU member states as well 
as the preferences of the Commission. In 2009, the national elections 
brought to power a new government that promised to review German 
energy policy, especially the nuclear phaseout decision. The following 
year, the Black- Yellow coalition prepared a new energy concept paper 
that called for extending the lifetimes of the remaining nuclear power 
plants (BMWi/BMU 2010).
In addition, the new energy concept suggests a greater degree of 
emphasis on pursuing Germany’s energy policy goals at the European 
level. One of the longest (of nine) sections is devoted to the issue of 
energy supply in the European and international context. Other pro-
posed steps include supporting the import of green electricity from 
third countries and pushing forward the creation of an integrated 
electricity market through new transmission lines in Europe and 
beyond. Nevertheless, it is too soon to tell whether these develop-
ments suggest more than minor adjustments in German policy, rather 
than a fundamental reorientation.
Notes
1. From 2002 to 2005, the BMWi was combined with part of the traditional 
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs to form a superministry 
known as the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (BMWA).
2. In 2009, Russia withdrew from the treaty (Westphal 2009b).
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Chapter Nine
The UK and EU Energy Policy: From 
Awkward Partner to Active Protagonist?
Francis McGowan
This chapter examines the way in which the British government has 
shifted its stance on the details and scope of a common energy policy 
in the European Union (EU). That shift has been highly significant: 
more or less from the moment of membership, British politicians and 
officials were wary of transferring authority over energy matters to 
the European level. A combination of domestic political divisions over 
its participation in the European Community and the desire to retain 
control over the resources of the North Sea meant that British govern-
ments were quite hostile to the development of a more coordinated 
European approach to energy matters. This reluctance to engage per-
sisted over the subsequent decades with regard to most aspects of 
energy policy, the principal exception being in the area of market liber-
alization (a policy innovation where the United Kingdom [UK] was an 
early adopter). In an echo of the UK’s traditional “economistic” moti-
vation for participating in European integration, Conservative—and 
later Labour—governments were forceful supporters of the European 
Commission (hereafter: the Commission) proposals to increase com-
petition in the energy sector (though other member states were, at 
least initially less enthused).
Over time, the choreography surrounding EU policy—and the 
nature of the UK’s participation in it—has changed. Some of the states 
that were opposed to, or ambivalent about, liberalization have become 
supporters of open EU energy markets. Moreover, the agreement on 
increasing competition in the sector has coincided with a broadening 
of the energy policy agenda. European institutions have embraced the 
climate change issue along with revived worries over energy supply 
security, using them to renew the case for a common energy policy. 
The New Labour government was increasingly supportive of such a 
policy, pushing it forward during its 2005 presidency and broadly 
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backing the specific measures over the following years. At the time of 
writing, this support for EU- level policy seems to have survived the 
change of government in 2010.
The continuity between New Labour and the current coalition 
of conservatives and liberals also extends to some rethinking about 
how the means and ends of energy policy: after many years of leaving 
energy decisions to the market, the British government appears to have 
recognized the limitations of such an approach and the need for state 
intervention to rectify market failures. It remains to be seen how this 
will influence its preferences at the EU level where the Commission 
remains strongly committed to market solutions. Both changes seem 
to stem at least in part from the same change in circumstances, how-
ever: the country’s shift from being a net exporter to becoming a net 
importer of energy.
This chapter explores the changing priorities and principles 
underlying the UK’s stance on European energy policy. The chapter 
begins by providing an overview of the UK’s energy balances and 
of the development of national energy policy. On this basis it then 
examines the UK’s role in European energy policy in terms of how it 
has influenced and has been influenced by European initiatives. The 
paper reviews the evolution of policy from the period before the UK 
joined the European Communities to the present day. This historical 
dimension is appropriate given the mix of continuity and change in 
the British approach and the way in which a variety of factors—from 
the geological to the ideological—have acted as catalysts and con-
straints in UK- EU energy relations. The chapter concludes by consid-
ering what has driven the changes in the UK’s position. Has it been 
the result of more communautaire spirit on the part of the govern-
ment? Has it been due to recognition that markets cannot address 
some of the major challenges facing the energy economy in the UK or 
in Europe? Or is it a reflection of changed national priorities? Just as 
the UK’s national interest was once expressed in a defense of energy 
sovereignty and opposition to anything more than a limited European 
energy policy, it may be that its preferences have adapted to new cir-
cumstances in which collective action may serve Britain better.
The UK’s Energy Endowment: 
Resources and Policy
As with any other member state, an assessment of the UK’s position 
on European energy policy has to take account of the evolution of its 
10_Birchfield_Ch09.indd   188 4/12/2011   5:27:38 PM
The UK and EU Energy Policy 189
own policy priorities. This in turn requires some understanding of 
how the UK’s energy endowment has developed over time.
Unique among member states in the postwar era, the UK enjoyed 
for a number of years a surplus of energy resources, producing more 
than it consumed. Its status as a net exporter was furthermore rein-
forced by the diversity of fuels at its disposal: as was said by more 
than one commentator, Britain was an “island of coal floating in a 
sea of oil and gas.”1 In the last decade, however the country’s self-
 sufficiency has been eroded and the UK has returned to being a net 
importer of energy. Moreover, the balance of fuels has shifted over 
time in response to changing market and environmental conditions. 
Table 9.1 summarizes the changes over time.
The coal industry was at the heart ofthe UK’s energy economy 
for many decades but has been in relative and increasingly absolute 
decline over the postwar period. While historically dominating the 
country’s energy balances, changing demand patterns and the growth 
of oil consumption meant that between 1948 and 2009, coal’s share 
of primary energy supply fell from around 90 percent to around 14 
percent (with the market now almost entirely focused on power gen-
eration). Moreover, whereas historically British demand for coal was 
overwhelmingly met from national supplies, in the last two decades 
the share of imports has increased substantially. British coal produc-
tion was by European standards relatively cost efficient but consum-
ers have been able to import from suppliers—outside the EU—whose 
costs are considerably lower. Many mines outside the EU were able to 
produce and export coal at much lower prices. As a result, in 2009, 
coal from British mines accounted for around 5 percent of the coun-
try’s total energy needs.
At the same time as domestic coal entered a relative and absolute 
decline, the country became a significant producer of oil and gas. 
Consumption of oil had increased substantially over the postwar 
period while natural gas began to be supplied in the late 1960s. The 
discovery of large reserves off the British coast (particularly the North 
Sea) meant that the country was effectively able to meet most of its 
requirements for both fuels (though in practice the country continued 
to import crude oil and oil products). Between the end of the 1960s 
and the end of the last century, production of gas rose from under 1 
percent to 27 percent of energy supply. Oil production began slightly 
later, rising from the equivalent of 26 percent of needs at the end 
of the 1970s to 60 percent at the end of the 1990s. In this century, 
however, production of oil and gas has not been able to keep up with 
demand and more recently has entered into a steady decline, with gas 
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output meeting only 76 percent of total gas requirements in 2009 and 
oil production just over half the levels of ten years earlier.
The UK has also been a significant producer of non- fossil energy. In 
the 1950s Britain was one of the pioneers of civilian nuclear technol-
ogy. Over the following decades its share of total energy supply rose 
from less than 1 percent in 1958 to around 8 percent in the 1990s. 
The role of renewables has been relatively modest. Traditionally, it 
focused on large- scale hydroelectric capacity—mainly in the North of 
Scotland—but the country has lagged behind other parts of Europe 
in the development of other renewable energy sources. While renew-
able production has been rapidly increasing in recent years, it has 
been from a low base—it is now around 3 percent of total primary 
supply—and remains an underexploited resource.
Managing this energy endowment has been the primary objective 
of national energy policy. As in most European states, energy policy 
has been primarily a supply side affair with relatively little attention 
paid to managing demand. There have been initiatives to foster greater 
energy efficiency—particularly in the wake of the energy crises—but 
the resources and commitment of officials and politicians have tended 
to favor investments in energy production (Chesshire 1986).
Table 9.1  Energy production and supply in the UK
 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008 2009
Total Energy Production (m.tonnes oil equivalent)
Coal 134.1 38.6 107.1 75.5 63.3 25.8 11.4 11.0
Oil 0.2 0.2 0.2 58.2 125.5 145.3 78.6 74.7
Natural Gas 1.9 36.2 42.1 90.2 69.7 59.7
Renewables 2.5 4.0 4.9
“Primary Electricity”* 0.4 1.3 7.0 10.3 17.0 24.0 13.0 16.5
Total 134.7 40.1 116.2 180.2 247.9 287.8 176.7 167.0
Total Primary Energy Supply (m.tonnes oil equivalent)
Coal 128.0 129.2 100.7 73.3 69.6 40.9 37.9 31.0
Oil 14.3 40.6 89.7 97.0 84.0 87.1 83.5 79.4
Natural Gas 3.0 41.0 51.5 88.3 93.7 86.7
Electricity 0.4 1.3 7.0 10.3 18.1 25.0 13.9 16.7
Renewables 2.1 5.3 6.1
Total 142.7 171.1 200.4 221.6 223.2 243.4 234.3 219.9
Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics.
* Note: “primary electricity” is primarily nuclear. Hydroelectric contribution has been around 
0.3/0.5 mtoe annually for most the period. Since 1996 wind generation has been included in the 
statistics, bringing the total renewable contribution to primary electricity to 1.1mtoe in 2008 and 
1.3 mtoe in 2009.
10_Birchfield_Ch09.indd   190 4/12/2011   5:27:38 PM
The UK and EU Energy Policy 191
Before the 1980s, the country’s energy supply industry almost 
entirely in the public sector (oil being a partial exception). For much 
of the postwar period until the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, 
British energy policy was largely conducted through the publicly 
owned firms created by the nationalization of the coal, electricity, 
and gas industries in the late 1940s. Nationalization and reorganiza-
tion of these industries was relatively uncontentious, with a variety of 
justifications invoked (ranging from the building of socialism to the 
reaping of scale economies). As public enterprises they were deployed 
for a wider range of economic objectives than the core task of ensur-
ing adequate supplies. Over the following years the energy industries 
were to be key players in economic reconstruction and retained a stra-
tegic aspect throughout the period of public ownership (Bending and 
Eden 1984; Cairncross 1985).
Prior to the energy crises of the 1970s, British energy policy focused 
upon setting a framework for the development of new resources (oil 
and gas) and technology (nuclear) while managing the rationalization 
of the coal industry. The oil shocks—and the return of a Labour gov-
ernment following a confrontation between the previous Conservative 
government and the coal miners in 1973/1974—changed the balance 
of policy. There was increasingly a perception of energy as a precious 
commodity, and the new government sought to increase the role of 
the state in the development of the North Sea resources as well as 
to foster new nuclear technologies and revive the coal industry. The 
policy had its successes (fostering offshore oil and gas development 
and managing a major conversion of domestic infrastructure from 
manufactured to natural gas) and failures (the management and devel-
opment of nuclear power). As we will see, however, a primary consid-
eration was to retain national control over the exploitation of these 
valuable resources (Cook and Surrey 1977; Department of Energy 
1978; Department of Fuel and Power 1967).
When the Conservatives returned to power in 1979, energy policy 
began to change quite fundamentally. Hitherto, UK energy policy 
could be described as primarily concerned with the development 
of British energy resources with a view to meeting domestic energy 
needs but also with a view to fulfilling a number of broader economic 
objectives in promoting industrial, regional, and social policies, with 
publicly owned enterprises an important policy instrument. In 1993 
(after nearly 15 years of Conservative rule), the government sum-
marized its energy policy objectives as: to encourage competition 
amongst energy producers and to provide a regulatory framework 
to allow markets to work well; to commercialize energy markets in 
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which the full costs of energy were borne by customers; to privatize 
the energy industries and support wider share ownership, to take 
account of the environmental impact of the energy sector and meet 
international commitments; to promote energy efficiency and safe-
guard health and safety (Department of Trade and Industry 1993). 
While some aspects and aspirations are common to both periods, a 
change of emphasis—away from government planning toward the 
market—is all too apparent.
While this transformation did not happen overnight, the govern-
ment’s approach to energy policy shifted steadily away from being one 
where it was the dominant player to one where more decisions were 
taken by privately owned firms operating in market conditions. One 
of Mrs. Thatcher’s first energy ministers, Nigel Lawson, recalled in 
his memoirs that he “was determined to break the dirigiste mentality 
that pervaded both the Department of Energy and the nationalized 
energy industries” (Lawson 1992: 163). In a 1982 speech he outlined 
the change of direction, arguing that the government’s principal task 
was to “set a framework which will ensure that the market operates 
in the energy sector with a minimum of distortion and that energy 
is produced and consumed efficiently” (Lawson 1982: 3). Such sen-
timents reflected the government’s overall economic policy and its 
ideological commitment to private enterprise and competition. At the 
heart of the new energy policy was a nexus of policies involving the 
privatization of state owned energy companies, the opening up of 
the markets in which those companies operated and the establish-
ment of regulatory frameworks to encourage competition, and to 
control prices where competition was not possible (Helm, Kay, and 
Thompson 1989).
The policy was a political success—boosting the government’s rev-
enues, enriching a number of small shareholders, transforming the 
ethos and corporate culture of the energy sector and creating a growth 
industry in privatization—though its broader economic impacts have 
been more contested. What were not perhaps clear at the time were 
the incentive effects of the combination of privately owned utilities 
and competitive energy markets. Although obtaining significant 
returns, the new owners had few incentives to invest, particularly 
in longer term, capital- intensive technologies. The coincidence of 
the privatizations with a sustained period of low energy prices and 
apparent surpluses in global energy markets eroded the perception 
of scarcity, which had defined energy policy since the 1970s. In the 
electricity sector, utilities lost interest in technologies such as nuclear 
power (whose reputation had been tarnished by revelations of poor 
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economics during privatization and by accidents such as Chernobyl), 
and instead favored the development of gas power stations (Surrey 
1996).
The other casualty was the coal industry. Following the strikes of 
the 1970s the Conservative party regarded the miner’s union as the 
epitome of trade union power which they were committed to con-
front. Over the course of 1984 and 1985 the government faced off a 
prolonged strike over pit closures and restructuring. However, ulti-
mately the most serious challenge to the sector came in the wake of 
electricity privatization when “the dash for gas” (the rush to invest in 
gas fired power stations) led to a further scaling back of the industry. 
While the issue became highly contentious—forcing the government 
to provide some additional supports for the industry—ultimately the 
effects were to accelerate a rationalization of the sector (the rump of 
which was privatized in the mid- 1990s) (Parker 2000).
The shift from coal to gas was in part justified on environmental 
grounds. Over the 1980s the British government’s reputation on envi-
ronmental issues was poor—it was known as the dirty man of Europe 
for its tardiness in reducing emissions from power stations which were 
responsible for acid rain in other parts of northern Europe (Boehmer-
 Christiansen and Skea 1991; Weale 1992). From the end of the decade 
and throughout the 1990s, however, the government sought to rein-
vent itself as more responsive to environmental concerns (Department 
of the Environment 1990; Jordan 2000; Osborn 1997).
The return of the Labour Party to government did not mark a 
major shift in British energy policy. In opposition the party had 
been critical of many parts of the Conservative government’s market 
based energy policy, at times even committing to renationalize the 
energy industries (Labour Party 1983; Labour Party 1987; Labour 
Party 1992). However, under the leadership of Tony Blair the party 
adopted a more “market friendly” approach to the economy, includ-
ing the energy sector. Aside from a “windfall tax” on the electric-
ity utilities and some refashioning of regulatory responsibilities to 
give greater weight to the interests of consumers and address social 
issues, governments since 1997 not only left the previous policy in 
place but enthusiastically embraced and advanced it. The govern-
ment abandoned its commitment to public ownership in the sec-
tor and pursued the extension of competition in gas and electricity 
markets to all customers (Gray 2004; Labour Party 1997; Rutledge 
2007).
New Labour’s principal innovation was its pledge to deepen the 
commitment to an environmentally friendly energy policy, particularly 
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in relation to climate change. While the Conservatives had launched 
some initiatives as part of their attempts to improve their environmen-
tal reputation, the integration of climate change into energy policy 
advanced to another level in the late 1990s. This reflected a growing 
acceptance of the significance of the threat and increased attempts 
to agree an international response, with the government becoming a 
strong advocate of market based instruments to drive the transition to 
a low carbon energy economy (Carter 2008).
Climate change concerns were important in the government’s 
drive to redesign national energy policy after many years of neglect 
(Department of Trade and Industry 2003; Department of Trade and 
Industry 2007). While energy markets were still at the heart of the 
policy, the government also sought to encourage energy efficiency 
and renewables through a variety of mechanisms (Mitchell 2007; 
Politt 2010). As the country’s energy self- sufficiency began to dimin-
ish, concerns over supply security also reemerged, particularly as 
international energy prices and worries over long- term availability 
of supplies increased (Lovell, et al. 2009; Helm 2005; Scrase and 
MacKerron 2009). It has been in this context that the government 
sought to revive the fortunes of nuclear power. It is worth noting 
that the nuclear industry had been lobbying for many years for such 
a change but growing insecurity seems to have been the catalyst for a 
change of heart among senior politicians and officials. (Department 
of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008). However, while 
private investors were now keener in principle to invest in nuclear, the 
market conditions were still seen as uncertain. In this and in other 
areas of energy policy it appeared that price signals and competition 
were working against investment in such risky and long- term options. 
As a result New Labour moved toward a more interventionist energy 
policy, which, while not a full circle return to the energy policy agenda 
of the past, marked a major shift (Wicks 2009).
Nor was it only New Labour that recognized the need for a change 
in energy policy. In the period before the election, the Conservative 
energy spokesman criticized New Labour for being too reliant on 
energy markets and stressed the importance of energy security and 
the need to intervene (EU Energy 2009). While its policy proposals in 
the run up to the election did not repudiate the past commitment to 
energy markets, it clearly signaled a more extensive role for govern-
ment (Conservative Party 2010; MacKerron 2010). In effect, there-
fore, the Conservative- Liberal coalition government, which came to 
power in 2010, seems to be consolidating the reorientation that began 
in the last years of New Labour (HM Government 2010).
Pls specify 
Helm 2005a 
or 2005b.
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UK and EU Policy: Historical Evolution
British energy policy has been primarily defined by changes in its 
energy balances, particularly the availability of energy resources. 
Those considerations have been equally important in the conduct of 
its energy relations with other countries: The pursuit of the national 
interest in energy matters has entailed the maintenance of sovereignty 
over choices on energy resources. The UK’s role in the development 
of EU energy policy has to be seen as one aspect of such energy diplo-
macy. Negotiations by politicians and officials with other member 
states and institutions have been framed by this concern.
This concern with energy sovereignty has been compounded by 
two more general factors: the UK’s liberal disposition on matters 
of economic policy and its ambivalence toward the wider project of 
European integration. The interplay between these two factors has 
been a characteristic of British relations with its continental neighbors 
for many years (at least since the Cobden Chevalier Treaty of 1860 
and the embrace of free trade) (Marsh 1999). Since the creation of the 
European Communities in the 1950s it is notable that the British gov-
ernment reconciled itself to membership because of the perceived eco-
nomic advantages of joining the “common market” (as well as in some 
cases a perception of declining global influence) (Aspinwall 2004; 
Young, H. 1999). However, while it has largely embraced economic 
integration, the British political class has been more ambivalent about 
the political consequences of membership (George 1998; Gowland 
and Turner 1999). The issue has been a cleavage in British politics, 
between and within the major parties. The impact of “Europe” on 
domestic politics, moreover, has fed back into the way that govern-
ments position themselves in negotiations on European policies. As 
we will see, both factors have left an impact on the UK’s negotiating 
position on EU energy policy as well as on EU energy policy itself.
From 1950s to Membership
Many reasons have been given for the failure of the British to partici-
pate in the negotiations for the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). The UK’s aspirations to remain a major power (on the basis 
of its links to its commonwealth and colonies and its close relation-
ship with the United States [US]) meant that it was not prepared to 
engage in a serious project of European integration (Young, H 1999). 
However for our purposes it is worth noting the response of Herbert 
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Morrison, a senior Labour politician, to the proposal. Upon hearing 
about the Community he declared that the government could not con-
template joining because “the Durham miners won’t wear it” (quoted 
in Young, H. 1999: 64; Dell 1995). The idea that the coal industry—
not long nationalized in one of the most symbolic acts of the Labour 
government—would be subject to outside control was deemed to be 
politically unacceptable. At the time, of course, the inclusion of coal 
in the treaty was primarily related to its role in the steel industry—
though the first steps toward a Community perspective on energy 
matters were made under the ECSC’s auspices (Lucas 1977) and fol-
lowed up after the creation of the European Economic and Atomic 
Energy Communities (EEC and Euratom) (Lister 1960; von Geusau 
1975)—but the quote illustrates the tension between the prospect of 
integrating energy markets and satisfying domestic constituencies. 
With the UK remaining outside the Community for another 20 years, 
and energy scarcely a policy success story over the same period, how-
ever, such a prospect seemed fairly distant.
The UK cooperated with its European neighbors on energy mat-
ters in the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), particularly in the aftermath of the Six 
Day war when the Organization became the focus for discussions on 
storing and sharing oil stocks (Shackleton 1978; Thorpe 2007). When 
new negotiations of membership of the Communities finally began 
in 1970, energy was not to be one of the principal sticking points. 
Most of the issues related to those energy sources covered by separate 
treaties: Euratom was relatively straightforward on energy matters 
(Shovelton 2000, 206ff) while coal was in some aspects more sensi-
tive, with negotiations clouded by concerns over a possible loss of 
national control over the industry (Shovelton 2000 204). As regards 
the acquis relating to energy, there was not much to negotiate about 
(not withstanding nearly 20 years of attempts to formulate such a 
policy). As the official history of the negotiations noted, energy was 
one of the European Community’s common policies that was “for-
tunately still . . . relatively rudimentary though beginning to develop 
fast” (O’ Neill 2000, 188).
Indeed, the UK’s membership of the European Communities (here-
after: the Community)—at the beginning of 19732—coincided with 
a renewed attempt by the Community to formulate a comprehensive 
energy policy. Proposals made in the late 1960s had been refash-
ioned by the Commission in 1972 (Commission of the European 
Communities 1968; Commission of the European Communities 
1972). However, neither set of proposals met with much enthusiasm 
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from the existing member states (particularly France). In discussions 
about the Commission’s proposals shortly after accession, British 
government officials indicated that they shared the French goal of 
restricting the Commission’s role in developing any policy (Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office 1973).
Britain and Europe in the Energy Crisis: 
An Opportunity Avoided?
As it turned out, an Anglo- French entente on energy matters did emerge 
but not in the way that was anticipated. Although there was grow-
ing concern in the early 1970s about the strength of the oil export-
ers—and some discussions on the need for a commensurate collective 
response from consuming countries (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office 2005)—the manner in which the energy crisis emerged was a 
surprise (Yergin 1991). The 1973 Arab- Israeli war was accompanied 
by efforts by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC) to engineer a boycott against those countries that were sup-
porting Israel, principally the Netherlands. While the Dutch looked to 
the support from their fellow member states, the response of the British 
and French was less than wholehearted. The British in particular were 
anxious that the Community not do anything that would antagonize 
OAPEC (Hellema et al. 2004; 1975; Walton 1976).
Nor was it only the embargo which divided the member states: the 
British and French were the first to seek bilateral agreements with 
the governments of exporting nations to ensure future supplies, in 
the process undermining the scope for a collective response by the 
Community (Connelly and Perlman 1975; Lucas 1977, 59). While 
there may have been a hope that the energy crisis could serve as an 
opportunity for the Community to rekindle a rather sluggish energy 
policy debate, this was not to be the case. Indeed, when the crisis was 
discussed at the Copenhagen summit in December 1973, progress on 
agreeing a common response was blocked by disagreements between 
Britain and Germany over the funding of regional policy (Lucas 1977, 
59; Times 1973).
Central to British policy in this period was the desire to prevent 
the Commission from managing the oil market and to retain com-
plete control over the North Sea energy resources. As the Commission 
put forward new proposals on energy in 1974, the UK’s response 
was lukewarm. A paper prepared by the then energy minister Eric 
Varley provides a very clear statement of British opposition to an 
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extensive Community policy. Noting that little progress has been 
made on energy policy despite the intentions expressed at the Paris 
72 and Copenhagen 73 summits, the paper was responding to the 
Commission’s 1974 proposals for an energy strategy (Commission of 
the European Communities 1974). Varley was candid in seeing little 
to gain from a Community policy especially given the country’s likely 
self- sufficiency in energy resources. Those areas where international 
cooperation is needed were better pursued in wider fora (involving the 
US and Japan—effectively the emerging IEA [International Energy 
Agency]—or bilaterally (nuclear) (Cabinet Office 1974).
However the paper also recognized the dangers of adopting too 
hostile a stance as it would “generate ill will” (Cabinet Office 1974, 
1) with other member states and undermine the planned renegotiation 
of membership terms. On this point Varley echoed a senior official’s 
view that it was necessary to pay some lip service to cooperation “if 
we are to get our own way on the things that really matter” (Prime 
Minister’s Office 1974). Much of what the Commission proposed was 
unproblematic and could be supported, though the report argued that 
many of the objectives being set involved a “large element of wish-
ful thinking” ranging from the optimistic to the unrealistic (Cabinet 
Office 1974, 1). The exception to this approach was the Commission’s 
plans for the oil market, which Varley saw as an attempt to gain con-
trol of the country’s resources. The UK was completely opposed to 
the proposals partly because it doubted the Commission’s competence 
but mainly because it did not want to surrender sovereignty over such 
an important policy area. In particular, it opposed the creation of a 
new European Energy Agency, something proposed in various forms 
by the Commission and the French. (Cabinet Office 1974, 5).
British ambivalence was more publicly manifest at a Council meet-
ing in the summer of 1974 when one of the principal opponents of 
membership of the Community—Peter Shore—led the British delega-
tion in a discussion of energy and other matters. In what proved to 
be a rather embarrassing episode, Shore refused to back conclusions 
on energy policy, effectively unraveling the careful background diplo-
macy of the previous months. His actions—described in one news-
paper report as his “finest hour as an anti- marketeer” (Times 1974a) 
antagonized the other member states and the Commission but was 
relatively short- lived in its impact: within a matter of months the UK 
had lifted its objections and the resolution was passed by the member 
states (Times 1974b). The episode nonetheless demonstrated how the 
domestic differences within the government on Europe spilled over 
into the conduct of particular policies.
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In this period, the UK seemed to prefer the newly created 
International Energy Agency as its forum for discussing energy pol-
icy matters. As noted, it regarded an organization that embraced the 
other industrialized economies (particularly the US) as a better venue 
for discussing international energy problems. While this need not 
have been incompatible with the pursuit of a common energy policy, 
the decision of the French not to join the agency, made coordination 
between the two organizations more difficult (Simonet 1975; Van der 
Linde and Lefeber 1988).
It would be wrong to attribute all the problems of developing a 
common energy policy in the 1970s to the reluctance of the British but 
they manifest particularly strongly the tendency of member states to 
defend their own preferences. European energy policy for much of the 
rest of that decade and for the earlier part of the 1980s was primar-
ily characterized by rather weak target setting initiatives (McGowan 
1990) which presented few problems for the British government. 
However the UK was to eventually make a more significant contribu-
tion to European energy policy, which had the effect of making the 
policy itself more significant in its impact on member states.
Britain and the Internal Energy Market: 
From the Exception to the Rule?
As noted earlier, the UK had embarked in the 1980s on a radical shift 
in its energy policy by giving much greater weight to the role of market 
forces in determining prices and investment and allowing competition 
to replace the model of a vertically integrated monopoly that had been 
regarded as the appropriate model for energy utilities. This was, of 
course, a part of a much more fundamental shift in the economic pol-
icy of the UK and other industrialized economies. Within Europe one 
of the factors underpinning—or even forcing the pace of—that lib-
eralization process was the model of economic integration on which 
the EU was built. Although perhaps not apparent in the early period 
of the European Community, there was nonetheless a strong element 
of economic liberalism in the original treaties and this became appar-
ent as the economic policy pendulum moved in the direction of the 
market (McGowan 2001, 76–81). The EC in particular emerged as 
a strong advocate of economic reforms based on removing barriers 
to trade amongst member states and, under the leadership of Jacques 
Delors and a number of liberally minded Commissioners, sought to 
use Community law and legislation in pursuit of such reforms. In 
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1985 the Commission launched the Single Market initiative, a package 
of over 300 legislative measures designed to open up to competition 
those sectors which had hitherto enjoyed various forms of protection 
from competition (Moravcsik 1991; Young 1999).
The initiative, steered by the British commissioner Lord Cockfield, 
impacted only indirectly upon the energy sector but as it gathered 
momentum, the Commission proposed to extend the policy to the 
energy industries—sectors which it had considered to be “too dif-
ficult” to tackle, given the sensitivities and vested interests involved. 
A Commission communication on the Internal Energy Market was 
published in 1988 and laid out a program of market liberalization for 
sectors that had traditionally enjoyed privileged and protected posi-
tions, often national as well as natural monopolies (Commission of 
the European Communities 1988).
In pursuing such a policy there is no doubt that the British experi-
ments made the Commission’s strategy more feasible than it otherwise 
would have been. It effectively broke the taboo which considered the 
electricity and gas sectors as natural monopolies and made it harder 
for those member states hostile to the proposals to have the propos-
als dismissed. Armed with the UK example (and the UK support) the 
Commission embarked on an extended debate to liberalize the EU 
electricity and gas markets. Yet in the early years of the debate, the 
British were arguably the only country to support the Commission. 
(This was also apparent at the industrial level where the industry asso-
ciation Eurelectric [The Union of the Electricity Industry]—mainly 
hostile at that time to liberalization—was obliged to publish a major 
policy document as the opinion of the “continental members” of the 
organization) (Eising 2002; Eurelectric 1991).
The negotiations on the liberalization of electricity and gas markets 
were drawn out over four phases of legislation and nearly 20 years of 
bargaining (the first transit proposals were made in 1989 and the final 
reforms were agreed in 2008). Over that time the UK was a key pro-
tagonist supporting the Commission’s proposals—sometimes criticiz-
ing the reforms for not going far enough—and building up a coalition 
in favor of market opening (Department of Trade and Industry 1997, 
14). Over time and as member states pursued their own reforms the 
balance of opinion in the EU institutions duly shifted. Where there 
remained attempts to dilute or change reforms to favor the status quo, 
the British government was to the fore in arguing against such moves 
(not always successfully). The most recent instance of this struggle 
came in 2006 when the Commission published its proposals to bring 
about a full liberalization of the gas and electricity markets (the 
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 so- called third package) (Commission of the European Communities 
2006). As part of these reforms the Commission proposed that the 
member states apply a full separation of the different components of 
production, transmission, distribution, and supply of electricity and 
gas (“unbundling”). While previous reform packages had required 
companies to break up their vertically integrated structures the mea-
sures had not always been effective in ensuring a level- playing field 
that would encourage competition. The new proposals were opposed 
by those member states—such as France and Germany—whose gov-
ernments had retained close ties to their national energy utilities which 
had in turn maintained high levels of de facto integration. When these 
member states proposed amendments to the reforms which substan-
tially diluted the Commission’s proposals the British and other pro-
 liberalization member states sought to maintain the Commission’s 
original plan but ultimately had to agree to the compromise (Wood 
2008).
Given its fundamental role in supporting market reform at the 
European level, it is perhaps ironic that it was the British government 
that came under the scrutiny of the Commission’s competition authori-
ties for the way in which it planned to reorganize the electricity indus-
try. The growing activism of DGIV (later DG- Comp [Competition 
Directorate- General]) was the other feature of EU- level liberaliza-
tion in the last 25 years and in the process of energy liberalization, 
the Commission was keen to establish its competence to oversee the 
energy markets and ensure that they were compatible with EU com-
petition rules. For the most part the Commission’s interventions were 
directed at those least willing to reform. Ironically, however, it was 
often easier for the Commission to intervene in cases where changes 
were taking place than in those where incumbency was underpinned 
by inertia. Thus when the British government embarked on the most 
radical phase of its energy privatization policy, it attracted the atten-
tion of the Commission.
The proposals for privatizing the British electricity sector envisaged 
a fragmentation of the industry into a series of production and distri-
bution companies and a set of contracts between these companies had 
to be established to underpin the industry as it shifted from public to 
private ownership. Moreover there needed to be special arrangements 
to underpin the country’s nuclear power companies (whose lack of 
economic health had been revealed by the privatization process). The 
Commission investigated these arrangements, prompted in part by 
the efforts of British environmentalists who claimed the nuclear subsi-
dies were contrary to EU rules. The Commission ultimately accepted 
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the government’s proposals but only after much debate (a number of 
Commissioners were opposed to nuclear energy) and after the UK gov-
ernment had limited the extent of the support it would give the sector 
(European Commission 1991; Guardian 1990). According to some 
accounts, the then British competition commissioner Leon Brittan 
(formerly a member of the Conservative government) was central to 
ensuring that the Commission approval was obtained (Independent 
1990).
This would not be the last time that the British government’s 
treatment of its energy sector came under Commission scrutiny (the 
rescuing of British energy in 2002 and 2004 was perhaps the most 
sensitive intervention) (Commission of the European Communities 
2002; 2004). However one has to remember that the Commission 
was becoming much more active in examining the conduct of gov-
ernments toward the energy sector and its dealings with the UK 
were generally not as fraught as they were with other member states. 
Moreover the UK government itself was prepared to complain to 
the Commission against what it saw as unfair competition in the 
energy sector in areas such as coal subsidies (Department of Trade 
and Industry 1997, 119) and delays in implementing legislation 
(European Report 1999).
Energy and the Environment: The 
Laggard Catches Up
While it is difficult to imagine energy liberalization being pursued 
and sustained without the support and advocacy of the UK, in other 
areas of European energy policy the UK was less of a pioneer. The 
1980s were marked by a greater awareness of the environmental con-
sequences of energy use and the development of stricter policies to 
limit its impact. As noted, initially the British government was slow to 
recognize the growing political significance of the environment and 
to accept the need for tougher controls. Even later on when it had 
agreed to EU regulations on controlling emissions and had adopted 
a greener hue in its own policy rhetoric, the UK remained skeptical 
about the direction of EU environmental policies as they affected the 
energy sector (Grant, et al. 2000).
This opposition was most clearly apparent from the early 1990s 
when the Commission sought to address the emerging challenge of 
climate change. Central to its strategy was a proposal for a carbon 
tax (later a carbon- energy tax). The plan enjoyed support from most 
Pls provide 
reference 
details for 
European 
Commission 
1991.
10_Birchfield_Ch09.indd   202 4/12/2011   5:27:39 PM
The UK and EU Energy Policy 203
member states (though the French were opposed to the “energy” com-
ponent which they considered would penalize their nuclear industry). 
However the British were perhaps the most intransigent. As a govern-
ment report from 1994 noted, the UK would meet its commitments 
on CO2 reduction “without recourse to a carbon tax. It therefore does 
not need a tax at the national level and does not accept the case for one 
at EU level” (Department of Trade and Industry 1994, 82). Sustained 
British opposition through much of the 1990s effectively buried 
the proposal (as taxation matters required the unanimous support 
of member states). Later, the UK’s enthusiasm for market solutions 
allowed it to adopt a more positive approach to EU climate policy. 
In the wake of the failure of the fiscal option, the EU turned to the 
idea of emissions trading as a way of combating the use of fossil fuels 
and encouraging low carbon alternatives (an option the Commission 
had originally rejected). Since it had established a domestic system 
of emissions trading in 1999, the UK was broadly supportive of this 
new direction in EU climate policy (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2009; 
Wettestad 2005).
Developing a Community Competence 
in Energy
So far our discussion of the UK’s role in EU energy policy has focused 
on a variety of initiatives that were proposed by the Commission on 
the basis of a variety of treaty provisions. The relatively more success-
ful measures agreed in the last 20 years have been proposed under the 
legal bases covering the internal market (energy liberalization) or the 
environment (climate policy). Over the years there have been a num-
ber of attempts to develop a common energy policy or energy strategy 
which have sought to pursue and reconcile a variety of objectives (such 
as supply security, sustainability, and competitiveness) and render 
them into a coherent EU approach (McGowan 1990). Some advocates 
of a common energy policy, however, considered this approach to be 
too piecemeal and uncoordinated, arguing instead that a common 
and consistent response to the various energy challenges facing the EU 
required a dedicated treaty chapter. In the various Intergovernmental 
Conferences that were held over the 1990s, drafts of such a chapter 
were presented for consideration (European Commission 2000, 9; 
Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1994). Until 2004, however, they were 
abandoned because of a lack of consensus amongst member states. It 
is perhaps no surprise that the UK was a consistent skeptic on the need 
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for such provisions. In the negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty, for 
example, the British government noted that it “would prefer a more 
flexible arrangement and remains doubtful about the need for any 
formalized process” (Department of Trade and Industry 1997, 15) 
such as an explicit treaty provision on energy.
Yet in the negotiations that resulted in the European Constitutional 
Treaty (and which in this respect were largely carried over into the 
Reform—or “Lisbon”—Treaty), the member states agreed to the inclu-
sion of an energy chapter. Such a provision could have been vetoed 
by the British government but while it was under pressure to do so 
from some parts of the British energy industry (notably in the offshore 
oil and gas sector) it chose not to do so (Economist 2003; European 
Voice 2003). The government claimed that it had ensured that the 
treaty provisions were limited in their scope (House of Commons 
Library 2004). The government was initially keen to argue that its 
agreement to an energy chapter constituted a relatively modest con-
cession. However, it appeared to presage a more fundamental shift in 
the UK’s view of the value of and need for a common energy policy.
The shift in the UK’s stance was confirmed during its presidency 
of the European Council in 2005. Many issues contended for atten-
tion during the second Blair presidency (all the more important after 
its differences with other European powers during the Iraq war). As 
usual, the British government was keen to encourage other member 
states to embrace economic liberalization. Yet in the preparations for 
an informal summit (at Hampton Court) on economic reform (where 
the usual market nostrums would be repeated) the British also put 
forward a paper calling for greater attention to energy cooperation 
among member states. The paper—prepared by a British academic 
closely involved in the policy debate on British energy policy—identi-
fied a number of areas where European cooperation would be appro-
priate (notably on climate change and the development of energy 
networks and storage) (Helm 2005). Later the British government was 
to refer to the “Hampton Court Agenda” as reinforcing the case for a 
European energy policy as laid out in the Lisbon Treaty (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 2007, 3).
Blair’s advocacy of a European approach to energy policy was 
arguably an important contributory factor in reviving interest in 
energy policy. New Commission initiatives on energy policy had been 
expected but the British “u- turn” in favor of a collective response 
undoubtedly eased their progress. In any event, the case for such a 
response was reinforced within a matter of months when a dispute 
between Russia and Ukraine disrupted the flow of gas into some EU 
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member states. Coming at a time when concerns about the price and 
availability of energy were increasing, the dispute underpinned the 
case for a common response, enhancing the supply security rationale 
for such a policy (McGowan 2008).
The Commission’s proposals for climate and energy were developed 
over the course of 2006 and 2008—initial ideas were endorsed by the 
member states at their Spring Summit in 2007 and agreement was 
reached on the legislation in late 2008. In most respects the UK played 
a broadly positive role in the negotiations - a fact acknowledged by 
the Commission President in a tribute to Blair (Agence Europe 2007). 
Even on those aspects where the UK was skeptical—principally a pro-
posal to set binding targets for the development of renewable energy 
by 2020—it eventually acquiesced. Leaked government papers showed 
that officials were opposed to the setting of binding targets on the 
grounds that they would undermine the carbon price and blunt the 
effectiveness of carbon trading (and be very difficult for the UK to 
meet) (Guardian 2007). However, in the face of considerable criticism 
about plans to blunt the proposal, the British prime minister Gordon 
Brown reaffirmed the government’s commitment to the overall policy. 
Other aspects of the proposal—such as a scheme for trading renewable 
energy “certificates of obligation”—were backed by the government 
but had to be diluted in the face of the opposition of other member 
states (Nilsson et al. 2009; Toke 2008).3 Why did the government not 
pursue its preferences on these matters? It may have been that a com-
bination of bad publicity—for an ostensible supporter of renewable 
energy—and a possible defeat in any vote persuaded the government 
that it was not tenable either to oppose the principle of fixed targets or 
to insist on a comprehensive renewable trading system.
A bigger question, of course, is why the government embraced the 
principle of a broadly based—and binding—energy/climate policy. A 
number of factors may help us understand this change. One is the 
UK’s desire both to be seen as contributing to a coherent European 
policy in an area where it had highlighted the need for national action 
and contribution toward international cooperation. Another may 
have been that it realized that there were limits to existing policies 
and that supportive interventions were needed. However, while these 
factors may well have played a role, perhaps the most important fac-
tor was the change in UK’s energy circumstance. As it moved out of 
energy self- sufficiency it not only did not have a strategic advantage 
to defend but was also becoming more vulnerable to external disrup-
tions and therefore more amenable to collective actions which might 
limit such risks.
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Overall, the UK government appeared to recognize the value of an 
EU energy and climate policy. It shared and continued to push for mar-
ket liberalization and broadly endorsed the objectives and instruments 
for tackling climate change. Even in those areas where it considered 
that EU proposals would be difficult and expensive to implement (as 
in the legislation setting binding targets for renewable energy supply) it 
was ready to adapt British policy. However, there remain limits to this 
newfound willingness to cooperate. Over the last year the Commission 
and some member states have refloated the possibility of a carbon tax to 
discourage the consumption of fossil fuels in those areas not covered by 
the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). The British have been to the fore 
in opposing such a proposal on the grounds that it would impinge on 
member states’ fiscal sovereignty. Since such a measure would require 
unanimity in the Council, it appears that the Commission has post-
poned making a proposal in this area (EurActiv 2010).
It seems that the Coalition government is maintaining the broadly 
positive stance of its predecessor toward EU energy policy. There had 
been expectations that a Conservative government would be less will-
ing to cooperate with the EU. Relations with the EU had been a source 
of division for the party in the 1990s and 2000s, much as was the 
case for the Labour Party in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the issue 
appeared to have been resolved in favor of Euro- skeptics (Bale 2010). 
Even so, the Conservative leadership had indicated that in some areas 
cooperation in the EU was desirable and climate policy was one of 
those areas (MacKerron 2010). Once in power, the Coalition gov-
ernment seems to have adopted an apparently more positive line on 
the EU overall (Financial Times 2010; HM Government 2010), and 
this has been particularly apparent in the area of energy and climate 
policy. A notable development was the government’s willingness to 
endorse a call for tougher carbon reduction targets of 30 percent by 
2020 (Department of Energy and Climate Change 2010).
Conclusion
The UK’s Damascene conversion to EU energy policy in 2005 has been 
as much an outcome of national interests as was its preceding reluctance. 
When the UK enjoyed a favorable energy balance, it was unsurprisingly 
less keen on policies that would encroach upon its ability to determine 
its own policy and particularly the allocation of energy resources. As 
its energy dependence has re- emerged, it has become keener on coop-
erative strategies. The government has had its difficulties with key 
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elements of the policy—for example, the targets for renewable energy 
production—but, after an initially hostile position it seems to have 
acquiesced, accepting that the need for a strong political commitment 
to an EU- wide energy and climate policy takes priority over the details 
of how it should be implemented. However, while the first conversion 
may have eased the progress of EU energy policy, a second shock on the 
road to Damascus may prove rather problematic.
The same factors which endeared the British government to a more 
comprehensive EU energy policy have called into question the central 
plank of the UK’s approach for nearly three decades. In that period the 
combination of plentiful energy supplies at home and abroad (which in 
turn impacted upon energy prices and perceptions of energy security) 
coincided with the government’s pursuit of privatization and liberal-
ization to create a new market driven energy policy. More recently, 
however, the UK seems to be rowing back from its enthusiastic endorse-
ment of market based energy policy. The failure of the energy indus-
tries (particularly firms in the gas and electricity sectors) to invest in 
new capacity and the limited impact of carbon pricing as an incentive 
mechanism for producers and consumers seems to have prompted a 
rethink amongst those advising government and potentially those in 
government as well. Subsidies to foster new investment and a more 
interventionist role by government appear to be the order of the day. 
This shift in emphasis seems to be shared by the new government.
However, if the principal advocate of energy liberalization is back-
ing away from such an approach in its domestic dealings, what are 
the implications for EU policy as a whole? For the moment it appears 
that the Commission remains committed to a market- driven energy 
policy (Commission of the European Communities 2010). If such a 
policy fails to deliver the anticipated results, however, the balance 
of policy may be rethought. If the UK is less assertive of the primacy 
of markets and less defensive of national sovereignty on energy policy, 
such a rethink would be relatively easier to attain.
Notes
1. Establishing the original source for this statement appears beyond the 
search capacities of the web. However it has also been quoted—without 
attribution—in such sources as IEEP (2005).
2. The UK’s membership in 1973 followed more than a decade of attempts 
to join the Community. Most of these had foundered on the opposition 
of the then president of the French Republic—General Charles de Gaulle 
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and it was only after de Gaulle’s retirement that the prospects for British 
accession improved (Dinan 2004).
3. Advocates of trading in certificates claimed that such a system was market 
driven, cost effective, and compatible with the ETS. Critics argued that 
it would undermine those systems of support for renewable energy which 
had been most successful in promoting the technologies (Toke 2008).
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Chapter Ten
Rethinking European Climate 
Change Policy
Arno Behrens and Christian Egenhofer
European climate change policy has been designed to meet the 
requirements of a more efficient, greener, and more competitive 
economy. With domestic legislation in place comparatively early, 
the European Union (EU) has over several years assumed the role 
of a driving force behind international climate policies and nego-
tiations. However, this link between domestic action and interna-
tional leadership has recently been weakened. On the one hand, the 
economic crisis and related greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
have starkly reduced the ambitiousness of domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction targets and thus also their model character for 
other industrialized and emerging economies. On the other hand, 
the failure to reach a legally binding, comprehensive, and ambitious 
climate change agreement in Copenhagen has put into question the 
influence the EU can assert on the international level. EU climate 
change policy needs to react to these developments in order to pro-
vide incentives for low- carbon energy investments required to fight 
global warming and its predicted impacts on Europe and indeed the 
world.
This chapter first gives an overview about the possible impacts 
of climate change on Europe before describing the current state of 
climate change policy in the EU. More importantly, the chapter 
assesses options for the EU to react to recent developments related 
to the economic crisis and the failure of the Copenhagen climate 
change conference in 2009. A special focus is placed on transport 
and the urgent need to address growing greenhouse gas emissions 
from this sector by means of a comprehensive policy approach. 
To conclude, concrete policy recommendations are made for the 
required framework for the transition toward a low- carbon energy 
system.
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Impacts of Climate Change in Europe
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
there is persuasive evidence that most of the temperature rise that has 
occurred over the past 100 years is attributable to human activity and 
in particular the increasing level of global greenhouse gas emissions. 
With an average temperature increase of about 1 degree Celsius since 
preindustrial times (EEA 2008), Europe experienced a higher temper-
ature increase than the global average of about 0.74 degrees Celsius 
(IPCC 2007a). As greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
continue to increase, the potential impact of greenhouse gas emissions 
on people and ecosystems may prove to be significant. For the next 
two decades, the IPCC (2007b) projects a global average tempera-
ture rise of about 0.2 degrees Celsius per decade across a range of 
emission scenarios. Again, projections suggest higher temperatures 
in Europe than the global average (EEA 2008). The consequences of 
further temperature increases may be serious for humanity and other 
forms of life on earth.
The effects on Europe have—among others—been analyzed by the 
European Commission (2009a) and even under the assumption that 
mitigation will be substantial, temperatures in various regions are 
estimated to increase on average by over 4 degrees Celsius by the end 
of the century. The highest temperature increases are expected in the 
Mediterranean region in the baseline scenario without mitigation.
As to the impacts of increasing average temperature on Europe, 
a recent literature review by Behrens et al. (2010) found that direct 
losses from extreme weather events are projected to increase consider-
ably all over Europe.
Although there remains a lot of uncertainty about local and 
regional effects, it is clear that the repercussions will vary considerably 
across regions (see Table 10.1). Some effects could even benefit certain 
regions. Most of the positive impacts will be in northern Europe. This 
region could benefit from higher crop yields, an expansion of for-
est areas and enhanced forest- growth rates, an increasing number of 
tourist visits, and a net decrease in climate- related deaths.
While northern Europe will also have to bear some severe nega-
tive consequences (e.g. in the form of more frequent extreme weather 
events or coastal and river flooding), it is mainly the countries in the 
south, which are already economically disadvantaged, that will suffer 
most. Some of the most severe negative impacts in the Mediterranean 
include prolonged periods with temperatures above the comfort zone 
and the accompanying effects on human health and tourism, increasing 
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water scarcity, droughts, forest fires, desertification, decreasing agri-
cultural productivity, coastal flooding, and loss of biodiversity. One 
of the few positive outcomes will be the reduced likelihood of river 
flood disasters (which will be more frequent in central and Eastern 
Europe).
Impacts of climate change on Europe clearly show strong distri-
butional patterns. Similar to the global context, where poorer devel-
oping countries are expected to suffer most, it is the poor regions 
in Europe that will be affected most. Hence, climate change further 
compounds the difficulties of these countries in achieving a level of 
welfare equivalent to the EU average. At the same time, the cumula-
tive impacts of climate change on poorer countries will also affect 
northern European countries, as growing water scarcity and other 
repercussions in Mediterranean countries could pose social and secu-
rity challenges through increasing risks of conflicts and migration 
pressures. Fighting climate change through domestic and interna-
tional action is thus not only a matter of solidarity, but clearly in the 
self- interest of the EU and all of its member states.
The outlined future impacts of climate change on the EU are a use-
ful starting point for policy- makers when shaping effective adaptation 
Table 10.1  Simplified summary of climate change impacts in Europe and 
their intensity
Climate change Indicators Northern Europe
Central and 
Eastern Europe Mediterranean
Direct losses from weather 
disasters
M(– ) M(– ) H(– )
River flood disasters M(– ) H(– ) L(– )
Coastal flooding H(– ) M(– ) H(– )
Public water supply and 
drinking water
L(– ) L(– ) H(– )
Crop yields in agriculture H(+) M(– ) H(– )
Crop yields in forestry M(+) L(– ) H(– )
Energy for heating and 
cooling
M(+) L(+) M(– )
Hydropower and cooling 
for thermal plants
M(+) M(– ) H(– )
Tourism and recreation M(+) L(+) M(– )
Health L(– ) M(– ) H(– )
Source: Behrens et al., 2010.
Notes: H: High; M: Medium; L: Low; (+): Positive impact; (– ): Negative impact.
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(and mitigation) policies for Europe. Uncertainties, variability, and 
differences among estimates remain. Nevertheless, while the precise 
quantification of the economic consequences requires continuing 
research and may be impossible even at a later stage, the nature of 
the possible impacts and the geographical and sectoral differentia-
tion appear to be sufficiently clear at this stage. The magnitude of 
the effects depends on the global emissions pathways, but it has been 
possible to approximate it from existing global mitigation efforts and 
it can be adjusted as the effects evolve.
EU Strategies for Climate 
Change Policies
As early as 1996, the EU adopted a long- term target of limiting global 
temperature increase to a maximum of 2 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial levels. This was reiterated over the years, among others 
in the European Council of October 29/30, 2009 (Council of the 
European Union 2009). Limiting global warming to a maximum of 
2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels—a level below which EU 
policy- makers believe that irreversible ecological damages may still be 
 avoided—will require cuts in global emissions of at least 50 percent by 
2050 relative to 1990 levels. According to the European Commission 
(2009b)—making reference to the Fourth Assessment Report by 
the IPCC (IPCC 2007a)—this would require developed countries to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 25–40 percent by 2020 and 
80–95 percent by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. At the same time, 
developing countries would need to limit emissions growth to 15–30 
percent below baseline by 2020 (European Commission 2009b).
The EU’s position must be understood in the context of the mul-
tilateral climate change negotiations where the EU has traditionally 
played an important role. In the year 2001, the EU found itself cata-
pulted into leadership after United States (US) president George W. 
Bush declared that the US would not take part in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Active EU diplomacy ensured that Japan, Canada, and Russia rati-
fied the Protocol, which entered into force in 2005. To prepare for 
this, the EU has adopted numerous legal texts (directives, regulations, 
decisions, recommendations, and opinions; see Egenhofer et al. 2009) 
to fulfill its commitments. Among them have been policies to sup-
port renewable energy and to improve energy efficiency in buildings 
and transport. However, the centerpiece of EU climate change policy 
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has been the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which became 
operational in 2005. While these and other policies have focused 
on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol commitments, in par-
allel the EU has been developing a new strategy to meet mid- and 
longer- term climate change objectives. The EU had realized that—in 
the absence of US engagement—EU leadership was indispensible for 
reaching a global agreement on climate change. At the same time, this 
leadership position is regarded as an opportunity for shaping the new 
regime in line with the EU’s climate agenda. Other benefits include 
the reduction of energy import dependency and the possibility to gain 
leadership in low- carbon technologies.
The Energy and Climate Change 
Package
Although there have been several prior EU policy initiatives, the 
heart of its current greenhouse gas emissions reduction strategy is 
the energy and climate change package,1 which was formally adopted 
on April 6, 2009. This package intends to achieve the EU’s overall 
binding environmental targets, which were adopted by the European 
heads of state and government at their March 8–9, 2007 summit 
chaired by the German presidency (Council of the European Union 
2007). There, leaders committed themselves to unilaterally reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent by 2020 compared to 1990 
levels (up to 30 percent if other developed countries were to commit to 
comparable emissions reductions) and to increase the share of renew-
able energy in the EU’s total energy consumption to 20 percent. While 
these two targets are binding, they also set themselves a nonbinding 
energy efficiency goal of reducing primary energy consumption by 20 
percent by 2020 compared to projections.
The core elements of the energy and climate change package are 
the revised EU ETS,2 in combination with the so- called “effort-
 sharing” decision3 and the directive for the promotion of renewable 
energy sources.4 The revised ETS- Directive strengthens the ETS by 
setting the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 by 21 
percent below 2005 levels in the covered sectors (representing some 
40 percent of the EU’s total greenhouse gas emissions). Emissions 
reductions outside of the ETS sectors are covered by the effort- sharing 
decision, which requires non- ETS sectors (covering some 60 percent 
of EU greenhouse gas emissions) by 2020 to reduce their emissions 
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by 10 percent compared to 2005 levels. Efforts will be shared among 
member states according to the principles of solidarity and equity, 
resulting in different (binding) targets for different countries. Taken 
together, both pieces of legislation will result in greenhouse gas emis-
sions reductions of 14 percent compared to 2005, which is equivalent 
to a reduction of 20 percent compared to 1990.
The renewable energy directive,5 on the other hand, creates a com-
mon EU framework for the promotion of renewable energy sources, 
with the aim to increase the percentage share of energy from renew-
able sources in the EU’s final consumption of energy to 20 percent by 
2020 (up from some 8.5 percent in 2005) and to achieve a 10 percent 
share of energy from renewable sources in each member state’s trans-
port energy consumption. The directive sets for each member state 
a national target for the overall share of renewable energy in gross 
final energy consumption, taking into account differences in starting 
points between member states as well as equity and solidarity consid-
erations. Each member state will need to adopt a National Renewable 
Energy Action Plan, which was due to be notified to the European 
Commission (hereafter: the Commission) by June 2010. Although the 
directive provides for flexibility and cooperation mechanisms (e.g., 
statistical transfers between member states, joint projects with third 
countries, etc.), most national targets will be reached through domes-
tic action.6 The directive also establishes common rules related to the 
access of renewables to the electricity grid and includes sustainability 
criteria for biofuels and bioliquids to ensure that they can be counted 
as renewable energy for the purpose of this directive.
Such an integrated approach to energy and climate change issues 
was necessitated by various changing conditions faced by the EU. With 
dwindling domestic resources and increasing dependence on energy 
imports—to a large extent on Russia—the EU and its member states 
have been examining domestic and external policy options to move to 
a more sustainable and secure energy supply. This includes, amongst 
others, investment in renewable energy sources (for an assessment of 
the role of renewables for the security of European energy supplies, 
see Behrens 2010), pushing carbon capture and storage technology 
for fossil and other fuels and investment in nuclear energy in member 
states that wish to do so. To drive down costs for these technologies, 
there is a need for large- scale deployment. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA 2008) makes the case, for example, that renewables 
(except wind) experience significant capital cost reductions for each 
doubling of capacity, such as 15–20 percent for photovoltaics and 
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20 percent for solar water heaters. This justifies proactive support 
policies for low- carbon technologies.
To offset expected price rises both for industry and domestic con-
sumers, energy efficiency is a central piece, certainly for the transition 
period until new technologies and new fuels become available on a 
large scale. With increasing prices, reducing consumption gives a rea-
sonable prospect for keeping the energy bill constant. Energy efficiency 
is an important component of the Commission’s Second Strategic 
Energy Review—focusing on the security of European energy sup-
plies—which was tabled on November 13, 2008.7 Increasing energy 
efficiency is a strategic objective of the EU (20 percent by 2020) and 
related legislation has recently been strengthened or is under revi-
sion. For example, the recast of the Energy Labeling Directive entered 
into force in June 2010 and the recast of the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive in July 2010. Similarly, an evaluation of the 2006 
Energy Efficiency Action Plan is ongoing and expected to be com-
pleted in early 2011.
Unlike the greenhouse gas reduction target and the renewables 
target, however, there is no binding target on improving energy 
efficiency in the EU. Given the sluggish improvements of energy 
efficiency in member states, there seems to be increasing momen-
tum for the Commission to table a proposal for a binding 20 per-
cent target in the context of the upcoming new Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan. There is thus a chance that the currently indicative 
target of saving 20 percent of Europe’s energy consumption com-
pared to projections for 2020 could turn into a binding target in 
the future.
While the EU has started to address the climate change challenge 
with its energy and climate change package, it will require a global 
alliance to avoid dangerous climate change. Keeping in mind that the 
EU was only responsible for roughly 14 percent of global greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2007 (IEA, 2009a) and given that in the reference 
scenario, this share will decrease to around 9 percent until 2030 
(ibid.), the EU’s ability to have a direct effect on global greenhouse 
gas emissions is limited. This is well illustrated by the fact that EU 
cumulative CO2 savings between 2008 and 2020 (with a 20 percent 
CO2 emissions reduction target) would represent only 40 percent of 
China’s annual CO2 emissions in 2020. But even if all OECD coun-
tries were to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2030 
(which is highly unrealistic), non- OECD countries alone would exceed 
global emissions levels in line with the 2 degrees Celsius threshold 
(IEA 2009b). Effective international climate change cooperation thus 
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needs the involvement of developing countries, and especially of fast 
growing emerging economies.
The Failure at Copenhagen and its 
Implication for EU Climate Policy
The failure to reach a legally binding, comprehensive, and ambitious 
agreement in Copenhagen—in line with the 2 degrees Celcius tar-
get—has potentially severe consequences for EU climate change pol-
icy as well as for business. There is a risk that future EU policy may 
be stalled, reducing further the already low incentive for low- carbon 
investment (due to the economic crisis). In addition, it raises questions 
on the effectiveness of the EU’s international negotiations strategy 
and especially on how the EU can defend its interests.
Several options are currently being discussed on how the EU can 
retain the credibility of its climate change policies together with lead-
ership in international climate negotiations. One option could be to 
unilaterally increase the current 20 percent greenhouse gas emissions 
target to 30 percent as this might reinvigorate the EU leadership and 
infuse new dynamics into the global climate change discussion. In 
this way, the EU would document that it believes that a stringent 
unilateral target is in its self- interest, preparing the economy for the 
low- carbon future. While more affluent member states tend to be in 
favor of such a move, this would almost certainly trigger very difficult 
discussions on burden sharing, finance, and competitiveness. There is 
also a fear especially in those member states with a per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) below the EU average that due to their EU 
membership they are asked to reduce a multiple of what developing 
countries are asked to do. They are loath to contributing to large-
 scale finance transfers to developing countries, some of which are 
actually richer than them. And finally, an EU move to 30 percent 
would quickly erode the substantial excess allocation in the form of 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) under the Kyoto Protocol that these 
countries possess and are keen on selling internationally.
However, it should be noted that the recent financial crisis and the 
associated economic recession had a considerable impact on EU green-
house gas emissions and that the current EU 20 percent reduction tar-
get may be substantially easier to reach than was assumed before the 
crisis. By and large, a 30 percent reduction target post crisis appears 
to be roughly equal to the 20 percent reduction target precrisis in 
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terms of costs. Amann et al., (2009) for example, show that by 2020, 
EU greenhouse gas emissions could be almost 14 percent lower than 
was assumed precrisis (i.e., in 2008). Compared to 1990 emissions 
levels, this would mean a reduction of over 16 percent, which brings 
the EU relatively close to its target without further climate measures. 
An evaluation of the EU’s current ambitions, for example, by chang-
ing the base year for greenhouse gas emissions reductions from 1990 
to 2005, shows that the EU’s 20 percent target compares poorly 
with the ambitions of other industrialized countries including the US 
(Egenhofer 2010). The EU will thus need to consider how credible a 
target is that represents little of a constraint for another decade. From 
this perspective it is difficult to see how the EU can avoid moving—
relatively swiftly—to a 2020 target higher than the current 20 percent 
goal. This is in contrast to government’s reflexes to avoid additional 
burden in times of economic crisis.
A second and currently more plausible option is to target specific 
sectors with integrated policies such as transport (see below), build-
ings, or agriculture, or by making the energy efficiency target legally 
binding. The upcoming EU budget review offers an opportunity to 
make available EU budgetary resources to assist those member states 
with per capita GDPs below the EU average to accept to implement 
energy efficiency policies. Under either scenario there might be con-
tinuous calls for tightening the ETS cap, for example, by reducing 
offsets or even by adjusting the cap to ensure that the ETS delivers 
effectively. Incentives through price signals (in ETS sectors and by 
national carbon taxes) are seen as economically more efficient than 
regulation.
Regarding the international dimension of its climate policies, the 
EU’s soft approach is often criticized. Given that this approach has 
largely failed in Copenhagen, the issue of introducing a carbon border 
tax is gaining some momentum. Indeed, carbon border taxes are the 
only credible and realistic option the EU has to defend its interests. 
Currently such a move is still highly controversial not only between but 
also within member states and within the Commission not only because 
of potential implications for EU relations with China and India, the 
world trade regime and international relations, but also for European 
businesses operating internationally. However, from a purely economic 
perspective this would be a straightforward means of moving toward 
a global ‘shadow’ carbon price (see, for example, Gros and Egenhofer 
2010). Precondition would have to be a 30 percent reduction target or 
more, 100 percent auctioning of allowances under the EU ETS and a 
national or EU- wide carbon tax for the nontrading sector, not a likely 
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but a possible scenario. Importantly, the EU will need to take a posi-
tion, or otherwise delegate the outcome of this debate to the US.
There is also another option for the EU to pursue pricing of car-
bon on the global level. By scaling up and reforming existing flexible 
mechanisms such as the clean development mechanism (CDM) and 
by creating new ones that allow the establishment of a global carbon 
price, the EU could regain leadership on the international level. But 
this would require the cooperation of other countries, notably devel-
oping countries, which is currently rather unlikely.
Another option and what seems to be chosen by the EU is to slog 
on by attempting to integrate the achievements of the Copenhagen 
Accord into the two United Nations (UN) negotiation tracks and then 
hope to achieve a legally binding global agreement. This assumes that 
a legally binding, comprehensive, and ambitious agreement is within 
reach in South Africa 2011 and that the Copenhagen Accord, as 
a kind of bottom- up pledge and review system is only a historical 
blunder on the way to a truly global agreement worth its name. This 
assumes also that the world as a whole is ready to discuss and agree 
on a final carve up of the remaining global carbon budget. These are 
bold assumptions, especially in the light that China and India have 
shown little appetite for anything other than “extreme” unilateral 
actions. The Chinese negotiation position has been remarkably con-
sistent in rejecting any calls for legally binding commitments before 
(possibly) 2030 and China even has a major issue with international 
monitoring. In addition, the US continues to struggle even with a very 
modest domestic bill, let alone Australia or Canada.
This is where the EU’s domestic and international agendas come 
together again. Under the assumption that a legally binding, compre-
hensive, and ambitious agreement in South Africa is within reach, the 
EU strategy will need to focus on managing the transition from an 
EU perspective, that is, by reinforcing incentives toward low- carbon 
investment. If such an agreement is not within reach, the EU will need 
to reflect on some of the international issues presented above.
Focus: The Need for a “Transport and 
Climate Change Package”
The transport sector is not only vital for European integration; it 
also constitutes an important component of the European economy. 
The sector contributes some 7 percent of GDP and more than 5 per-
cent of total employment in the EU (European Commission 2009c). 
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Progressive European (market) integration, notably successive ways of 
enlargement have lead to a substantial increase in transport volumes 
in recent years. On average, passenger transport (pkm) increased by 
1.7 percent annually since 1995—mainly driven by air and road trans-
port, while freight transport (tkm) increased by 2.7 percent over the 
same period (ibid.)—mainly driven by road and sea transport. These 
developments have lead to an increasing recognition of the negative 
side effects of mass transport in Europe, including deterioration of 
infrastructure, land use issues, congestion, air and noise pollution, 
injuries and deaths, as well as substantial amounts of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The latter is of particular importance in the context of 
the EU’s global climate leadership. Failure to address greenhouse gas 
emissions in transport will not only jeopardize the achievement of 
recently adopted EU emissions reduction targets, it would also hinder 
the industrial transformation of the transport sector.
While greenhouse gas emissions decreased in all sectors of the 
European economy since 1990, transport was the only sector that 
experienced continuous growth in emissions, which increased by 
some 36 percent8 in the period between 1990 and 2007. As a result, 
the European transport sector is currently responsible for almost 
a quarter of all EU greenhouse gas emissions. The fastest growing 
modes of transport between 1990 and 2007 were civil aviation (+93 
percent) and navigation (+51 percent), while in absolute terms the 
largest increase was in road transport (+29 percent). Road transport 
continues to contribute the bulk (71 percent) to transport greenhouse 
gas emissions and is responsible for some 17 percent of total EU green-
house gas emissions (European Commission, 2010).
These figures clearly show that the transport sector will need to 
play a major role in the EU’s climate policy. In order to meet the 2 
degrees Celsius climate change target, by 2020 emissions from road 
transport need to decrease in absolute terms while increases in emis-
sions in the aviation and maritime modes need to be halted. In the 
longer term, that is, until 2050, emissions from the transport sector 
need to decrease by up to 80 percent in order to achieve the global 
emissions reduction targets. Achieving these objectives will require 
a dramatic shift in the way people travel and in the way we move 
goods.
Reducing transport emissions will have additional benefits in terms 
of security of energy supplies. The transport sector today depends on 
up to 97 percent on hydrocarbon fuels, and mainly on oil. Biofuels 
and other renewables will not be enough to address vulnerability. 
The overall EU transport demand is projected to increase to such an 
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extent (18 percent by 2020 according to the IEA) that the EU target 
of replacing 10 percent of transport fuel use with renewable energy 
sources—although creating an additional security margin—can only 
moderately reduce European dependence on oil. In a time where oil 
imports will continue to replace declining domestic oil production 
and import dependence will increase, a low- carbon transport strategy 
seems unavoidable.
There has been little progress in designing an integrated and 
strategic response to rising greenhouse gas emissions, security of 
energy supply issues and the transport sector’s innovation challenge. 
European transport policy to date has largely been aimed at increas-
ing efficiency, reducing costs, and increasing the speed of transport. 
But it has failed to take into account environmental considerations. 
The transport related elements of the energy and climate change pack-
age (including the “renewables directive,” the “clean cars directive,” 
and the “fuel quality directive”) represent a step in the right direction 
but fall significantly short of an integrated strategy that sketches out a 
pathway to a low- carbon transport sector. To do this, Europe needs a 
“transport and climate change package” comparable to the aforemen-
tioned energy and climate change package. This package must give 
answers to fundamental strategic questions about what a sustainable 
EU transport system should look like and how it can be achieved. It 
may include setting concrete (binding) targets for the decarbonization 
of the transport sector. In addition, it should comment on the cost-
 effectiveness of alternative low- carbon transport options with the aim 
of building political consensus for their implementation.
The transport and climate change package needs to review a num-
ber of policies at EU but also member- state level. The “polluter pays” 
principle will need to be applied across all modes of transport and 
will need to include responsibilities for greenhouse gas emissions. 
Pricing mechanisms need to reflect the true costs of transport. This 
also means that taxation will need to treat comparable fuels in a com-
parable way. The tax exemption of aviation fuels, in the fastest grow-
ing mode of transport, will thus need to be reconsidered. Another 
central policy area will be infrastructure. Upgraded and new trans-
port infrastructure will be required to master the transition to a low-
 carbon economy in much the same way as smart grids will become 
the backbone for the energy sector’s transition. In fact, road transport 
infrastructure and electricity grids will need to become more closely 
integrated because decarbonization of road transportation will not 
be possible without an increasing share of low- carbon electricity in 
transport. The decarbonization of the power sector and a strong 
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commitment for innovation in the car and related industries are thus 
prerequisites for decarbonization of road transport. Although it looks 
likely that future road transport will rely on electricity, this is not 
to say that other alternatives to conventional combustion engines 
(e.g., hydrogen) should not be looked at. The largest challenge for 
decarbonizing the transport sector will be in international aviation 
and maritime transport because of a lack of technological options 
in the near future. Biofuels could play an increasing role, together 
with energy efficiency measures and demand reductions. The EU will 
need to take leadership aimed at reaching international agreements 
for reducing emissions from aviation and shipping. In addition, the 
expansion of the high- speed train network may help in the substitu-
tion of air and road travel. Given that transport by rail is two to three 
times more energy efficient per metric ton of cargo than by road, the 
continuing decline of the rail freight market share will need to be 
addressed (especially in the new member states) to facilitate a shift 
toward multimodal transport.
R&D and technology will be at the heart of greening the transport 
sector. On the one hand, technologies will need to be tested. On the 
other, only deployment ensures decreasing costs. The new transport 
and climate package should thus introduce technology deployment 
targets, for example in the area of advanced car technologies. This 
could relate to the vehicles themselves (e.g., a certain share of the 
vehicle fleet needs to be carbon neutral), as well as to innovative infra-
structure projects (e.g., minimum requirements for electricity infra-
structure for cars). To stimulate technological innovation, a number 
of demonstration or ‘flagship’ projects may be considered, aimed at 
using state- of- the- art technologies, including advanced telematics 
technology in urban transport to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and other harmful environmental effects, to reduce congestions, to 
increase efficiency and generally to increase competitiveness. Such 
systems can now be based on the GALILEO global navigation sat-
ellite system. Mandatory large- scale demonstration projects can be 
justified because they play an important role in bringing down costs 
of the equipment.
The contributions from technology should be complemented by 
those from other stakeholders, including users, government, and 
associated industries. Technology alone will not be enough to bring 
down emissions and demand side management, including infrastruc-
ture pricing, will also need to be given consideration in the proposed 
transport and climate package. Internalizing the full environmental 
and social costs according to the polluter pays principle together with 
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better data and information will be crucial in influencing consumer’s 
behavior.
Similarly, efficiency standards should be the backbone of any sen-
sible climate change policy. Fuel efficiency standards have been intro-
duced for cars with the revised fuel quality directive in the context of 
the energy and climate change package. These should be extended to 
vans and trucks. Standards for aviation and shipping should also be 
taken into consideration.
The transition toward a low- carbon EU transport system is a 
European task. Despite the fact that transport policy is still largely 
determined by national and commercial interests rather than European 
considerations, one or several member states alone will not be able to 
achieve this transition on their own. Greening the transport sector 
will require an integrated approach from all stakeholders, including 
the automotive industry, the fuel industry, different governmental 
institutions, and consumers. Europe will need to develop the most 
viable pathways toward decarbonizing the transport sector in differ-
ent modes and to come up with cost- effective, incremental solutions 
to achieve this vision.
Policy Conclusions
With almost 80 percent of the European energy mix based on fossil 
fuels in 2007 (European Commission 2010), Europe’s energy systems 
are still far from sustainable levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Given 
the substantial emissions reductions that will need to be achieved 
by 2050 in order to stay below the 2 degrees Celsius threshold, the 
strategic decisions of the coming years will be decisive. With its ETS 
strengthened through the adoption of the energy and climate change 
package, the EU has attempted to start addressing the issue of cli-
mate change domestically. Internationally, the EU continues to push 
for a legally binding global agreement for the post- 2012 period. This 
reflects the fact that Europe’s transition toward a low- carbon energy 
system will be greatly facilitated in the context of global greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions.
Domestically, the EU will need to do more to speed up this transi-
tion. The financial and economic crises have substantially reduced 
the ambitiousness of the EU emissions reduction target (−20 percent 
by 2020 compared to 1990) by leading to accumulated output losses 
that will impact greenhouse gas emissions in 2020. The 20 percent 
EU target is thus already within easy reach even without much further 
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action. Although more robust figures are currently being gathered, it 
can be said that the equivalent of a 20 percent reduction effort precri-
sis is close to a 30 percent reduction target postcrisis. In addition, it 
is not credible that anything less than a EU 30 percent reduction tar-
get (or possibly even more) by 2020 can realistically keep the option 
open to reach the envisaged 80–95 percent reduction for industrial-
ized countries by 2050 (as reaffirmed by the European Council, for 
example, in October 2009).
While an increase of the greenhouse gas reduction target to - 30 per-
cent may prove politically difficult in the current economic situation, 
other alternatives may be more plausible. Targeting specific sectors 
such as transport, buildings or agriculture with integrated policies 
could be a politically more realistic strategy to tighten EU climate 
change policy. Similarly, it should be considered to make the energy 
efficiency target legally binding and to tighten the ETS cap in order to 
ensure that EU climate change policy sets the right incentives for low-
 carbon energy investments. However, there is a risk that governments 
in the end might take the easy way out, that is, by favoring policies 
to postpone action in the hope that new back- stop technologies such 
as carbon capture and storage or new nuclear will become available, 
which will reduce costs for climate change mitigation. Relying pri-
marily on such a technology push is a convenient short- term strategy 
but will ultimately increase costs and the risk that Europe could fail to 
achieve broad- based incremental technology improvement.
The EU’s leading role in combating climate change and in increas-
ing energy efficiency offers opportunities for a worldwide advance in 
related technologies and patents, and for new domains of excellence 
and export worldwide. The European Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan (SET- Plan) is a step in the right direction aimed at boosting a 
clean technology sector currently characterized by high costs, market 
barriers, and underinvestment. However, various challenges still need 
to be solved. One of them is the level of financing. With substantial 
EU funding required for a low- carbon future in Europe, the budget 
review in 2011 is a unique chance to reallocate funding toward SET-
 Technologies. To take into account the technology specialization of 
member states/regions and thus to increase efficiency, it should be 
considered to create clusters of EU member states for each European 
Industry Initiative. But EU support will not be enough, and member 
states will need to contribute substantial amounts of public money to 
SET- Plan funding.
The EU technology policy is emerging only very gradually. To date, 
the EU’s contribution typically is low —focusing on EU added value, 
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and dwarfed by member- states’ payments. Similar but longer- term and 
greatly scaled up programs are most likely needed also for other low-
 carbon technologies, for example, in the European transport sector. In 
addition, a principal EU role is to ensure better coordination of indus-
try and member states’ R&D programs and dissemination of results. 
The SET- Plan aims at facilitating these coordination efforts. Another 
effective means to support industry R&D has been EU support for 
industry commitments such as industry technology platforms.
Finally, there is a clear case for aligning transport and energy poli-
cies. Clean power will be a prerequisite for a low- carbon transport 
system. However, due to the slow pace of change based on major 
infrastructure investment, “decarbonizing the energy sector needs to 
be even higher on the agenda than the development of low- carbon 
vehicle technologies” (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
2009).
Notes
1. The energy and climate change package contains six elements: The renew-
able energy directive, a directive improving and extending the EU ETS, 
an effort- sharing decision covering greenhouse gas emissions outside of 
the EU ETS, a regulation on reduced CO2 emissions from cars, a revised 
fuel quality directive, and a directive setting up an EU- wide regulatory 
framework for CCS.
2. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of April 23, 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and 
extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community.
3. Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of April 23, 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their green-
house gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission 
reduction commitments up to 2020.
4. Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of April 23, 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC 
and 2003/30/EC.
5. Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of April 23, 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC 
and 2003/30/EC.
6. European Commission, Summary of the Member State Forecast 
Documents (Brussels: European Commission, 2010).
7. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
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Committee of the Regions, Second Strategic Energy Review: An EU 
Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan.
8. All figures include international bunkers, that is international traffic 
departing from the EU.
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Chapter Eleven
The Role of EU Institutions in Energy 
Policy Formation
Vicki L. Birchfield
A basic puzzle underlying any effort to understand energy policy for-
mation within a complex transnational decision making arena like 
the European Union (EU), where both national and supranational 
level interests are simultaneously represented and preferences contin-
uously negotiated, is why there is any semblance of a common energy 
policy in the first place. Such an achievement, albeit limited and frag-
mented in its current state, is quite remarkable given the sheer com-
plexity of the energy sector, the range of import dependencies, and 
the varying energy mixes among the 27 member states. Coupled with 
these challenges is the multiplicity of crosscutting pressures inherent 
in the EU’s three- pronged policy objectives of energy security, eco-
nomic competitiveness, and environmental sustainability. As the pre-
ceding chapter highlighted, problems emerging from environmental 
degradation, rapidly diminishing resources, and the increasing reli-
ance on energy imports have necessitated the development of a more 
integrated approach to energy and climate change and the move to a 
more sustainable and secure energy supply. Despite the fact that large 
majorities of European citizens embrace the goals of environmental 
sustainability and show strong support for EU and domestic efforts 
to combat climate change, there nonetheless remains a complex array 
of core and often competing national interests that would seem to 
bedevil a more comprehensive, transnational approach to energy 
policy. How have EU level institutions and supranational processes 
operated thus far to transform such national and intergovernmental 
barriers to a common energy policy?
Although many of the contributing chapters to this volume have 
demonstrated how the complex and varied dimensions of a common 
European energy policy are being negotiated in less than coherent 
ways due to the influence of narrow interests of industry lobbies 
and the competing agendas of various member states, less attention 
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has been paid to the nature and role of the specific EU institutions 
and the actual processes of policy formation at the community level. 
Therefore, this chapter offers an analysis of the policy- making pro-
cess within the EU institutional landscape with a goal of teasing out 
how each of the core EU institutions contributes to energy policy for-
mation and its relative coherence (or lack thereof), given the varying 
degrees of competence and authority possessed by each institution, 
the interinstitutional rivalry inherent in the EU policy process, and 
the elements of both intergovernmentalism and supranationalism 
that characterize how European energy policy is being shaped at this 
stage. Each of these three factors will be addressed here as we seek to 
understand the prospects for a common energy policy in this new era 
of EU institutional development under the Treaty of Lisbon.
The chapter is organized into three sections. The next sec-
tion “Theoretical and Conceptual Models for Understanding EU 
Institutions and the Policy- Making Process” provides an overview 
of the most prevalent conceptual or theoretical frameworks that are 
typically employed to explain policy outcomes in the EU context and 
argues that the multilevel governance approach is the most useful 
and analytically appropriate for our examination of energy policy 
and the role of EU institutions in its formulation thus far. Following 
this discussion, the second section “The Role of EU Actors and Inter-
 Institutional Rivalry and Coordination in Shaping Energy Policy 
Development” employs the multilevel governance framework to trace 
key policy developments in recent years and to analyze the role and 
specific actions of each institution therein. Whereas many of the pre-
ceding chapters in this volume have highlighted the various tensions 
between the European Commission’s (hereafter: the Commission) 
approach vis- à- vis the Council and member states, very little attention 
has been paid to the third actor in the EU institutional triangle, the 
European Parliament. Therefore, more effort is made here to elucidate 
the role of the Parliament in advancing EU energy policy through its 
various responses to the key actions and proposed legislation of the 
Commission as well as its interaction with the other decision mak-
ing body, the Council of the European Union (formerly known as 
the Council of Ministers in the pre- Lisbon period). Addressing the 
fundamental questions at the heart of this book, the final section of 
the chapter “EU Institutional Interactionand Impact in the Formation 
of the EU Energy Policy” attempts to answer to what extent the EU’s 
institutional actors can lay some claim to the success and progress 
made so far in the effort to formulate a common and more comprehen-
sive energy policy and to identify the major obstacles and institutional 
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barriers that might impede further movement toward a truly common 
EU energy policy.
Theoretical and Conceptual Models for 
Understanding EU Institutions and the 
Policy- Making Process
The scholarly literature on the EU has evolved significantly since 
the early days of the functionalist/neofunctionalist debates when 
European integration was almost exclusively studied from the lens and 
theories of International Relations. As the Union itself has developed 
politically and institutionally over the course of more than half a cen-
tury, the concepts and analytical tools of Comparative Politics have 
been increasingly applied to understand and explain decision making 
processes and policy outcomes in the EU setting. Since its inception, 
the EU1 has had the institutional characteristics of a domestic politi-
cal system, that is, legislative, executive, and judicial organs, and as 
Simon Hix (1994, 1999) argued, has by now acquired most of the 
policy- making attributes possessed by national governments. In fact, 
he suggests that approximately 80 percent of the laws and rules gov-
erning the flow of goods, services, and capital in the member states 
now emanates from the European level (Hix 1999, 3). Whether or not 
the EU functions like a state or is rather a sui generis political entity 
is a central question that continues to drive a great deal of theoretical 
and methodological debate, but perhaps the more contentious division 
is between state- centric and nonstate- centric approaches to under-
standing European integration. The former largely rejects suprana-
tionalist or federalist perspectives or interpretations of developments 
in EU history and generally draws insights from realist theories of 
international relations to explain those developments as products of 
interstate bargaining and compromises reached through intergovern-
mental negotiations. Moravcsik’s seminal text The Choice for Europe 
(1998) is perhaps the defining work of this approach and the central 
tenet articulated therein is (unsurprisingly) that European integra-
tion can be best understood “as a series of rational choices made by 
national leaders” (1998, 18).
In contrast, those applying nonstate- centric approaches are much 
more willing to acknowledge the autonomy of action and power of 
supranational institutions and elites. These approaches can be loosely 
seen as descendants of the neofunctionalist school whose founding 
text was Haas’s 1958 classic, The Uniting of Europe, wherein the 
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critical concept of political spillover was elaborated. Political spill-
over refers to the gradual convergence of interests and beliefs of 
national elites in response to the integration process. Haas asserted 
that: “Political integration is the process whereby political actors in 
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyal-
ties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre- existing 
national states” (1958, 16). In no way discounting the role of member 
states and their elites in the integration process, there is, nonethe-
less, recognition that the supranational institutions and the leaders 
within them are independent actors in their own right. Thus, this 
phenomenon of supranationalism—community level actors, ideas, 
and interests—could be seen as the primary object of inquiry and 
locus of analysis of those working in the nonstate- centric tradition. 
One such example is the Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) analysis of 
the instrumental role the Commission played under the leadership 
of its president, Jacques Delors, in revitalizing the European project 
and relaunching political integration through its introduction of the 
Single European Act in 1986. In their study, the authors asserted the 
notion of policy entrepreneurship to describe the leadership initia-
tive taken by the Commission to galvanize national governments and 
enlist industry support for achieving a unified internal market. As 
others have noted and the authors readily acknowledge, their argu-
ment was reminiscent of Haas’s depiction of institutions as “agents 
of integration” (1958, 29).
Understanding the functions of the EU institutions and how they 
shape policy development is therefore directly linked to the larger 
interest in or broader goal of explaining integration and how policy 
formation can be seen as a key variable in that enterprise. As such is 
the primary objective of this chapter, it is important to bring these 
theoretical debates into focus and particularly to underscore how 
scholarship seems to have moved beyond the facile intergovernmen-
talist versus supranationalist debates. Sandholtz in particular rejected 
the dichotomy between what he referred to as the intergovernmen-
talist and institutionalist approaches recognizing that some decisions 
are made within intergovernmental institutions and therefore require 
analysis of intergovernmental bargaining, but he also emphasized 
that the formation of government preferences are “themselves influ-
enced by EC institutions and law” (1993, 3). This more symbiotic 
perspective was further developed by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet in 
European Integration and Supranational Governance (1998) where 
the authors sought to explain why lawmaking competences tended to 
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migrate from the national to the EU level more rapidly in some policy 
domains than in others. Their question bears directly on our attempt 
in this volume to understand the emergence of and the prospects 
for continued and deeper development of a common energy policy. 
They argued that increasing cross- national exchanges would encour-
age public authorities to develop modes of supranational governance 
undermining and making national modes of governance more costly 
to maintain. Thus, once these supranational rules were in place and 
new policy spaces created, institutions and EU organizations would 
structure further expansion of cross- border exchanges, transnational 
policy networks and the EU’s authority to govern. The authors called 
this process one of “institutionalization” and further argued that it is 
this dynamic that has essentially transformed the integration process, 
shifting it away from negative integration that focuses on eliminating 
national barriers to exchange to one of positive integration of forg-
ing common European policies that now extend beyond agriculture, 
trade, and monetary policy to include areas such as environmental 
protection, consumer health and safety, gender equity, foreign policy, 
and justice and home affairs, and so on.
Included in these institutionalist approaches are also scholars who 
have applied the insights of historical institutionalism to the study 
of the EU, arguing that while national governments are key actors 
responsible for making most EU decisions, the rationale and motiva-
tions for their decisions and preferences are shaped by the history of 
their past involvement in the EU (“path dependency”). These scholars 
also refuse to treat EU- level institutions as black boxes or mere arenas 
within which interstate bargaining takes place and view institutions 
as shapers of values and norms.2 Mirroring broader debates in inter-
national relations and comparative politics, constructivist approaches 
are also on the rise in EU studies.3 Sharing with historical institu-
tionalists the notion that ideas and identities matter, constructivists 
explore how integration processes are transforming the nature of the 
state system and the political, social, and cultural identities therein. 
While important, such approaches are not as relevant for understand-
ing why and how certain policies evolve upward to the EU level and 
what specific roles are played by the EU institutions in creating and 
sustaining that legal and policy migration.
The framework that seems best suited for that task and the aims 
of this project is what may be broadly referred to as the governance 
approach. This growing literature examines the functioning of the 
EU as a system of governance and emphasizes not only the process of 
institutional change but also the day to day functioning of the EU as 
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a normal polity. There is a plethora of studies employing some form 
of governance approach4 but one of the earliest and most influential 
is the multilevel governance approach formulated by Marks (1992) 
and Hooghe and Marks (2001). Their approach emphasizes the open-
 ended nature of the EU system within which a diverse range of actors 
operates at different levels from the local to the international where 
all have the potential to wield influence.
Theories of multilevel governance attempt to go beyond tradi-
tional analyses, which focus on competing national and EU level 
interests. Rather, multilevel governance scholars insist that EU policy 
is shaped by cross- national and cross- institutional actors/ alliances 
that work together toward common objectives in issue areas and 
reflect a “melding” of states “into a multi- level polity” (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001, 27). As Warleigh has pointed out, new theories 
and approaches to studying the EU must “address what appears to 
be a rather different world of policymaking, in which not only the 
range of actors involved, but also the very ways they produce pol-
icy, have changed. This shift is often thought of as one from “gov-
ernment” to “governance . . .” (2006, 78). Interestingly Warleigh 
advocates combining multilevel governance with concepts of policy 
networks, which he says can be either policy communities or issue 
networks. He argues that taken separately each approach can eluci-
date only so much about the nature of the EU polity or the process 
of decision making but employed together we can understand both 
issues. However, alone the policy- based literature and related con-
cepts seem analytically inadequate to fully explain why new policy 
formation such as that of the energy field is emerging in the first 
place. Ironically, as Richardson points out, policy communities and 
network analysis are the dominant models for explaining EU policy 
making despite the fact that most radical policy changes did not 
emanate from either but rather in response to exogenous changes 
(see Richardson 2001, 12). Indeed, as Jean Monnet famously opined, 
“Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions 
adopted for those crises.” One way of interpreting the recent flurry 
of activity and attempts to formulate a common energy policy in 
Europe could in fact be related to the threat of an already real and 
looming crisis over energy security problems as well as the grow-
ing evidence of global warming. Such conjecture would not give us 
much analytical purchase here, but the crisis thesis will be revisited 
in the concluding chapter.
Ironically, one of the limitations of the purely policy oriented stud-
ies includes the failure of describing the actual workings of the EU 
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institutions. In addressing this problem, Richardson explores the rela-
tionship between epistemic communities and EU institutions and the 
influence that knowledge- based communities can wield in the policy-
 making process. The role of epistemic communities, which are in fact 
a variant of a policy network, is certainly critical in shaping EU energy 
and environmental policy, yet applying this conceptual framework 
only brings in a single dimension of the policy process—the initial 
phases of discerning the technical nature of problems and how they 
contribute to policy formation. For example, the Commission often 
convenes panels of experts to study problems and produce reports 
that subsequently form the basis of a policy initiative.5 Certainly these 
approaches are superior to the “garbage can” model where analysts 
assert that “decision situations” arise under three conditions: prob-
lematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. Here 
the key decision making organization is viewed as “a collection of 
choices looking for problems, issues, and feelings looking for deci-
sion situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for 
issues to which they might be the answer, and decision- makers look-
ing for work.” (Cohen, et al. 1972, 2) This is a much less structured 
approach to describing the policy- making process, and therefore has 
been employed to analyze the EU policy- making process, but it tends 
to imply that policy agendas are somewhat random, which is certainly 
not reflective of what has transpired in the 2000s with regard to EU- 
level energy policy innovation.
Likewise, the “Policy Soup” approach (Kingdon 1984) argues 
that policy agendas emerge out of a process stream of problems, 
policies, and politics, which converge at certain opportune “policy 
windows” to allow for policy formation, depending on compelling 
outside circumstances. Again, the vagueness and lack of analytical 
focus on nonstate oriented institutional actors like the Commission 
and the European Parliament render this policy approach ineffective 
and largely inapplicable to the analysis of EU energy policy forma-
tion. Finally, Richardson’s work on policy making in the EU traces 
how game theorists have attempted to explain EU policy formation 
through rational choice models. However, there are many critiques 
of this approach (Busch 1999, Hechter 1990, Garrett and Weingast 
1993, Sabatier 1988), particularly given the repeated social interac-
tions within the EU, the ideational factors around which actors may 
converge, and shared normative beliefs, all of which can significantly 
influence cooperative efforts. Thus it appears that the frameworks 
conventionally employed to understand EU policymaking too often 
offer only partial explanations and are inadequate to the deeper 
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aim of understanding how the institutional architecture within the 
EU fundamentally shapes the process. Instead, many studies are 
now combining various polity- and policy- oriented explanatory 
frameworks in efforts to more fully understand EU policy- making. 
Notable among these are the combination of multilevel governance 
and policy network theory as advocated by Warleigh (2006) and 
Bache (2008). Per Ove Eikeland (2010) employs this synthetic 
approach to powerful effect in a recent analysis of the EU’s third 
internal energy market package. As he frames it: “The suprana-
tionalist perspective inspires our long- term analysis of the power of 
EU institutions vis- à- vis member- state governments, while a policy 
network perspective underlies our analysis of influence by nonstate 
agents on the Commission proposal” (2010, 3). It is interesting to 
note that while only attempting to explain a single dimension of 
EU energy policy—efficiency and competitiveness elements con-
cerned with creating free and fair internal energy markets—there 
was nonetheless a need to utilize a more complex analytical appa-
ratus. Specifically, what Eikeland sought to explain were the logic 
behind and the implications of the Commission proposals in the 
2007 package, which included revised electricity and gas directives 
as well as new regulations of access conditions for electricity and 
gas networks, the establishment of a new EU- level energy regula-
tory agency, and last but not least, the highly contested mandatory 
ownership unbundling proposal.
Eikeland’s study powerfully illustrates the crosscutting and com-
plex nature of EU energy policy formation. As the author notes, even 
within this singular focus on the internal market and the economic 
efficiency drive, strong degrees of “high politics” are present due to 
the role of energy supply as a strategic security asset. Furthermore, 
strong control traditionally exercised by national governments, and 
even by some sub- state levels of political administration, would lead 
one to predict member- state government reluctance to yield control 
in favour of the EU level. On the other hand, the decision to include 
energy in the single market policy framework back in the 1990s had 
already created the potential for EU institutions to play a greater 
role in energy policy, which incidentally validates the insights and 
arguments made by historical institutionalists. In trying to answer 
whether or not the Commission through its third internal energy 
market package exerted more independence and ability to influence 
member states than had previously been the case, Eikeland’s analysis 
also brought into focus the roles of the other institutions such as 
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the Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as well as 
the critical role of industry- related policy networks. While the study 
answered this affirmatively with solid empirical evidence, it was also 
concluded that the various coordination linkages between the EU 
institutions and external policy actors are far from approximating a 
strong policy community. As the author sums up: “With the tradi-
tionally strong policy network between the Commission and energy 
producers now appearing weaker than before, the larger picture to 
emerge from this study is clearly in line with Richardson (2000, 
1008): policy networks in Europe have become less stable and more 
issue- specific, making policy predictions less certain than before” 
(Eikeland 2010, 14).
Thus, if the energy policy networks are too disparate to system-
atically impact the policy process even within a narrow domain, it 
is not necessary or appropriate to integrate such concepts here for 
this broader level of analysis. Nonetheless, this lengthy digression on 
Eikeland’s study serves to accentuate the tensions and complexities 
involved even when isolating the analysis to one single dimension of 
EU energy policy. Although this chapter is concerned with more fully 
exposing the policy- making process, the primary aim is to discern the 
scope of action of the EU institutions in energy policy formation, and 
therefore the more general theoretical framework of multilevel gover-
nance seems better equipped to this descriptive and analytic task.
The multilevel governance approach does not deny that the state is 
an important feature in decision making (perhaps even the most impor-
tant), but asserts that the EU represents a new type of polity where 
the state no longer monopolizes European- level policy making or, for 
that matter, even the aggregation of domestic policy interest. A second 
and related assumption is that decision making at this level necessarily 
results in some loss of control at the national level. A final claim of the 
approach is that subnational actors do not necessarily operate within 
one national arena, but rather can create transnational associations. 
In summing up their approach, the authors insist that, “supranational 
institutions . . . have independent influence in policy making that cannot 
be derived from their role as agents of national executives . . . . National 
governments play an important role but, according to the multilevel 
governance model, one must analyze the independent role of European-
 level actors to explain European policy making.” (Hooghe and Marks 
2001, 3) Invoking the analytical concepts and theoretical assumptions 
of the multilevel governance framework, the independent role of EU 
institutions in energy policy formation will now be assessed.
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The Role of EU Actors and Inter-
 Institutional Rivalry and Coordination 
in Shaping Energy Policy Development
As is well understood by students of EU politics, three actors form 
what is known as the “institutional triangle” in the European Union 
(See Egenhofer et al. 2008). These core institutions are the European 
Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. 
Although the ECJ is a critical institution that undeniably shapes inte-
gration through its rulings and is perhaps the most supranational of 
all the EU institutions, it does not form part of the policy- making 
triangle per se and thus will not be considered here. The core com-
petence and authority of each of institution have been defined and 
transformed through the treaties with the most noteworthy changes 
being the ever expanding role of the parliament from an appointed 
and relatively powerless assembly in the first decades of its existence 
(1950s to the 1970s) to a directly elected body in 1979 and now a 
nearly equal co- legislative partner with the Council resulting from 
changes brought forth in the Single European Act (1986), Maastricht 
(1993), Amsterdam (1999), and Lisbon (2009) treaties. The Council, 
long considered the main decision making body and the chief mech-
anism of representing the member states, has also been somewhat 
transformed through the sheer expansion of the member states (from 
6 at its founding to 27 today) and the accompanying changes in its 
voting procedures—namely the shift toward more qualified majority 
voting thereby making this most intergovernmental of the institutions 
slightly less so with the national veto possibilities significantly cur-
tailed. Still, the Council undoubtedly remains the champion of the 
member states’ interests and the least supranationalist of the institu-
tional actors. The Commission, since its origins with the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) High Authority, continues to play 
the dominant and indeed monopoly role in policy initiation and such 
has been the case with recent innovations in energy policy and, as 
will be emphasized below, the Lisbon Treaty further enhances this 
capacity.
Though a full- scale textbook explanation of the powers and func-
tions of these institutions is beyond the scope of this chapter,6 it is 
necessary to sketch out the conventional trajectory of policy for-
mulation in the EU context to better understand the critical role of 
each institution in shaping EU energy policy thus far. In its role as 
the executive body and its sole authority to propose legislation, the 
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Commission will be briefly analyzed first followed by a short discus-
sion of the Council, and a fuller description of the role and newly 
expanded powers of the Parliament. Once these roles, functions and 
internal organizations are clearly understood, we can more readily 
trace specific examples of individual action of these key institutions as 
well as their relative degree of coordination in shaping energy policy 
formation. The multilevel governance framework specifies four dis-
tinct, sequential phases of the policy- making process in the European 
Union: (1) policy initiation; (2) decision making; (3) implementation; 
and (4) adjudication (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 12). For our purposes, 
only the first two will be considered as the implementation phase is 
nascent at best for most aspects of energy policy and the Court is not 
a part of our present analysis.
The Commission
Hooghe and Marks refer to the Commission as the “conditional agenda 
setter” in its power to initiate and draft legislation (2001, 12). As such 
it has been one of the most powerful institutions in shaping the evolu-
tion of integration, but it is also quite restrained in its financial and 
administrative resources. The Commission is led by a president, a set 
of vice presidents, and a College of Commissioners divided into vari-
ous functional units and policy portfolios at the ministerial level with 
the total number comprising 27—one representative from each of the 
member states. The corresponding Directorates- General (DGs) are 
predominantly sectoral in nature and generally provide technical and 
administrative support for each of the policy sectors. Approximately 
23,000 officials comprise the bureaucracy or administrative services 
making this the largest institution, yet its expenditures represent a 
mere 5 percent of the total EU budget. With this in mind it is quite 
remarkable that the Commission has operated as effectively as it has, 
particularly as its policy remit has expanded dramatically from a few 
limited fields to now include almost every policy sector imaginable. 
Part of this stems from the character of the Commission as a collegial 
body. There are elaborate mechanisms to ensure this principle of col-
legiality, with the real key to this being the Secretariat- General (SG). 
The SG serves as a sort of clearing house and a nerve center as it mon-
itors legislation, chairs meetings of the DGs and generally facilitates 
the horizontal coordination of the Commission. This is a crucial ele-
ment in policy fields like energy and the environment where crosscut-
ting issues involve multiple DGs in the drafting of policy proposals. 
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Also, it should be noted that Commission decisions are collectively 
taken by simple majority, and once a common Commission policy 
has been articulated and approved, all of the Commissioners must 
support that policy even it is not a part of their own portfolio and, of 
course, even if their own national government opposes it. In the con-
text of formulating policy initiatives, many of the Commission’s core 
competences derive from its role in the regulation of the internal mar-
ket, but as Andersen (2000) has illustrated, the Commission has been 
effective in exploiting institutional rules to redefine the energy sector 
to the environment and foreign policy areas as well. DG Tranport and 
Energy (DG TREN) has taken the lead in drafting actual legislation 
that has been the bulk of analysis in this volume but the environment, 
enterprise, competition, and in some instances two or three other 
DGs have all followed the dossiers very closely. In fact, as we will see 
below, the Commission has recently and quite aggressively invoked 
its authority in the external dimension of energy policy, by directly 
addressing the security of supply issue and putting concrete strategies 
and a proposed new organization into place to ensure diversification 
and to coordinate energy supply. This aspect of energy policy has, of 
course, historically been the jealously guarded prerogative of member 
states, so if this policy direction progresses, it is a clear validation 
of the multilevel governance assertion that national governments are 
indeed increasingly losing traditional decision making authority. To 
further illustrate the crosscutting nature of the energy sector just in 
terms of the Commission’s authority, whereas DG TREN and others 
have actually crafted the legislation, DG Competition intervenes in 
the implementation phase when member states have not fully trans-
posed internal energy market rules or implemented other energy regu-
lations (van Shaik 2006, 181).
The Council of the European Union
Until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council was always 
characterized as the main decision making body of the Union but 
as previously mentioned, the Parliament has now become a verita-
ble co- legislator. The Council is an interesting institution in that it 
is composed of both permanent representation from each member 
state, the Coreper I and II, as well as the important (non- permanent) 
ministerial formations that are convened in semi- regular sessions 
with the delegated Ministers coming from national capitals in order 
to deliberate and take decisions on legislative proposals from the 
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European Commission or amendments proposed by the Parliament. 
These meetings of national ministers take place in the composition 
of different sectoral Councils, the two most politically significant 
ones being the General Affairs comprised of foreign ministers and the 
ECOFIN Council composed of national economics and finance min-
isters, both of which incidentally, have some aspects of energy issues 
on their agendas. In the context of formal energy policy proposals, 
the leading Council formation is the Transport, Telecommunications 
and Energy (TTE), but as energy has become more of a political pri-
ority since 2006, other Council formations have been convened such 
as GAERC (security of supply, Russia, external relations and devel-
opment issues), ECOFIN (energy markets), and Competitiveness and 
Agriculture Council (biofuels) (van Schaik 2006, 178–179). Once 
again, this range of Council formations underscores the cross- cutting 
complexity and multifaceted nature of the energy policy area.
In contrast to the various Council ministerial formations that con-
vene only semi- regularly, the Working Party (WP) on Energy within 
the Council typically meets on a weekly basis. Coreper I led by deputy 
permanent representatives from the member states acts as the main 
clearing house between the WP and the Council and Coreper II, led 
by ambassadors, is involved only with the issues related to foreign 
policy, development and nuclear aspects. As noted above, the com-
petences on which much of the energy policies or proposals have 
been based are predominantly that of the internal market and the 
environment, and both of these areas are subject to the co- decision 
procedure (meaning an equal legislative role for the Parliament) with 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) used as the voting method within 
the Council. The QMV essentially means member states do not exer-
cise veto power, thus again strengthening the argument of the multi-
 level governance approach in that even in this strategic issue area, 
where horizontal competence has been absent until the Lisbon Treaty 
and where EU member states have such diverse interests and needs 
(i.e., producers versus nonproducers, cross- national diversity in the 
structures of energy sectors, varying energy mixes, different concep-
tions of energy as a tradable commodity or a public service, etc.), the 
decision patterns and policy making trends are decidedly less inter-
governmental than might otherwise be expected. Nonetheless, as we 
examine specific examples of Council action below, it is clear that it is 
definitely the member states and their negotiations within the Council 
that put the brakes on or otherwise limit the ambitions of a coherent, 
common approach to energy policies, particularly in the areas of com-
petitiveness and security of supply.
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The European Parliament
Turning to the third actor in the institutional triangle, the European 
Parliament, it is critical to underscore again the extent to which its 
powers have expanded dramatically over the past decades in order 
to appreciate how these may be increasingly deployed to exert more 
influence in shaping energy policy. As this institution has been the 
least discussed in this volume, we should first briefly examine the 
basic composition and internal organization of the institution before 
analyzing its role in the policy- making process. Directly elected in 
EU- wide elections since 1979, the European Parliament (EP hereaf-
ter) presently comprises 736 members for fixed, renewable five- year 
terms. Although the elections are organized nationally, once elected, 
the MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) do not sit as national 
delegations but rather in political- ideological blocs.7 Representing on 
average over 100 different political parties, the political groups are 
now reduced into seven core formations on the left- right dimension 
with an eighth grouping representing the “non- attached” members. 
Never has a single party group had enough seats to form a majority, 
so groups must work together to achieve a majority. Three groups 
have developed a rather consistent grouping over the EP’s history—
the Socialists on the left, the Liberals in the center- right, and the 
European People’s Party on the right.
The 2009 European elections resulted in a clear victory for the 
European People’s Party (EPP) and a defeat for the Party of European 
Socialists (PES) grouping. The EPP group currently has 265 members 
against 184 MEPs for the Socialists. In the outgoing 2004 European 
Parliament, the former EPP- European Democrats (EPP- ED) group had 
284 MEPs to the PES’s 215. The Alliance of Liberal and Democrats 
for Europe (ALDE) obtained 84 seats, down from 103 in the previ-
ous legislature. The Greens/European Free Alliance group won 55 
MEPs, increasing from 42 the last time around, which is a positive 
development in terms of prospects for greater pressure on sustainabil-
ity and climate change issues.8 In terms of member- state representa-
tion, the number of seats is based roughly on the size of population, 
meaning that Germany, the most populous EU member state, has 99 
seats whereas Malta, the least populous, is allocated five seats. Such 
a formula results in the smaller countries being overrepresented while 
larger ones are underrepresented. This is not a particularly salient fac-
tor however given that most scholarly research has shown that party 
or political affiliation is the stronger predictor of voting behavior, not 
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national identity (See for instance, Hix and Lord (1997) and Kreppel 
(2000)). The president is elected by the MEPs and thus is typically 
from the largest political group, and he or she serves a two- and- a- half 
year renewable term. The president plays a powerful role in this most 
unique of unicameral, transnational legislative bodies, where his or 
her responsibilities include presiding over plenary sessions, working 
with leaders of party groups to draw up the agenda, and overseeing 
the work of the parliamentary committees.
Just as in normal parliamentary bodies, the bulk of the real legisla-
tive work is done in committees, so for two to three weeks each month 
MEPs work in Brussels and typically convene full plenary sessions 
only three or four days each month in Strasbourg. The committees 
range in size from 28 to 86 members, reflecting the EP’s own hier-
archy and influence over certain policy areas with the environment 
and budget among the most powerful. In the case of energy policy, 
the Committee on Industry, Research, and Energy (CIRE) is the key 
actor, but other committees such as environment and foreign affairs 
are also engaged, depending on the particular content of legislation 
under consideration (van Schaik 2006, 181).
As noted, the EP’s decision making authority has incrementally 
expanded from an advisory and consultative (Treaty of Paris 1952 
and Treaties of Rome 1957) to a cooperative role (Single European 
Act 1986) giving the EP the right to a second reading for certain laws 
being considered by the Council, to its current role as a full legislative 
actor initiated with the co- decision procedure and rights to a third 
reading introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, extended in the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, and further strengthened with the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty. In addition to these legislative powers, the Parliament 
also exercises joint powers with the Council over fixing the EU budget 
and enjoys supervisory authority over other EU institutions, including 
the right to approve the College of Commissioners, and with a two-
 thirds majority, to force the resignation of the Commission through 
a vote of censure. Because the EP functions in a political system that 
is partly supranational and partly intergovernmental, there are none-
theless significant constraints on its power, in particular its inability 
to introduce legislation and raise revenue—the classic instruments of 
power wielded by traditional legislatures. However, in an empirical 
analysis of the EP’s relative policy- making authority vis- à- vis national 
parliaments, Bergman and Raunio concluded that “MEPs probably 
have a more direct impact on policy outputs at the EU level than many 
national MPs have on national- level policy” (2001, 123). This assess-
ment is further validation that the EU political system is becoming 
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more reflective of a multilevel governance structure as opposed to 
a state- centric, intergovernmental one. While not dismissing entirely 
the notion that states continue to matter and are vigilant in their 
attempt to safeguard sovereignty and policy- making authority, the 
multilevel approach allows us to move beyond the rigid intergovern-
mentalist versus supranationalist dichotomy and appreciate the multi-
 actor, multilevel governance mechanisms in place that are melding 
a new kind of polity. The way in which national parliaments and 
the EP interact is a primary case in point. All member states’ parlia-
ments now have standing European Affairs committees and subcom-
mittees that institutionalize their coordination and relations with the 
European Parliament. Therefore, rather than seeing power shifts in 
zero sum ways, the multilevel governance perspective emphasizes the 
intermeshing of competencies and shared authority across EU level 
institutions and between national governments and supranational 
actors.
The EP’s role in actual policy formation is substantially affected by 
the ways in which it acts in concert or in tension with its co- legislator, 
the Council. The Lisbon Treaty has now made virtually all policy 
areas subject to the co- decision procedure, which means that the EP 
has essentially obtained veto power. If a piece of legislation ends up 
being negotiated in a conciliation committees comprised of members 
from both institutions with a Commission and the Council does not 
accept the EP amendments, a proposal dies. Thus, the fate of and 
the actual policy content of the EP’s agenda and the way in which 
they try to shape proposals are largely determined by this interinsti-
tutional procedure. Undoubtedly, then, there is an element of institu-
tional rivalry that characterizes the policy- making process in the EU 
context, where the Parliament plays an increasingly independent and 
powerful role as opposed to its past experience as a junior legislative 
partner and an ineffectual and weak counterpart to the Commission. 
Now we will examine how this unique policy- making process and 
these key EU institutions have shaped the development of an emerging 
common energy policy.
EU Institutional Interaction and Impact 
in the Formation of EU Energy Policy
Figure 11.1 displays the timeline of the most significant actions taken 
by the EU since the mid- 2000s. What is missing from this trajectory 
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is the politically momentous decision taken by the European Council 
at the 2005 Hampton Court summit, where under the leadership of 
the UK presidency of the EU, the heads of state and government of 
the 259 member states acknowledged the need for a more coherent EU 
energy policy to reconcile the three primary objectives of competi-
tive energy choices for European consumers, security of supply, and 
environmental sustainability. This pronouncement paved the way for 
the Commission Green Paper in the spring of 2006 that in turn laid 
the groundwork for the EU’s new strategic energy policy proposed 
by the Commission. It is worth highlighting this event as it illustrates 
that ultimately the decision to push policy and governance upwards 
to the EU level still ultimately resides with the member states. The 
Commission is obviously a key driver of the future policy develop-
ments, but the initial political will that precipitates and is necessary to 
sustain it should not be underestimated. This final section will trace 
some of the key developments of energy policy formation with a goal 
of elucidating how these three core institutional actors can take some 
credit for the progress made so far in the effort to formulate a com-
mon and more comprehensive energy policy but it will also identify 
the major obstacles and institutional barriers that might impede fur-
ther movement toward a truly common EU energy policy.
Table 11.1 highlights key elements contained in the early commu-
nications regarding energy policy and illustrates many of the insti-
tutional tendencies discussed in this chapter. Displayed in the first 
column, the Commission Green Paper, “A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,” published March 8, 
2006, laid the foundations of a renewed effort to construct a common 
energy policy by outlining general policy areas and overarching goals. 
The paper focused on the completion of an internal energy market 
but also included proposals for responding to disruptions in supply, 
such as compulsory gas and oil stocks and a new regulatory European 
Energy Observatory, as well as the development of a common exter-
nal energy policy to coordinate relations with external suppliers. The 
Commission paper also addressed diversification of supply as well 
as a road map for renewable energy and a strategic energy technol-
ogy plan to promote research into new energy technologies. Goals 
proposed by the Commission remained broad, however, as reflected 
in the table, with the exception of a target 15 percent reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions after 2025.
The Council responded favorably to the Green Paper on March 24, 
2006, adding several of its own concrete energy targets as well as text 
addressing member state sovereignty, external relations, and security 
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of supply. The Council approved of measures to further the internal 
energy market and proposed the first concrete goals for energy sav-
ing and renewable energy usage, calling for a 20 percent savings in 
energy by 2020, an increase in the percentage of renewable energy 
in overall energy consumption to 15 percent and biofuels to 8 per-
cent by 2015. Most notably, the Council document, while proposing 
targets for Europe as a whole, reasserted the sovereignty of member 
states in determining the composition of their own energy usage and 
focused on the need for solidarity in external relations as well as a cri-
sis response mechanism to address disruptions in supply. The Council 
justified its proposals for renewable energy targets as necessary for 
the diversification of supply and the promotion of energy security.
A less favorable response came from the Parliament on December 
14, 2006, in the form of the Eluned Morgan Report.10 The report 
asserted the need for more action, specifically in the realm of cli-
mate change policy, with the goal of making the EU “the most energy 
efficient economy in the world by 2020” (Eluned Morgan Report). 
To reach this end, the Parliament argued for higher binding targets 
in nearly every area. It proposed cutting greenhouse gas emissions 
by 30 percent by 2020, with a 60–80 percent reduction by 2050, 
increasing energy efficiency improvements to 20 percent by 2020, and 
requiring a higher percentage of renewable energy usage (25 percent 
by 2020, 50 percent by 2040). At times, the Parliament’s report took 
a harsh, scolding tone toward the Commission for its lack of ambi-
tion in goal setting, such as when it stated that the Parliament “regrets 
that the Commission has enormous problems linking transport with 
the energy question; recalls that the transport sector is the cause of 
Europe’s biggest security of supply problem and intense oil depen-
dency, and that climate changing emissions from the transport sector 
are rising steeply, notably from aviation” (Eluned Morgan Report).
The Commission responded with its first proposals on January 
10, 2007, in “Energy for a Changing World” (An Energy Policy for 
Europe), which outlined more concrete goals for a common energy 
policy. Proposals included a 20 percent reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions from primary energy sources by 2020, with up to a 
50 percent reduction by 2050, and a minimum target of 10 percent 
for the use of biofuels by 2020. The communication also focused on 
the “unbundling” of energy companies and distribution networks 
to increase competition in energy markets and the development of a 
European Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan to support technol-
ogy growth in areas related to energy efficiency. In the realm of exter-
nal relations, the Commission suggested developing an  Africa- Europe 
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Energy partnership to assist the continent in developing as a sustain-
able energy supplier.11
Once more, the Parliament responded with a request for more 
aggressive measures, specifically to address climate change and envi-
ronmental issues. While the Parliamentary resolution welcomed 
efforts to harmonize markets and echoed security of supply concerns, 
the largest section of the document focused on “making energy policy 
environmentally sound.”12 The Parliament once more encouraged the 
Commission and the Council to make the EU the most energy effi-
cient economy in the world by 2020 and proposed higher targets in 
every area, calling for 25 percent renewables in the EU energy mix, 30 
percent greenhouse gas reduction by 2020, 60–80 percent reduction 
by 2050, and a 60 percent carbon neutral electricity supply by 2020. 
In arguing for these goals, the Parliament acknowledged the need for 
security of supply, but took most of its justification from the need to 
combat climate change. The Parliament also displayed some impa-
tience with member states’ progress in implementing older policies 
noting that, “if Member States were to fully implement existing EC 
legislation, half the EU target of a 20 percent energy saving by 2020 
would already be met” (European Parliament resolution on the input 
to the 2007a Spring Council in relation to the Lisbon Strategy).
An additional resolution on climate change, approved by the 
Parliament on the same day, reiterated this impatience with the other 
two institutions’ reluctance to act decisively on environmental issues. 
For example, the resolution states that the Parliament “regrets the lack 
of clarity of the Commission’s ‘energy and climate package’ with regard 
to the target for greenhouse gas emission reductions for 2020; empha-
sises that an overall 30 percent reduction for all industrialised countries 
is necessary to have a reasonable chance of attaining the EU objective 
of limiting the average temperature increase to 2°C,” and then “insists” 
that the Commission impose binding targets on CO2 emissions reduc-
tion.13 The Parliamentary document also admonishes member states 
that had not taken appropriate measures to meet building energy effi-
ciency standards and urges the Commission to take action against 
them. (European Parliament resolution on climate change)
The Council’s response to these communications reflects a com-
promise between the Commission and Parliamentary proposals. A 
meeting of the Council on March 8–9, 2007, debated and approved 
proposals including the original 20 percent reduction in CO2 emis-
sions by 2020. It did, however, include a provision for a 30 percent 
reduction goal if other developed countries agreed to comparable mea-
sures. The Council also accepted the Commission’s original goals of 
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20 percent renewable energy and 10 percent biofuel usage by 2020. It 
invited the Commission to publish updated Strategic Energy Reviews 
to serve as the basis for new action plans in the future. From these 
specific examples, as well as some of the other interventions high-
lighted in Table 11.1, we can discern a pattern of coordination and 
push- back that is largely reflective of the identity and the interests of 
each institution and their native competencies. The Commission, long 
an advocate of liberalization and completion of the single market, has 
been most eager to push through measures that deliver on that aspect 
of the EU’s energy policy priorities—competitiveness. In contrast, the 
Council, the negotiated summation of member state interests, is most 
defensive of each country’s sovereign right to choose between differ-
ent energy sources and the structure of its own energy supply, thus 
privileging the energy security priorities.
Finally, the Parliament is in a sense the most unencumbered of 
the institutions in that its main motivations and actions stem from 
overarching environmental commitments and the priority of sustain-
ability and combating climate change. In this vein, we might even 
characterize the Parliament’s role thus far in energy policy formation 
as perhaps the conscience of the Union.
These characterizations may be a bit oversimplified, but the gen-
eral pattern is not altogether unsurprising and seems likely to con-
tinue in the Lisbon era where Community level competence has been 
expanded in the area of energy policy. The expansion is explicit with 
the inclusion of the Energy Chapter and implicit by virtue of its grant-
ing to the EU a single legal personality, allowing it to act in a more 
unified and decisive way in its external relations and in signing inter-
national agreements.
The majority of text regarding energy in the Lisbon Treaty falls 
under Article 2, which lays out Union versus member authorities in cer-
tain policy areas. While it lists energy as a shared competence area in 
Article 2C, the Treaty reserves more authority for the EU in instances 
of difficulties in supply of energy, with an amendment to the Treaty 
on the European Union Article 100. The biggest section on energy, 
though, appears under Article 2, 147, replacing the old language in 
Title XX (which concerned the environment) with the more specific 
language that forms the basis of the new chapter on energy policy. The 
new Title XX, Article 176A stipulates that European Union energy 
policy will ensure the functioning of an internal energy market, guar-
antee security of supply, and promote efficiency and interconnection. 
Paragraph 2 gives responsibility for these goals to the Council and 
Parliament, with consultation of the Economic and Social Committee 
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and the Committee of the Regions. The Title then asserts that such 
authority will not hamper an individual member- state’s ability to 
structure its own energy supply and resources and then in paragraph 
3 reasserts the authority of the Council and Parliament over energy 
matters within the fiscal realm.14
Also noteworthy is the fact that the Lisbon Treaty does away with 
the comitology procedure, under which the European Commission had 
to consult with committees made up of member- state experts as part 
of the implementation process. The Parliament had been critical of the 
comitology procedure as undemocratic, as it gave a very limited role to 
the elected body and allowed the Commission to push through impor-
tant implementing measures without its endorsement. The Lisbon 
Treaty now puts the Parliament on the same footing as the Council, as 
the delegating acts come under parliamentary control. With the new 
legislation, the member states wanted to ensure that the EU execu-
tive must still consult national experts in the process and establish a 
mechanism for any institution to revoke an implementation measure. 
The Parliament, on the other hand, appears satisfied that it will have 
more powers under the new rules. It can revoke delegations or object to 
changes made by the Commission to an annex, for example.
In conclusion, it is evident that the EU institutions and supranational 
processes will likely play an ever greater role in shaping EU energy pol-
icy in the future vis- à- vis national governments and intergovernmental 
bargaining, given the new found powers of the Parliament, the shift 
toward Community methods and voting procedures even within the 
most intergovernmental institution, the Council, as well as the growing 
entrepreneurial drive and assertiveness of the Commission. However, 
the scope of their action and the relative coherence of the emerging 
common energy policy will likely be conditioned by the existing inter-
institutional rivalries and the policy preferences and biases therein. 
Thus, even in the face of new found political will and momentum and 
a stronger legal basis from which to exercise authority, the obstacles to 
a more coherent energy policy may ironically lie as much with the frag-
mented, competitive nature of the EU institutions and policy process 
as it does with the purported intergovernmental barriers.
Notes
 1. Note that this chapter follows the conventional practice of using the EU 
to refer not only to its proper name post- Maastricht, but also its former 
iterations as the ECC and the EC.
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 2. See for instance the collected volume edited by Sophie Meunier and 
Kathleen McNamara, (2007) The EU at Fifty.
 3. In fact, the European Journal of Public Policy in 1999 devoted a special 
issue to The Social Construction of Europe.
 4. Richardson (2001) provides an excellent overview of the various 
approaches that apply concepts of governance and suggests how such 
studies have contributed to better understanding of the complex system 
of governance within the EU including clearer analysis of the various 
actors (state, nonstate, supranational institutions and interest groups) 
and their mechanisms of coordination.
 5. This approach is extremely useful and applicable when it comes to 
environmental policy making. In the EU context, he, Mazey, and 
Richardson’s (1992) study revealed how the Commission worked with 
an epistemic community to process the CFC problem.
 6. See the following for such expositions: (Peters 1991; Nugent 1999 and 
McCormick 2010; Dinan 2011).
 7. According to EP rules, a group must have at least 20 members, elected 
from at least one- fifth of member states.
 8. EurActiv June 25, 2009. (http://www.euractiv.com/en/eu- elections
/2009- 2014- centre- right- european- parliament/article- 183383 (accessed 
September 30, 2010).
 9. 25 as opposed to the current 27 because the summit preceded the acces-
sion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.
10. The Eluned Morgan Report was an own- initiative report drawn up by 
Eluned Morgan, British member of the Industry, Research and Energy 
Committee, and later adopted by other committees and the Parliament 
as a whole.
11. Illustrating even further the cross- cutting policy perspectives that get 
folded into the EU’s energy policy agenda, the GAERC adopted Council 
Conclusions in April 2006 for the first time linking energy concerns 
with development policy. For more discussion, see van Schaik (2006) pp. 
182–185.
12. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=E
N&reference=P6- TA- 2006- 0603 (accessed October 5, 2010).
13. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=E
N&reference=P6- TA- 2006- 0603 (accessed October 5, 2010).
14. In Article 100, paragraph 1 shall be replaced by the following:
“1. Without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in 
the Treaties, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, 
may decide, in a spirit of solidarity between member States, upon 
the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular 
if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably 
in the area of energy.”
(replaced: The Council shall, acting unanimously on a pro-
posal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
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Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue direc-
tives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or admin-
istrative provisions of the member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the common market.” (147) Title 
XX shall be replaced by the following new Title and new Article 
176 A: “TITLE XX ENERGY Article 176 A
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and 
improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a 
spirit of solidarity between member States, to:
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; and
(c)  promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the devel-
opment of new and renewable forms of energy; and
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.
2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of 
the Treaties, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish 
the measures necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. 
Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Such 
measures shall not affect a member state’s right to determine the 
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply, without prejudice to Article 175(2)(c).
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, act-
ing in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall unani-
mously and after consulting the European Parliament, establish 
the measures referred to therein when they are primarily of a fiscal 
nature.”
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Conclusion
Taking Stock of EU Energy Policy: 
Progress, Problems, and Prospects
Vicki L. Birchfield and John S. Duffield
Energy has become an issue of integration and disintegration of the EU 
and perhaps will turn out to be the ultimate litmus test of political and 
economic unity in the EU.
Jacques de Jong and Coby van der Linde (2008)
This volume has brought together a broad range of expertise in energy 
policy and European integration to assess the current state of one 
of the most complex policy challenges facing the European Union 
(EU) today. European energy policy is a vexing subject to understand 
comprehensively due in part to its relatively nascent state, but also 
because of the multifaceted- objectives and policy- priorities. These 
include energy security, efficiency and economic competitiveness, 
and environmental sustainability, all of which encompass or impinge 
upon various dimensions of both the internal and external affairs of 
the European Union. The goals of this concluding chapter are to sum-
marize briefly the key insights and findings of the individual chapters, 
to evaluate how much progress has actually been made toward the 
achievement of a common EU energy policy, and to identify the main 
problems that might hinder its further development. Synthesizing the 
analyses of the preceding chapters, we also seek to offer an overall 
assessment of why progress has been more substantial in some areas 
than in others and what the implications of this uneven development 
are for moving toward a truly coherent and effective common energy 
policy in Europe.
The Context
As acknowledged throughout this volume, energy in some ways has 
been at the heart of the European integration project from its very 
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inception in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(1952), which fostered economic and technical cooperation through 
the pooling and collective regulation of these two basic resources 
essential to the reconstruction of Europe after the destruction of World 
War Two. That a supranational authority was first put into action as 
early as the 1950s to monitor production and prices in the critical and 
strategic area of energy belies the reality that it took nearly six decades 
before a more comprehensive EU energy policy would begin to crys-
tallize. Despite the creation of European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) with the Rome Treaty of 1957 and subsequent attempts to 
mount a community- level approach to energy, sustained movement 
toward a common energy policy began only with the adoption in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s of the agenda to complete the internal 
market, as contained in the Single European Act and the Maastricht 
Treaty on EU. Deepening integration was intended to increase effi-
ciency in sectors that had been largely under national control, which 
still included most aspects of energy policy.
Earlier efforts to develop a common energy policy had mostly failed 
due to the diverse mixes of energy in member states and the range of 
national interests invested in them. In the 1990s, EU energy policy 
discussions were predicated on the twin assumptions that energy mar-
kets would remain or become ever more globalized and that a market 
oriented approach with Russia and other energy- producing former 
Soviet bloc countries would be successful. Both of these assump-
tions turned out to be problematic. Instead, the attempted European 
Energy Charter and its associated treaty were frustrated by Russia’s 
refusal to ratify, and the focus on an internal market strategy became 
increasingly problematic, as volatility in international energy markets 
resulted in a shift from a buyer’s to a seller’s market. Thus, rather than 
being driven by companies and market forces, energy policy discus-
sions became increasingly dominated by national political interests(de 
Jong and van der Linde 2008, 2–3.) Global energy demand rose rap-
idly, particularly with the accelerated growth of emerging econo-
mies in China and India, while production capacity struggled to 
keep up. The lack of expected liberalization in Russia’s gas markets 
also caused problems, as did the divergence of views within the EU 
regarding a strategic relationship with Russia (see Grätz, this volume). 
Furthermore, political instability in other supplier countries contrib-
uted to rising prices and fears about supply disruptions.
As a result of these developments, national political concerns 
appeared to be trumping globalizing economic and European regional 
interests. Relations with Russia have become central in the EU’s quest 
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for a common energy policy, particularly given the recent membership 
of former communist countries with lingering fears toward Russia 
and greater exposure to security of supply concerns. Furthermore, 
many of these newer member states did not have the benefit of liberal-
izing their markets when supplies seemed abundant and prices were 
lower. Crisis management has arisen as another important issue to 
be addressed, along with external relations with supplier and trans-
port countries, but it is exceedingly difficult to arrive at a consensus 
in these areas. As many of the preceding chapters have elucidated, 
the EU is poorly equipped to play the usual governmental regulator 
role in energy, since it is not a state in itself with a direct and deci-
sive capacity to act and the member states that comprise it have such 
divergent interests and varying import dependencies.
Thus it has become increasingly evident that viewing energy policy 
primarily as an internal market issue is no longer adequate. Political 
concerns have moved to the forefront, with the tighter global market, 
the politicization of energy issues, and growing fears over security of 
supply taking precedence. And, it is precisely member- states’ vary-
ing levels of exposure to supply issues, differing energy mixes, and 
divergent views toward external relations (particularly with Russia) 
that make this critical policy area one for which it is ever difficult 
to reach consensus among 27 member states. Furthermore, the chal-
lenge of addressing all aspects of energy in one coherent policy—of 
combining environmental concerns with security of supply issues and 
internal market goals—is proving to be exceptionally difficult. The 
imperative to create an energy policy for the whole of EU in the face of 
such obstacles has resulted in what Jacques de Jong and Coby van der 
Linde have aptly described as a “litmus test of economic and political 
integration in the EU (2008, 3).” Bearing this in mind, we now offer 
a brief overview of the key insights of the various chapters in this vol-
ume to gauge the status of such a litmus test at this point in EU energy 
policy development.
EU Energy Policies: Progress 
and Problems
The chapters in part one of the book examine recent developments 
in six key policy areas: market liberalization, external energy policy, 
EU energy relations with Russia, emissions trading, renewable energy, 
and energy efficiency. Each chapter seeks to identify the key propos-
als and actions taken by the EU and member states, and to explain 
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why such particular policies were proposed and what considerations 
motivated EU bodies and member states in both furthering and/or 
impeding the creation of a common policy in the specific area of con-
cern. The chapters may loosely be grouped according to whether the 
specific areas analyzed deal with the internal or the external dimen-
sions of the EU policy efforts. Emissions trading, renewable energy, 
efficiency, and market liberalization all fall under the general guise of 
the EU’s internal policies, whereas relations with Russia and external 
energy policy issues such as security of supply are more bound up 
with the EU’s foreign policies and external relations.
One common theme among the disparate chapters in this volume, 
however, is that this bifurcation of internal versus external policies 
is a considerable hindrance to the development of a more coherent 
energy policy. Many of the contributing authors have observed that 
this rigid conception and binary classification of internal versus exter-
nal policy is actually quite misleading. Richard Youngs provides an 
explicit example of why this distinction is a rather dubious one:
EU competition laws condition foreign policy positions. For example, 
they have required non- EU oil producing countries to drop traditional 
“destination clauses,” through which they traditionally prevented 
a buyer passing on surplus supplies to other states. Removing such 
provisions undermines the exclusivity of bilateral contracts. Supplies 
are better able to flow to where they are needed within the European 
Union. And national EU governments gain leverage over producer 
states. Europeanised internal rules are what provide foreign policy 
leverage and unity. European policy- makers have readily acknowl-
edged that completing the internal market in energy is necessary for 
external influence and unity. The rules and regulations of the internal 
market are defined as the key foundation to the EU’s international 
projection in energy matters (Emphasis added. See Youngs page X, 
this volume.).
Nonetheless, as Youngs’ analysis reveals, there is still a consider-
able degree of political maneuvering as member states pursue bilat-
eral strategies that ultimately undermine the more “communautaire” 
approach. This problem is also pinpointed by Grätz in his chapter on 
the EU’s relations with Russia. The challenge of a common energy pol-
icy toward Russia has been aggravated by the fundamentally different 
perceptions of and widely divergent foreign policies toward Russia 
held by the member states. Whereas the European Commission (here-
after: the Commission) and a few smaller and new member states 
from Central and Eastern Europe have been wary of relying heavily 
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on Russia to meet their energy needs, some older member states such 
as Germany have preferred instead to endow energy policy with the 
broader goal of binding Russia closer to Europe by integrating their 
respective energy sectors. Thus it would appear that the external 
dimensions of the EU’s energy policy will continue to pose the most 
difficulty with respect to forging a more coherent and unified position 
with Russia and also with other suppliers and third countries.
Ironically, even in areas where specific policies appear to be clearly 
within the internal domain of EU policy- making, the external dimen-
sion is often directly implicated. We see this, for example, in Jørgen 
Wettestad’s examination of the development of the EU Emissions and 
Trading System (ETS). While he acknowledges that insufficient time 
has passed to effectively and comprehensively evaluate this program, 
he does take stock of some preliminary progress and challenges. 
Among the achievements of the ETS, Wettestad points to the develop-
ment of an unprecedented international marketplace for carbon emis-
sions trading, the growth of important infrastructure to support and 
regulate the ETS, and the beginnings of change in the mindset of cor-
porate leaders with regard to climate change issues. He also acknowl-
edges several criticisms of the ETS, however, including charges of 
too many allowances in the initial stages, wide fluctuations in price, 
internal market anomalies benefiting energy producers, and exter-
nal market anomalies involving carbon leakage. Overall, Wettestad 
assigns a “mixed performance” to the ETS, citing the reservations 
and mixed reviews of non- state actors as well as member states and 
EU institutions. For the future, Wettestad sees prospects for a much 
more centralized ETS with tighter caps, less flexibility for member 
states, and more auctioning. Importantly, he also notes that the ETS 
came about not only as a direct response to climate change, but also 
in an effort to influence and encourage climate change action on the 
international level. Thus, once again we see how EU internal policies 
are often motivated by external as well as internal factors and not eas-
ily interpreted or explained by a single theoretical framework, a point 
that was also made by Birchfield in her overview of EU institutions 
and policy making.
In an adjacent policy area, Jørgen Henningsen tackles issues 
related to energy efficiency. He argues that while there have been 
many opportunities in this area—what he terms “low- hanging fruit,” 
especially with the entrance of new member states, and in spite of 
the fact that energy efficiency has been given a prominent place in 
the 20–20–20 scheme, there has been in fact little progress thus far, 
and energy efficiency has remained a secondary priority. This is the 
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case, Henningsen asserts, because the EU has found it much easier 
to identify energy efficiency potential than to prescribe measures to 
improve it, as seen in the 2005 Green Paper on energy efficiency and 
the 2006 Energy Efficiency Action Plan, which merely restated previ-
ous measures or mentioned plans to review existing policies without 
advancing much of anything new. The lack of progress stems partially 
from the difficulty in addressing an issue that spans literally nearly 
all sectors of society, from appliances, buildings, energy production, 
and transportation, to the ETS, and the very different energy usage 
within member states. As a result of this enormous scope, a focused 
policy has been difficult to achieve and progress has been very lim-
ited. Furthermore, as Henningsen puts it, energy efficiency lacks the 
“glamour” of other priorities, such as renewables and security of sup-
ply. Henningsen does regard progress as likely in the future, although 
he predicts that the same problems will persist and that many of the 
energy efficiency “low- hanging fruit” will remain to be picked due to 
the limitations of ETS, the lack of a legally binding efficiency target, 
and the greater sense of urgency surrounding other issues.
Similarly pessimistic, Måns Nilsson discusses the less than stellar 
development of renewable energy sources (RES) as well as the chal-
lenges and successes seen in attempts to promote a common RES pol-
icy on the European level. He asserts that RES policy has long been an 
area of member- state dominance, with several states developing suc-
cessful programs such as Tradeable Renewable Electricity Certificates 
(TREC) and feed- in tariffs (FIT). Not much progress has been made 
in harmonizing these efforts under the European umbrella, however, 
particularly before 2006, largely because of differences in member-
 state interests. Recently, though, due to growing concerns over security 
of supply and stronger links to climate change, which has become an 
increasingly important consideration in European energy policy, RES 
policy has seen movement on the European stage, with the setting of 
binding national target levels. Nilsson asserts, however, that the EU 
is still far from having a real common RES policy. Furthermore, he 
argues that the future of RES is highly dependent upon the evolution 
of institutional relationships and agendas within the EU and does not 
view a true common RES policy as a step likely to be taken soon.
Underlying motivations for a more unified approach to energy 
policy at the European level is the implicit, but fundamental recogni-
tion that this sector is one that is inherently linked to the basic needs 
and welfare of society, yet also determinative of how competitive a 
domestic economy is. When that domestic economy is enmeshed in a 
larger regional economy like the EU, it is imperative that the energy 
13_Birchfield_Conclusion.indd   268 4/12/2011   5:30:41 PM
Conclusion 269
systems not operate in isolation, but rather that national markets be 
regionally coordinated to tap the full efficiency potential as well as 
to ensure consumer choice and lower prices—both of which are pur-
ported benefits of economic integration.
How has the EU fared in achieving the internal energy market? 
Eikeland’s assessment is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the 
Commission has been aggressive in its three policy packages replete with 
various regulations and directives designed to create free and fair markets 
for electricity and gas. On the other hand, the ultimate success of this leg-
islation has been contingent on the proper transposition of these energy 
rules and regulations into the 27 national systems. Eikeland’s study shows 
the gap between these two forces at work in EU policy- making efforts. 
The Commission has repeatedly, and as recently as 2009, had to initiate 
infringement procedures against many member states for deficiencies in 
their implementation of improperly implementing internal market provi-
sions for both electricity and gas. Despite these setbacks, he also reveals 
that the Commission’s benchmarking report for 2009 shows that most 
member states have finally transposed the legal provision guaranteeing 
all consumers the right to shift suppliers in the national electricity and 
gas markets, with just a few still lagging behind. So, the pattern of very 
mixed success seems to prevail, even in an area where the Commission 
has exercised clearer competence. A critical but often overlooked fac-
tor when assessing EU policy innovation is the extent to which member 
states actually follow through on the implementation front. It appears 
this will remain a key challenge in the area of energy policy.
National Perspectives: The Role 
of the Big Three
As we have seen, the sheer range of initiatives and the complexity of both 
the internal and external dimensions of energy policy make it difficult 
to offer definitive assessments of the EU’s relative success in achieving 
a common energy policy. The picture becomes even more complicated 
once we begin addressing the specific positions and influence of the 
member states in either pushing a EU policy forward or inhibiting its 
further development. In no way intending to discount the significance of 
other member states, this volume nonetheless focuses on the experience 
and perspectives of the three most influential member states: Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom (UK). Although some chapters touch 
on the role of other member states and underscore the diverse inter-
ests and policy- prerogatives underlying various aspects of energy policy 
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as it gradually moves upward to the European level, the prime movers 
and resisters have arguably been the largest and most powerful states. 
Analyses like those presented by Sophie Meritet, Francis McGowan, and 
John Duffield and Kirsten Westphal sufficiently illustrate that energy 
policy formation at the EU level is still very much a member state driven 
enterprise, even though the intergovernmental restraints have been less-
ened with the Lisbon Treaty and the Commission has become increas-
ingly proactive in promoting a common energy policy (Eikeland 2010).
Meritet’s chapter closely examines the challenges in aligning 
national energy policies with EU energy policy goals. She provides a 
detailed account of the French situation, unique for its lack of natural 
fossil fuels, strong governmental role, longstanding movement toward 
energy independence, and emphasis on its nuclear program, and 
analyzes how the country navigates its relationship with EU energy 
policy. While France is a founding and powerful member of the EU 
with a significant voice in EU policy, it has been considered a “black 
sheep” in energy policy because of its unique situation, and thus it too 
has had to adjust its traditionally state- centric energy sector in order 
to comply with EU energy requirements and policy goals. While this 
requirement has presented challenges for both France and the EU, 
Meritet sees much commonality in the overarching goals of mem-
ber states. All share a desire for environmental protection, reduced 
dependence on oil, the development of renewables to achieve diversity 
and security of supply with efficient market mechanisms, but national 
interests pose continual problems in achieving these EU level goals. 
Meritet points to the widespread acknowledgement of the need for a 
common EU energy policy throughout Europe and the development 
of stronger European foreign policy as promising indicators of future 
progress in this area. With these goals in mind, Meritet suggests that 
France itself may shift from a “black sheep” to a role model for future 
EU energy intensity, independence, and efficiency, if it can overcome 
its propensity toward heavy government intervention.
Similar to Meritet’s chapter, McGowan highlights the uniqueness 
and specificity of the relationship of the UK with EU energy policy. 
Like France, the UK viewed itself as an exceptional case initially when 
it came to energy issues—France because of its unusually high use of 
nuclear power and large government control of the energy sector, and 
Britain because of its unique position as a net fossil fuel exporter. Over 
recent years, however, both countries have recognized the need for a 
stronger common European stance in this area, due to supply security 
concerns and increased awareness of climate change issues. McGowan 
details the shift in the British case, focusing on the importance of 
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market- based solutions in the UK. Britain was initially hesitant, if not 
hostile, toward transferring authority to the EU in energy areas, with 
the exception of market liberalization, which has traditionally been 
the area of EU integration most acceptable to Britain. However, as 
the UK has shifted from an energy producer to an energy consumer 
and has become increasingly concerned with climate issues, the coun-
try has grown more open to the idea of European involvement and 
cooperation within the energy sector and more willing to consider 
solutions other than those that are market based and dominated by 
liberalization. As a result, the UK has become an influential actor in 
energy policy making on the EU level.
In contrast to the British case, Duffield and Westphal remind us 
that Germany has been a much more consistent champion of EU inte-
gration generally, yet when it comes to energy, it displays a similar 
ambivalence. The areas in which it has traditionally opposed coop-
eration, however, are unique. It has tended to back policy initiatives 
concerning climate change, renewable sources of energy, and energy 
conservation, but it has resisted a number of others, such as the cre-
ation of a common external energy policy and the liberalization of 
the gas and electricity markets, toward which Britain has been more 
supportive. This chapter examines in detail the specific context of 
German energy policy, which has been consistently in favor of energy 
efficiency and renewables, and less so toward nuclear energy and mar-
ket opening. German policy has been strongly influenced by the inter-
ests of a small number of powerful domestic energy companies, which 
dominate the internal market and retain very close ties with Russian 
suppliers. As a result, Germany has expressed rhetorical support for 
the internal energy market and a common external energy policy, but 
has been much more reluctant to back its words with actions. In other 
areas, however, Germany has backed EU measures because of strong 
societal support for renewables and action to improve energy effi-
ciency, particularly where it concerns climate change and the environ-
ment. Despite this record of mixed support for a common European 
energy policy, the authors do see some hope for future progress as a 
result of recent political developments in Germany.
Energy, Climate Change, and the Role 
of EU Institutions
The chapters in the third part of the book operate from a more macro 
perspective, addressing the role that the EU has played in promoting 
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climate change policies, particularly as a global leader in pressing 
for stronger reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and sustainable 
energy policies leading up to the Copenhagen summit, and assessing 
the overall nature of EU institutions and policy- making in the energy 
field. Both chapters attempt to situate the developments in EU energy 
policy in terms of the crosscutting pressures and perspectives inevita-
bly associated with policy- making at multiple levels of governance—
the global, regional, and national. Each chapter also confronts head 
on the challenges of policy- making in an area where intergovernmen-
tal interests and institutional mechanisms coexist with supranational 
policy ambitions and community level competence and authority.
Arno Behrens and Christian Egenhofer offer an assessment of 
the EU’s approach to combating climate change by first tracing 
how the European community will likely be impacted. They show 
that the consequences will in all probability vary considerably across 
regions, with northern Europe likely to experience some positive 
effects and the southern regions, already comparatively economically 
disadvantaged, very likely to be more negatively impacted and per-
haps even devastated by extreme weather patterns and rising tem-
peratures. The authors provide a detailed summary of these projected 
impacts in order to contextualize more properly EU policy responses 
and to show that the EU is ultimately falling behind in constructing 
a more comprehensive and integrated approach to energy policy. In 
particular, they suggest that the EU needs a clearer strategy on how to 
address more effectively increasing transport emissions not only from 
rail and automobiles, but also aviation and maritime transport. At 
the global level, they argue that the EU needs to regain leadership and 
proffer options of both a “soft” approach (e.g., the United Nations 
(UN) negotiation tracks) and a “hard” one (e.g., by introducing car-
bon border taxes).
While the focus on the EU actions in the climate change area dem-
onstrate how the EU’s rise as a global actor can help legitimize and 
shape its policy efforts, Birchfield’s chapter shows how the EU institu-
tional and policy- making landscape itself has propelled a new policy 
dynamic within which each of the three core institutions can be seen 
to be championing specific aspects of the EU’s overall energy policy 
goals. The Parliament appears to be the strongest advocate of a more 
ambitious approach to sustainable energy and fighting climate change, 
while the Commission, also proactive in this area, nonetheless tends 
to take a more market oriented approach consistent with its original 
competence to pursue economic integration through liberalization 
strategies, but also pushing regulatory processes upwards to the EU 
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as opposed to national levels. The Council of Ministers, of course, 
is predictably more concerned with energy security and supply ques-
tions and related issues that go to the heart of national sovereignty, 
geostrategic interests and independence in its foreign relations. Taken 
as a whole, we might then conclude that energy policy making at the 
EU level ultimately revolves around the classic push and pull of what 
the proper scope of action is for the supranational versus intergovern-
mental level, how individual member states are negotiating this ques-
tion, and how the various EU institutions themselves are shaping the 
multilevel governance and policy- parameters of an emerging, albeit 
fragmented and incomplete, common energy policy.
The Implications of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the Future Prospects for a Common 
European Energy Policy
After years of institutional impasse and intergovernmental negotia-
tions, the Treaty of Lisbon finally entered into force on December 1, 
2009. Characterized as the new institutional foundation for a more 
democratic, transparent, and streamlined EU, the treaty provides the 
EU with a new legal basis and specific mechanisms to tackle complex 
policy challenges such as energy and the environment. It consists of 
amendments to the Union’s two main treaties, Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC), with the latter being renamed as the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). As the Birchfield chapter highlights, 
the Lisbon Treaty places the European Parliament more or less on 
an equal footing with the Council of the European Union (formerly 
the Council of Ministers) in deciding the vast majority of EU laws 
and subjects 40 new fields to the co- decision procedure. Key areas of 
increased European Parliament power include energy security. The 
Parliament’s budgetary powers are also extended to the entirety of 
the EU budget. Although the main principles and objectives of EU 
environmental policy remain largely unchanged, the treaty explic-
itly reinforces the EU’s commitment to sustainable development, the 
fight against climate change, and development of renewable energy 
sources.
Article 3.3 of the amended TEU states that the Union “shall work 
for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced eco-
nomic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
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economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environ-
ment” (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 3.3).The change of emphasis brought 
by the amendment underlines the different dimensions of sustainable 
development (economic, social, and environmental). The same article 
also introduces specific reference to the promotion of scientific and 
technological progress, which could also have implications for envi-
ronmental protection. In its relations with the wider world, the EU 
shall uphold and promote its values and contribute to the “sustainable 
development of the Earth.” To this end, the union will work toward 
the adoption of “international measures to preserve and improve the 
quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global 
natural resources (Art. 21.2 TEU).”The treaty also introduces a sin-
gle legal personality for the European Union, enabling it to conclude 
international agreements and be formally represented in international 
organizations. Furthermore, the treaty ensures consistency of EU 
policies on the global stage, by connecting the different strands of 
EU external action, such as diplomacy, security, trade, development, 
humanitarian aid, and international negotiations. Of course, all of 
these legal changes must be proven through concrete measures and 
actions taken by the EU and then fully implemented at the national 
level, so only time will tell if the political will of the member states 
matches the treaty’s aspirations.
Of particular relevance to the development of a common EU energy 
policy are those provisions specifically concerned with the subject. 
Article 4 of the TFEU formally establishes energy, for the first time, 
as an area in which competence is shared between the EU and mem-
ber states. Article 194 of the TFEU goes on to elaborate four concrete 
aims for EU energy policy:
1. to ensure the functioning of the energy market;
2. to ensure the security of energy supplies;
3. to promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the develop-
ment of new and renewable forms of energy; and
4. to promote the interconnection of energy networks.
Measures intended to achieve these aims may be established by the 
Parliament and the Council acting under the co- decision procedure. 
The treaty nevertheless contains an important caveat that could sig-
nificantly constrain the ability of the community institutions to forge 
a common energy policy. It formally confirms each member- state’s 
“right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, 
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its choice between different energy sources and the general structure 
of its energy supply.” How and when this reservation of state sov-
ereignty is invoked will do much to shape the future course of EU 
energy policy. At the same time, there are reasons to expect that this 
obstacle is not insuperable. To be sure, a connecting theme of many 
of the chapters of this volume is that, while some impressive strides 
have been made, many obstacles stand in the way of a more coherent 
and truly common energy policy in Europe. Nevertheless, as invoked 
in the Birchfield chapter, the father of European integration, Jean 
Monnet, surmised that fundamental change and deeper integration 
would likely result not through incremental treaty changes or inter-
governmental bargains but from profound crises and the solutions or 
responses put forward to deal with such crises.
It remains to be seen whether the natural gas conflicts of 2006 and 
2009, or the growing evidence of global environmental degradation 
and potential devastation caused by climate change constitute the sort 
of crises that will propel the EU and its member states into the kind 
of action that will be necessary to overcome the barriers of narrow 
national interests flowing from geopolitical and domestic economic 
concerns as well as traditional foreign policy strategies in secur-
ing national energy needs. But when Russia’s gas deliveries through 
Ukraine were interrupted and some EU member states went weeks 
without power, thus invoking calls for solidarity and community- level 
action, the EU responded. Likewise, the global environmental crisis 
related to the effects of climate change or, for that matter, the crisis-
 like nature of the rapid deletion of fossil fuels coupled with instability 
and crisis in the global economic system have formed the backdrop for 
the EU’s justification to take aggressive measures in pursuing greater 
energy efficiency and renewable, alternative and “green” sources of 
energy. Thus, it could be argued that these various crises do indeed 
constitute a political call to action or the foundation upon which a 
common EU energy policy can be forged.
Yet, it is also well to acknowledge that even before the financial 
crisis of 2008, the incipient pressures of the 2009 UN conference on 
climate change, and the most recent Russian- Ukraine gas crisis, the 
EU had acted in an ambitious and progressive way in first articulating 
the 2006 Green Paper, adopting a comprehensive action plan in 2007, 
and then developing a detailed climate and energy package in 2008, 
Even with its noted limitations, this approach seemed positioned only 
to expand and deepen. Many factors, ranging from the internal (e.g., 
member- states’ varying energy mixes, different economic structures, 
public attitudes etc.) to the external (e.g., regional and global energy 
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markets, relations with suppliers, and transit countries) will shape the 
ways in which EU member states and EU institutions work in concert 
to establish policies that will be more effective, efficient and sustain-
able. Thus, the prospects for a future common energy policy within 
the EU will depend on both the degree to which energy issues in the 
21st century are marked by crises and the institutional and economic 
logic of operating within a complex policy landscape (supranational, 
intergovernmental, and multilevel) that itself reflects the interdepen-
dencies of a policy area like that of energy and the environment.
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